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―Restlessness is discontent and discontent is the first necessity of progress. Show me a 
thoroughly satisfied man and I will show you a failure.‖ – Thomas Alva Edison 
 
For future generations unknowingly burdened by current lifestyles of irresponsible consumption of 
bounded resources resulting in rampant social inequities and unnecessarily arduous, 
insurmountable challenges. There is no better time for corrective action than the present, as the 
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Texas features a growing economy and population. The state boasts a large and well-
developed network of roads, freight railroads, and air facilities, which make the state a vital link in 
the movement of people and goods. However, as the state continues to grow in population and 
economic significance, these systems are straining to meet state, national, and even global 
needs. It is increasingly obvious to residents and state officials that Texas should consider 
implementing alternative modes of transport, including development of passenger rail, for which 
Texas currently lags behind many of its peer states. Passenger rail provides quantifiable benefits 
in displacing less energy-efficient and higher pollutant-emitting air and automobile modes while 
generating potential positive economic impacts and enhancing consumer choice and 
multimodalism. Conveniently, renewed national interest in rail has invigorated research 
measuring the applicability of passenger rail services to many different regions of the United 
 vii 
States, with the possibility that future national transportation visions will include passenger rail as 
an essential element. This thesis seeks to clarify the potential for passenger rail specifically in 
Texas through comparison and contrast with other regions and nations in the midst of new 
national-level knowledge and the changing transportation opportunities and challenges facing the 
state. Some of the ideal characteristics of successful international passenger systems exist in 
Texas, including optimal city spacing and a well-established rail network, which have fuelled 
ongoing interest demonstrated by various system proposals for high-speed intercity transportation 
in Texas over the last four decades. Despite these characteristics, the state presents a number of 
barriers to rail transport rooted in low transit use coupled with generally lower density and 
ambivalent support from politicians and residents when officials present realities of eminent 
domain and land use changes. However, with revitalized national rail interest and new federal rail 
planning requirements, the state may yet be able to work through these challenges to exploit the 
opportunities the state possesses. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
By most measurements, the completion of Interstate 70 through Glenwood Canyon in 
Colorado in 1992 finally realized the original vision for the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways (Rowe et al, 2004). This stretch of highway is likely one of the most expensive 
sections of the entire system, as the 12 miles of highway adorning steep cliffs alongside the 
winding Colorado River cost $490 million (1992 dollars, Colorado Department of Transportation, 
2006). Still, the project embodies the extensive nature of the system and provides an 
appropriately complex capstone and punctuation to the visionary project that effectively dictated 
United States transportation policy for four decades. Initial estimates placed the cost of the 
system as low as $25 billion and the total time of construction at 12 years; $114 billion ($425 
billion in 2006 dollars) and 35 years later (Minnesota Department of Transportation, 2006) one of 
the most tangible actions of government reached a sense of finality. 
The Intermodal Surface Transportation Equity Act of 1991 (ISTEA) brought the 
completion of the original Interstate Highway System vision. Quickly evident in the wake of ISTEA 
and the finishing of the Interstate System was the lack of a new coherent national transportation 
policy vision. As the Interstate System dictated national transportation policy until that time and no 
new vision existed, improvements on the nation‘s highway system expectedly continued. 
However, in the absence of clear national policy, most of the expenses were in the form of grants 
to states, which would then spend money as they saw fit. Without any national political fortitude or 
strong rationale for changing policies, states continued outlays toward highway widening, 
extension, improvement, and modification (see Figure 1, BTS, 2010). The only major difference 
seen between 1995 and 2006 is a notable increase in the outlays for air transportation for 2006, 
mostly at the federal level, likely reflecting drastic changes in airport security and airport design 




1995 2000 2006 
Highway total 90,075 62.9% 119,911 64.3% 157,613 61.3% 
Federal 1,685 1.2% 2,190 1.2% 2,972 1.2% 
State and local 88,391 61.7% 117,720 63.2% 154,641 60.1% 
Transit total 25,460 17.8% 34,828 18.7% 44,097 17.1% 
Federal 1,277 0.9% 3,677 2.0% 83 0.0% 
State and local 24,183 16.9% 31,150 16.7% 44,014 17.1% 
Rail total 1,049 0.7% 778 0.4% 1,548 0.6% 
Federal 1,023 0.7% 765 0.4% 1,528 0.6% 
State and local 26 0.0% 13 0.0% 20 0.0% 
Air total 19,250 13.4% 22,525 12.1% 41,873 16.3% 
Federal 10,807 7.5% 9,285 5.0% 23,480 9.1% 
State and local 8,443 5.9% 13,240 7.1% 18,393 7.2% 
Water total 6,623 4.6% 7,634 4.1% 10,888 4.2% 
Federal 4,314 3.0% 4,493 2.4% 6,603 2.6% 
State and local 2,309 1.6% 3,141 1.7% 4,286 1.7% 
Pipeline total 24 0.0% 46 0.0% 91 0.0% 
Federal 12 0.0% 28 0.0% 66 0.0% 
State and local 12 0.0% 18 0.0% 25 0.0% 
General support 775 0.5% 653 0.4% 1,117 0.4% 
Federal 769 0.5% 645 0.3% 1,105 0.4% 
State and local 6 0.0% 8 0.0% 12 0.0% 
Total, all modes 143,256   186,374   257,226   
Federal 19,886   21,084   35,836   
State and local 123,369   165,290   221,391   
Figure 1: Government transportation expenditures by mode (2010 dollars) for 1995, 2000, 
2006 (BTS, 2010) 
Despite the highway-centric emphasis for funds, highway congestion increased 
substantially over the last two decades (TTI‘s annual Urban Mobility Report most famously 
documents this), likely indicating that expansion of highways has not kept pace with increases in 
highway demand, expansion of alternative modes has not been executed in a way to significantly 
curb highway demand, and demand management strategies for highways specifically have made 
only minimal penetration into policymakers‘ toolboxes. 
Tucked into a proverbial corner of ISTEA, the legislation also designated the first five of 
the nation‘s high-speed rail (HSR) corridors. The designation of these corridors originally began 
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not specifically as passenger corridors, but rather as speed and safety improvement corridors, 
where federal money provided for elimination of at-grade crossings. TEA-21 added six additional 
corridors, while the DOT and Congress have brought the number of these corridors to thirteen in 
2011. In the high economic times of the mid-1990s, the prospect of higher-speed trains operating 
in the United States brought great interest to Texas as well, where foreign interests proposed 
connecting major Texas cities with a European-style high-speed passenger train system. 
Following complications that this thesis will later address, the Texas TGV system retreated from 
the Texas political mindset, although it continues to survive as a dream of localized rail 
enthusiasts. Proposals for passenger rail would resurface in the mid-to-late 2000s with the Trans-
Texas Corridor (TTC) idea, the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA), and 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) grants available in the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), followed by similar grants for FY2010. As one would expect, public 
musing about United States potential for high-speed passenger rail soared in recent years, 
particularly in highly populous regions of the country. The topic received only relatively mild 
attention in Texas, despite the proposal for passenger rail fifteen years earlier and a large (and 
growing) population. Given that national leaders continue fumbling for a definitive and 
transformative national transportation vision that will withstand the tests of time, and that high-
speed passenger rail is the only major underdeveloped intercity travel mode in the United States, 
it seems reasonable that intercity passenger rail will, at minimum, exist as an essential 
component of a future transportation vision. This thesis develops the basic concepts relating to 
the success of high-speed passenger rail worldwide, while analyzing those concepts with a Texas 
emphasis, hoping to understand what role passenger rail may have in Texas as a part of potential 
future transportation policy. Then, using lessons from past experiences, particularly the Texas 
TGV, this thesis will analyze various corridor proposals in order to provide basic cost and location 
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data. Finally, some recommendations and ideas for future work may provide direction for 
passenger rail in the state. In particular, this thesis addresses several research questions: 
 What experiences do other populous states/regions have in planning, promoting, and 
implementing passenger rail that could inform the issue in Texas? 
 What factors affect the potential for high-speed rail success, and how does Texas fare 
when considering these factors? 
 What is the current state of multi-modal connectivity in Texas and how could connectivity 
be improved to encourage freedom of movement and success of a potential high-speed 
passenger rail system? 
 How do spatial and legal considerations, particularly land use, zoning, and eminent 
domain restrictions affect corridor development? 
 What role does energy use and environmental efficiency have in a potential high-speed 
passenger rail system in Texas? 
 Where should state policymakers prioritize corridors in order to maximize success for a 
potential high-speed passenger rail system? 
 What is the effect of past and future statewide politics on the success for a potential high-
speed passenger rail system? 
 What are some innovative ideas that might aid the realization of a high-speed passenger 
rail system in Texas? 
To build valuable conclusions on the topic of high-speed passenger rail in Texas, this thesis will 
first introduce a brief history of transportation development in the state, providing background 
information for the posed research questions. Next, this thesis will move through each of these 
questions, devoting a single chapter to each. A simple evaluation tool and method is developed to 
determine the most feasible approaches to corridor prioritization. Finally, a series of conclusions 
based on the work from the prior chapters as well as directions for future work will close the 
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document. Much of the passenger rail research, especially for HSR, takes place outside the 
United States. Consequently, this document will use American units as often as possible given 
the application in Texas, however use of research and data from abroad will occasionally require 
use of SI units or a mixture of the two systems. 
HISTORY OF STATE TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES DEVELOPMENT 
The Texas transportation network is quite extensive. Stemming from a forward-thinking 
state highway program in the 1950s and 1960s, the state‘s large land area (268,000 square 
miles), and more recently a large population influx, the state-maintained road network is 
expansive, covering 192,150 lane-miles. Of this, federal and state highways comprise less than 
50% and the state‘s farm-to-market road system covers 44% of the state‘s highway lane-miles, 
the largest segment (Texas 2030 Committee 2010). Indicative of the state‘s vast highway 
network, Interstate 10 from Anthony, TX (at the New Mexico state line) to Orange, TX (at the 
Louisiana state line) forms the longest segment of interstate highway within a single state at 880 
miles. With Texas‘ largely agricultural history, roads have played a major role in the economic 
development of the state (hence the name ―farm-to-market‖), which also helps to explain the 
extensive system. 
What initially began as trails blazed by Native Americans and Spanish explorers became 
Texas‘ first roads. Remaining largely unimproved for many years, the emergence of hard-paved 
roads did not occur until well into the twentieth century, when the state highway department was 
founded in 1917. By 1929, Texas boasted nearly 18,000 miles of roads, of which approximately 
half were hard-surfaced. With Great Depression efforts by the department to provide jobs, some 
additional 3,000 miles of roads were constructed in the next six years, with simultaneous 
improvements to facilities benefiting drainage, visibility, ride quality, and general safety. World 
War II placed notable limits on supplies, thereby curtailing expansion of the state‘s road system 
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until the post-war era. However, the abrupt dismissal of these limitations following the war period 
ushered in the largest period of development in the Texas roadway system. As early as 1945, 
state transportation authorities approved additional construction for 7,500 miles of new rural 
highways. This legislative encouragement for development of the state rural road system 
continued for several years, reaching its peak in 1962 where the program expanded to include 
50,000 miles of roads at a cost of at least $23 million annually (more than $170 million annually in 
2011 when adjusted for inflation). Simultaneously, the nationwide system of Interstate and 
Defense Highways commenced in 1956, for which states completed construction and received 
federal reimbursement. By 1989, Texas completed nearly 42,000 centerline miles of secondary 
highways (the largest in the world), and more than 3,000 miles of Interstate highways, the 
majority of the Texas contribution to the system (Kite, 2011). As with much of the United States, 
the demand for roads ballooned in Texas over the last six decades as vehicles miles traveled 
(VMT) increased drastically at the expense of most other modes of travel (see Figure 2 below). 
Additionally, the state, like many others, has struggled recently to cover the maintenance costs of 
existing roads while also providing additional capacity to permit continued growth in VMT. It is in 
this context that non-road-based travel approaches are of renewed local, state, and federal 
interest for both passengers and freight. 
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Figure 2: VMT per capita in Texas and the United States 1970-2009 (Dallas Indicators, 2011, 
FHWA, 2011, and Texas Department of Public Safety, 2011) 
Rail has historically played a large role in Texas‘ transportation, primarily by providing 
connections to the state‘s agriculture areas. As with roads, Texas boasts the nation‘s largest 
network of freight rails, with 44 railroads operating nearly 15,000 miles of track, including trackage 
rights. Large Class I railroads operate a majority of these rails, linking major port and border cities 
of the state with other important freight centers of the United States. Texas leads all states in 
terminated rail-tons shipped. Major east-west rail movement is largely comprised of unit trains on 
UP tracks connecting the nation‘s coastal ports. BNSF dominates north-south movement, which 
serves the coal-rich Powder River Basin in Wyoming, providing an energy source for much of the 
state (TxDOT, 2010c). 
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Through 1850 and 1860, transportation still presented a major problem to settlers in 
Texas, who largely found themselves along rivers or the Texas coast. A number of attempts to 
develop rail lines were complicated due to lack of capital and land, but by 1861, nine companies 
operated 470 miles of track, much of it in and around Houston connecting different port facilities. 
The insufficient local capital to fund railroads and East Coast financiers wary of a frontier state 
required that the state, counties, and cities issue bonds to provide the necessary funding for 
many of the railroads. Land grant laws passed in the 1850s also encouraged railroad 
development. Following the Civil War, most of Texas‘ railroads remained functional unlike many 
railroads in confederate states, but suffered from years of overuse and neglect. However, with 
land grants, railroads began to crisscross the state by the 1870s. Texas connected to the national 
rail network in 1872 when the Missouri, Kansas, and Texas railroad met existing tracks in 
Denison. By 1890, rail had seen great increases in track with more than 6,000 miles constructed 
since 1880. With the conglomeration of the Gould system and monopolization of railroads in the 
next decades, the national rail system would reach its peak in 1916, although more than forty-five 
percent of Texas rail was constructed after this. The Texas Railroad Commission was created in 
1891 as a regulatory body to counteract the increasing power and scandalous actions of the rail 
monopoly. Electric Interurban Railways made a foray into Texas rail transportation in the first 
three decades of the twentieth century. About 500 miles of interurban railways were eventually 
constructed primarily for passenger service. With increasing downward pressure on demand for 
rail due to the influx of personal automobiles, the Great Depression, and World War II, most of the 
interurban railways ceased operations by 1940. Streamlined diesel passenger service operated 
between Texas‘ major cities beginning late in the 1930s. Following several successful years of 
operation and increased positive economic outlook after World War II, diesel passenger rail 
operators purchased new equipment and entered a period of extensive passenger operation. This 
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time would be short-lived with competition from automobiles and passenger jets rapidly siphoning 
demand for passenger rail. Amtrak absorbed the remaining passenger rail operations in 1970 
(Rieder, 2011 and Werner, 2011). Figure 3 shows the contrast in passenger services in the 
twentieth century, particularly the drastic change between 1950 and 1970. Since 1970, Texas 
continues to operate the largest rail network of any state in the nation, although with limited 
passenger service. While railroads once connected the far-flung rural and agricultural regions of 
the state, they contribute only a minor amount to commodities moved by rail in the state at 
present. Coal is by far the largest commodity terminating in Texas, although stone and gravel, 
chemicals, food products, and intermodal freight also terminate in significant quantities. Outgoing 
freight has a similar makeup, with the major exception of coal. Petroleum is a major commodity 




Figure 3:  Passenger rail in Texas during twentieth century (Christensen, 1977) 
In addition to the well-developed network of roads and freight rails, Texas also leads the 
nation in air facilities. Texas has more airports (292) and landing facilities (more than 1600) than 
any other US state, and asserts itself nationally in passenger air travel (TxDOT, 2010b). Three of 
the nation‘s largest passenger air carriers – American, Continental (United), and Southwest – are 
all headquartered in Texas. American and Continental/United have large hub operations at 
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Dallas/Ft.Worth and Houston Intercontinental airports, respectively, while Southwest provides 
frequent intercity service between Texas‘ major cities and other cities in the state and nationwide. 
The history of air transportation is expectedly shorter than that of roads and rail, but it 
influences the trajectory of Texas transportation systems development at present. World War I 
first brought aircraft to Texas, where new military operations were developed and student pilots 
appreciated the quality flying weather and level terrain. Texans quickly became inclined to utilize 
flying as a means for transport in a large state with relatively large distances between cities. The 
1930s and 1940s brought Texas‘ first commercial service from Braniff Airways operating out of 
Dallas Love Field. American Airlines also entered the Dallas market, providing services that 
linked the city with both coasts of the country. World War II saw a great influx of military pilots 
training at many of Texas‘ military bases. After the war, the demand for general aviation greatly 
increased as the state‘s increased business interests and connections to both coasts necessitate 
new urban airports. Houston Intercontinental airport opened in 1969, while Dallas-Fort Worth 
International airport saw its first flights in 1973. These facilities continue to impact state and 
national air travel, as they have both been adopted as major hub cities for the commercial airline 
operations of Continental (soon to be United) Airlines, and American Airlines, respectively. Austin 
Bergstrom International Airport (opened in 1997) is one of the newest airports in the nation and a 
successful demonstration of conversion from military operations to commercial and general 
aviation. The other major airports in the state have undergone recent improvements to increase 
capacity. Dallas Love Field and Houston Hobby will undergo renovations in the coming years, 
largely funded by the majority carrier, Southwest Airlines. Houston Intercontinental completed the 
Terminal E expansion in 2004, while Dallas-Ft. Worth International opened international Terminal 
D and the sleek Skylink people mover system in 2005.  
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POPULATION GROWTH 
Texas‘ economic growth over the last thirty years is incredibly noteworthy. Though 
various cycles of economic growth and decline particularly affected Texas‘ peer states, Texas 
generally seems to have weathered these with relative ease. Since World War II, Texas 
decennial population growth has exceeded US growth as a whole by at least 5%, with this rate 
closer to 10% in more recent decades. Texas growth has continued to be higher than that of the 
entire country by nearly 10% (US Census Bureau, 2010a). This continued growth led Texas to 
pass New York in the 1990s, becoming the second most populous state in the nation. Texas 
cities continue to expand (see Figure 4 below), with three of the ten largest cities proper in the 
United States located in Texas – Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio. In terms of metropolitan 
population, Dallas/Ft. Worth and Houston are the central cities in the fourth and sixth largest 
MSAs in the United States, respectively, as of 2009 Census estimates. Together, they have 
grown by more than 24% since 2000 and now boast a combined population of more than thirteen 
million people. Other Texas metropolitan areas have seen similar growth rates since 2000. The 
Austin-Round Rock MSA has seen 36% growth, adding nearly 500,000 people, while the San 
Antonio MSA has grown by nearly 400,000, or about 21% from 2000 to 2009 (US Census 
Bureau, 2010b). While not confined to the eastern half of the state, growth has been slower in the 
other areas of the state; many of the mid-sized cities and rural counties in the western half of the 
state have seen stagnant population growth and/or decline over the last twenty years. The major 
exceptions to this include border cities in the Rio Grande Valley and El Paso, for which growth 
rates mirror the rest of the state. Cities in the border regions of South Texas, such as Laredo and 
McAllen, have experienced growth in excess of 25% since 2000, while El Paso has demonstrated 
a more modest, yet still significant growth rate of 10% over the same period (US Census Bureau, 
2010b). 
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Texas population growth over the last decade presents a fascinating trend as Texas 
capitalizes on the overall national shift of population both south and west. Within state lines, 
however, this growth is heavily concentrated in the metropolitan areas, particularly those in the 
eastern half of the state. The Texas State Data Center estimates (0.5 scenario, which was utilized 
for the update of the Texas Rail Plan in 2010) that the state will add an additional 10 million 
people by 2040, with 92% of these new residents living in metropolitan counties of 50,000 people 
or more. As trends have suggested in recent years, the population of the state‘s rural areas, 
particularly west of the I-35 corridor, will continue to lose people as migration to urban areas 
continues. Contrary to perhaps some stereotypes, Texas is already a highly urbanized state with 
about 85% of residents in metropolitan areas; Texas State Data Center estimates suggest that 
this number will only increase. Population increases naturally correlate with increased demand for 
transportation, as one intuitively expects. Urban population growth in particular results in enough 
demand to justify service by higher speed modes, and thus provides an impetus for considering 
higher speed transportation modes connecting the urban areas in Texas. 
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Figure 4: Population Texas‘ fifteen largest MSAs 2010-2040 (Texas State Data Center, 
2008) 
ECONOMIC CHANGES AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
The Texas economy has grown in both scale and diversity. While much of the state‘s 
economy was oriented around extensive oil and gas operations well into the 1980s, Texas has 
since attracted a variety of different industries to its cities and suburbs, including relocations of 
corporate headquarters for such household names as American Airlines (AMR), JCPenney, and 
Kimberly-Clark to the Dallas/Ft. Worth area, for example. Houston, in addition to retaining 
continued affiliation with the energy sector, has developed a strong relationship with the 
healthcare and the aerospace industries, in part due to the proximity of the Texas Medical Center 
in central Houston, and the Johnson Space Center in the southeastern suburbs of the city. As of 
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2011, 51 Fortune 500 corporations located corporate headquarters in Texas, a leader in the 
United States, along with New York (57) and California (53) (Fortune, 2011). While many of these 
companies are still energy-related and headquartered in the Dallas and Houston metropolitan 
areas, San Antonio and Austin are also home to diversifying economies, especially the high-tech 
and biotech industries in Austin, and the communications and healthcare industries in San 
Antonio. For instance, Dell Computers calls Round Rock (a northern Austin suburb) home, and 
San Antonio houses the headquarters for media conglomerate Clear Channel Communications. 
The state‘s central geographic location has led many companies with large distribution operations 
to set up office in the state. Texas‘ extensive system of roads, airports, and freight rail make the 
state well-connected to the rest of the nation for goods movement. Figure 5 illustrates the 
economic makeup of Texas in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Worth noting is the apparent 
replacement of manufacturing jobs with service-oriented jobs, and the decreasing proportion of 






Figure 5: Texas private employment by SIC group, selected years (BEA, 2009) 
As has been demonstrated in recent years, many people in Texas and the United States 
are accustomed to an economic system sustained only by continued growth, which fuels cyclical 
increases in many economic aspects (and great discomfort when prior growth rates are not 
sustained, as this most recent recession demonstrated). Transportation is no exception to this, as 
RA Smith (2003) describes whimsically: 
―Everyone has personal knowledge of the increases in mobility that have occurred in their 
lives. Whereas today‘s grandparents travelled within a relatively small compass, often 
only near their local town or village, to travel across the globe both for business and 
pleasure is now relatively commonplace.‖ 
Succinctly capturing this idea, Schafer and Victor (2000) illustrate that increases in income bring 
consistent increases in travel across different global populations. Texas shows this relationship 
between vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) per capita and gross state product (GSP) over the last 35 
years (Figure 6), although slower per capita VMT growth in recent years diverges slightly from 
this clear trend. 
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Figure 6: Gross state product (2005 dollars) per capita and vehicle-miles traveled per capita 
in Texas 1978-2007 (BEA, 2011, Dallas Indicators, 2011, FHWA, 2011, and Texas 
Department of Public Safety, 2011) 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that continued growth in Texas will lead to continued increases 
in travel demand. However, the phenomenon of the relatively constant travel time budget across 
incomes, considered by Schafer, indicates the challenging prospect that increases in travel 
demand will not be met without improvements in travel speed. This implies that as people 
become wealthier and societies grow economically as a whole, demand for faster transportation 
grows. Markets where rail can offer a speed advantage over existing modes may capture a 
growing sector of transportation demand. Considering Texas currently has minimal passenger rail 
service operating at speeds capable of competing with personal automobiles, much less 
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airplanes, the potential of passenger rail services at speeds faster or at least competitive with 
existing modes is high. 
CONGESTION AND DEMAND CHALLENGES 
Even as the strength and magnitude of the economy increases with continued population 
growth, Texas‘ transportation systems increasingly strain to meet the state‘s mobility needs. TTI‘s 
Urban Mobility Report (Schrank et al, 2009) indicates that a reversal of this trend is unlikely. 
Texas, despite being a populous majority-urban state with 85% of the state‘s population in urban 
areas, demonstrates a very strong car culture. Because of this car culture, inadequate vehicular 
capacity and high demand have created an exigent mobility problem. Since 1990, growth in 
population and VMT in the state‘s major urban areas has drastically outpaced growth in lane-
miles of highway. This situation is not unique to Texas, but the recent surge of these in Texas is 
likely more exacerbated than in other states, particularly those growing more slowly. In an 
extreme case, VMT in El Paso have increased 72% since 1990, yet growth in lane miles has only 
increased 10%. While not as daunting, other large Texas cities still have seen growth in VMT at 
more than twice the growth in lane miles. In some areas, this may reflect the state‘s ambitious 
highway building program from previous decades. While additional lanes are just now beginning 
to reach capacity, auto traffic congestion is still worsening. Other cities have demonstrated 
ongoing mobility problems that continue to worsen. The Dallas/Ft. Worth area experienced a 43-
hour average increase in traveler delay from 1982–2007, second only to the Washington DC 
area, according to TTI. Other major urban areas in Texas also saw above-average increases in 
delay, indicating that mobility issues are growing faster in Texas than in the nation as a whole. 
Congested roadways do not form an entire picture of Texas‘ mobility issues. The nation‘s 
largest freight rail network arguably faces greater congestion issues. Texas‘ central location on 
the North American continent makes it an important intersection point for freight with many 
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different origins and destinations. San Antonio, Fort Worth, and Houston pose some of the most 
egregious bottlenecks in the nation‘s freight rail network, and many of the major rail lines in these 
areas currently operate at 70-80% of capacity (―Level-of-service D‖) (Cambridge Systematics, 
2007). More importantly, anticipated growth in freight rail operations by 2035 is expected to 
challenge the Texas system if no improvements are made. A majority of the Class I rail lines will 
experience extreme congestion and delays as they will operate near or above capacity, 
particularly in the eastern half of the state. TxDOT has recently funded a number of freight rail 
studies across the state that identify nearly $4 billion in improvements and an additional $3.6 
billion in different planning cases that will benefit both the public and private railroads (TxDOT, 
2010c). Outside of identification, most of the improvements have not progressed beyond paper. 
Developing passenger rail operations on existing congested freight facilities would be a major 
challenge causing additional capacity constraints and requiring additional costly improvements. 
Thus, locating passenger rail corridors in alignments with no freight rail operational impact is 
essential. 
As GSP and population continue to increase, air travel is forecast to increase, requiring 
upgrades in terminal space and runway facilities (DFW Airport 2010) assuming no changes in 
mode choice. The 2010 Texas Airport System Plan (TASP) and the FAA Terminal Area Forecast 
(2010) estimate that Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport (DFW) and Houston Bush 
Intercontinental Airport (IAH) together account for more than 70% of passenger enplanements in 
Texas, with respective increases of 2.5% and 3.5% annually through 2030. Statewide 
enplanements at commercial service airports are forecast to grow more than 50 % by 2030 to 
more than 100 million annually. Airport master plans detail expensive capital improvements over 
the next few decades. Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) demonstrates the boldest expansion 
plans, with a total inflated cost of more than $9 billion by 2025. This provides for the construction 
of two additional runways and 50 new aircraft gates, of which 35 are designated for regional 
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service. Figure 7 shows other planned development at Texas commercial airports (although the 
list omits some airports in the state). Development of passenger rail services, particularly those 
that interface with Texas‘ larger airports, may provide a less expensive and more flexible option 
for regional and state travel, while simultaneously limiting additional land taking if the right-of-way 
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Lubbock (LBB) $235 (2006) 2026 Master Plan Update  
McAllen (MFE) $184 2024 Master Plan Update 
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San Antonio (SAT) $1,003 2030 Vision 2050 Master 
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Texarkana (TXK) $133 2022 Master Plan Study 
2003 
 
Tyler (TYR) $183 (2006) 2025 Master Plan Update 
2006 
 
Wichita Falls (SPS) $55 (2010) 2029 Master Plan Update 
2010 
 
Total $15,212    
Note: Expenditures are inflated for individual project years at a given airport unless 
otherwise indicated 
Figure 7: Planned expansion expenditures at major Texas airports 
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ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
The costs, energy effects, and environmental effect of capacity expansion affect the state 
at an increasing rate. Despite the many wide-open spaces in the state, environmental issues are 
catching up with Texas. As of 2004, Texas‘ two largest metropolitan areas do not meet National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for 8-hour ozone. The Houston area falls into ―severe 
non-attainment‖ – while Dallas/Ft. Worth has remained at ―moderate‖ for the last seven years. 
The Beaumont-Port Arthur area also falls into the ―moderate‖ non-attainment for ozone (US EPA 
2010). El Paso is a non-attainment area for PM10. Texas has made some progress recently in 
environmentally-friendly renewable energy sources, and now leads the nation in wind power 
generation at the state level (AWEA, 2010). However, the state‘s warm climate, heavy reliance on 
automobiles, extensive industrial operations, and less efficient building codes still contribute to 
very high energy use. Compared with its peer states, Texas‘ per-capita residential energy use 
was 65.2 billion BTU, higher than both California (42.4 billion BTU) and New York (59.7 billion 
BTU), although slightly less than Florida (69.9 billion BTU). Taking Texas industries into 
consideration, Texas energy consumption (across all uses) per real (2000) dollar of GDP was at 
12,500 BTU per chained dollar. California, New York, and Florida were all less at 5400, 4100, and 
7400 BTU per chained dollar, respectively (US DOE, 2010). A summary of various energy 
consumption statistics is seen in Figure 8 below, and they clearly demonstrate that Texas energy 
consumption is relatively high. As energy consumption is high, so is the portion of that energy 
consumed by transportation. While transportation amounts to 27% (which has been slowly but 
steadily growing since the 1970s) of the total energy use in the United States, it accounts for 
more than 70% of national petroleum consumption, which alone is about 180% of domestic 
petroleum production. Considered differently, 96% of national transportation energy consumed is 
petroleum-based. Nationally, highway modes consume 80.7% of transportation energy alone. As 
transportation contributes about 25% of total statewide energy use, it can be reasonably assumed 
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that these values on petroleum consumption are similar in Texas as well. While Texas has 
accomplished great economic growth in recent decades, it has not come without costs in terms of 































California 229.1 88.24 5.4 2.08 
Florida 241.4 82.53 7.4 2.53 
New York 204.9 57.47 4.1 1.15 
Texas 475.3 117.87 12.5 3.1 
United 
States 
326.5 92.26 8.6 2.43 
Figure 8: Summary of energy use in Texas and peer states (Davis and Diegel, 2010) 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Texas plays a crucial role in the development of transportation infrastructure. The modern 
influence of the state on air and rail transportation reflects decades of economic growth and 
transportation development bringing Texas to the mobility forefront. Though not constant over 
time, the Texas economic growth of recent years reflects a growing population in major cities 
throughout the state and a broadening in the economic base throughout multiple sectors. It is 
reasonable to expect that this economic growth will instigate newfound transportation demand. 
With this demand, the state struggles to maintain a road-focused system that meets needs. 
Increasing congestion on all the state‘s transportation facilities, particularly roadways, threatens 
to stymie the economic growth so lauded by the state‘s residents. The state struggles with energy 
use and environmental degradation resulting from the state‘s automobile reliance and fossil fuel-
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based energy sources. Passenger rail implementation will not solve all these issues but is 
nevertheless an important and overlooked transportation mode that Texas ought to consider.   
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Chapter 2: Texas Rail in a National Context 
NATIONAL RAIL POLICIES 
National passenger rail in the United States is practically synonymous with Amtrak. Even 
those non-federal agencies (primarily state DOTs) that enable intercity passenger rail operations 
commonly utilize the Amtrak branding for their service. Since the creation of the National Railroad 
Passenger Corporation in 1971 (operating as Amtrak), federal-level policymaking on passenger 
rail remains largely related to the appropriation of funds for Amtrak operations and maintenance, 
and occasionally capital improvements. Because Amtrak lacks a dedicated funding source in its 
initial creation, the Congressional song and dance on the issue of Amtrak appropriations re-
appears every few years. Ideological fiscal conservatives exhibit zero tolerance for direct 
subsidies while Amtrak defenders and mild critics remind those vocal opponents that typically a 
―for profit‖ label, such as that established for Amtrak in its creation, allows for government-
supplied capital infrastructure (as for highway and air modes) with private operators covering the 
cost of moving people and goods through airports and on roadways (Dunn and Perl, 1997). This 
argument about federal support for Amtrak isn‘t new, although representatives for regions served 
by Amtrak have engaged in quirky political games in the appropriations process since Amtrak‘s 
creation (Baron, 1990).  
Although the 1994 congressional elections enabled perhaps the strongest round of calls 
for zero tolerance on Amtrak appropriations, it is possible that the rail operator emerged with 
some degree of reinvention and spirit for rebranding. In the coming fifteen years, Congress 
concocted various deals to keep Amtrak appropriations flowing and to complete the Northeast 
Corridor capital improvements. Some of the stipulations included self-sufficiency by 2003 (not 
achieved), and reduction in the dining and sleeper services which were a drain on revenues. 
Until the 2000s, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) engaged in relatively little 
planning or capital improvement for passenger rail, acting primarily as a safety organization. 
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States pursuing passenger rail typically worked through the confines of Amtrak, with some 
success, while FRA remained generally uninvolved with the grant process for passenger 
improvements. Gradually FRA planning and grant involvement has increased, although safety still 
dictates much of the agency‘s work. 
Probably the legislation most affecting Amtrak came in 2008 despite President George 
W. Bush‘s initial veto threats. PRIIA (Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act) 
addressed a number of items related to the success of passenger rail in Texas by focusing on 
improving operations, service, and facilities for Amtrak‘s long-distance intercity routes. Two of 
Amtrak‘s more maligned long-distance routes – The Sunset Limited and Texas Eagle – operate  
in Texas, and were subjects of performance reviews. Otherwise, this legislation marked the first 
major action by the FRA on planning and implementing passenger rail corridors in states, Texas 
included. It is unclear exactly what future role the federal government will take in developing a 
national rail policy that impacts Texas, although it appears that the DOT will likely take a larger 
role in guiding national passenger and freight rail improvements than in the past. In a departure 
from the present, it is possible and quite likely that Amtrak may not operate intercity passenger 
rail in some states and regions, yet corridors may still be eligible for federal funding through new 
or increased grant programs. While the President‘s national rail goals may be in temporary limbo 
given budget compromises for FY 2012, the greater national role in developing a broader 
passenger rail network appears likely to survive in the long term (Rutter, 2011). Because of this, 
Texas would be well-advised to prepare the necessary documentation and complete the essential 
state DOT structure updates to be eligible for future national rail funding. Even if the Texas state 
legislature were to suddenly embrace passenger rail for the state, such a project would likely 
require additional resources of federal origin, as has been demonstrated by plans in other states.  
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TEXAS’ FREIGHT RAIL ROLE 
As noted earlier, the state anticipates increases in freight traffic over its railroads in the 
coming years. Yet, deregulation in the 1980s contributed to reduction in excess rail capacity, as 
unprofitable routes were abandoned. As seen in Bhat et al (2006), more than 1200 miles of track 
were abandoned in Texas from 1991 to 1999, even as freight tonnage grew by approximately 
40% over a similar period (1991 to 1998). The abandonment of rail infrastructure affects the 
capacity available for both freight and passenger rail services. With shortages of available right-
of-way in metropolitan areas, shared use of freight rail by proposed passenger rail operations 
commonly exists as the only feasible option. However, as private for-profit enterprises, railroads 
will only allow the use of their track under conditions that will not undermine service quality for 
their customers. Specifically included in the recent Texas State Rail Plan, UP and BNSF have 
adopted guidelines for passenger use of freight rail corridors: 
 Safety should not be compromised. 
 Capacity must be provided for current and future freight operations. 
 Compensation must be made to the railroads for any additional costs imposed by 
expanded passenger rail service, such as new infrastructure, increased maintenance 
costs, and any other related operational costs. 
 Liability should be capped. 
BNSF and UP also expressed concerns about additional capacity on their lines to prevent 
degradation of operations as a result of accommodating passenger rail services. Regarding 
shared right-of-way, UP stated that such an arrangement would only be permitted if additional 
right-of-way was purchased and rail lines were separated by fifty feet. Specifically considering 
planning for high-speed rail corridors along existing rail lines, freight railroads expressed 
concerns over grade separation assuming barriers would impact access to freight customers 
opposite any new HSR tracks (TxDOT, 2010c). In any case, implementation of passenger rail in 
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Texas requires collaboration with freight railroads in the state. At minimum, passenger rail 
operations may negotiate with freight railroads for access to tracks or right-of-way near existing 
intermodal stations (many of which remain in existence from a time when current railroads 
operated passenger services decades ago). However, future passenger rail improvements likely 
will require more than this. Specifically, these improvements may require acquisition of railroad, 
shared or acquired right-of-way, and negotiations with freight railroads for operations on their 
existing tracks. Passenger rail facilitators should thus engage freight railroads as primary 
stakeholders in any prospective passenger rail plans in Texas.  
AMTRAK SERVICES 
At present, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) is the sole provider of 
intercity passenger rail service in Texas. All the major metropolitan areas in the state feature 
Amtrak service, although the cities themselves are not all directly connected and many of the 
connections are made by Amtrak Thruway bus services. Three routes serve Texas, with the 
shorter-distance Heartland Flyer connecting Fort Worth with Oklahoma City. The Sunset Limited 
connects Los Angeles and New Orleans with intermediate stops at El Paso, San Antonio, and 
Houston, among others. The Texas Eagle links Chicago and San Antonio via St. Louis, Little 
Rock, Dallas, Fort Worth, and Austin, with other stops as well. While Amtrak ridership has shown 
growth over the last ten years, it still comprises only a small portion of intercity travel in the state 
with about 320,000 passengers annually in 2009. All the major cities in Texas are served by 
stations in central business districts, with intermodal rail connections available in Dallas and Fort 
Worth, and bus connections available elsewhere.  
Heartland Flyer 
The Heartland Flyer operates on 72 miles of BNSF track between Fort Worth and 
Oklahoma City with a single daily trip in each direction. Since commencing service in 1999, the 
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Heartland Flyer has demonstrated increased ridership and represents one of several examples of 
relatively successful shorter-distance intercity service sponsored by states served (Oklahoma and 
Texas in this case). Ridership has increased from about 25,000 annually in 1999 to more than 
60,000 annually in 2009. Currently the trip takes about 4 hours 15 minutes, or about 1 hour longer 
than by personal automobile. Oklahoma and Texas are evaluating improvements that could 
decrease route run times, thereby increasing ridership. TxDOT also requested a feasibility study 
for a potential station in the village of Krum, just outside Denton. Such a station would provide 
access to central Denton County, one of the state‘s fastest growing counties. The Heartland Flyer 
experienced volatile on-time performance over the last ten years, but recently has performed well, 
with an on-time performance rate of 86% in 2009.  
Texas Eagle 
Operating over 1300 miles of track, the Texas Eagle links San Antonio, Austin, Fort 
Worth, and Dallas with Little Rock, St. Louis, and Chicago, via East Texas. Within Texas, the 
route operates on a combination of UP and BNSF track. Three days per week, the train connects 
with the Sunset Limited for through service to Los Angeles. After being threatened with 
discontinuation in 1996, the Texas Eagle has seen increased ridership and revenues, with 
ridership roughly doubling between 1998 and 2009. Historically, the route suffered from dismal 
on-time performance, with an on-time performance rate below 30% between 2006 and 2008. 
Perhaps as a result of reduced freight traffic due to economic issues, on-time performance has 
greatly improved in recent years.  
Sunset Limited 
Traveling roughly east-west across the southern tier of the United States, the Sunset 
Limited operates for approximately 950 miles in Texas, providing nearly 50% of the trackage 
between the current termini of Los Angeles and New Orleans. Amtrak terminated service 
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between New Orleans and Jacksonville following Hurricane Katrina and has not restored service, 
although Congressional requirements dictate a plan to restore service imminently. Ridership on 
the Sunset Limited remained flat or slightly declined over the last ten years, with a horrendous 
record for on-time performance. Not until 2009 did the train achieve any better than a 33% on-
time performance rate in a given year.   
LESSONS FROM TEXAS TGV 
Initiated by a German-funded private consultant presentation to the Texas Legislature in 
1987, a HSR venture quickly became a political hot-topic in the state. While subsequent 
legislation didn‘t incorporate the proposal itself, it did permit the Texas Turnpike Authority (TTA) 
to investigate for itself the feasibility of HSR. This state-funded investigation culminated in the 
creation of the Texas High Speed Rail Authority (THSRA), where legislation directed the authority 
to review franchise applications and select a franchisee if a HSR system was determined to be in 
the public interest. However, because the completed study already demonstrated need and acted 
as the required proof, the awarding of a franchisee only remained as the final hurdle. The initial 
TTA evaluation recommended using technology capable of 150 mph or greater based on the cost 
of about $8 million per mile, where other estimates by the Transportation Research Board ranged 
from $10 - $18 million per mile (1990 dollars). The quick-action legislation may have prevented 
thorough evaluation of the most cost-effective technology. Nevertheless, the study concluded that 
the project was economically sound although it required the use of public funds to cover initial 
capital costs and did not analyze the project using a benefit-cost structure. 
The act creating the THSRA, Senate Bill 1190, known as the Texas High Speed Rail Act, 
allowed the project to move forward through a level of limited scrutiny unusual in large 
transportation projects, merely displaying ―public convenience and necessity‖, although the act 
also forbade the expenditure of public funds on the project. After submitting an application and 
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the required $500,000 fee, two consortia presented possible HSR projects to the Authority. Both 
centered on competing European interests, the consortia offered slightly different approaches to 
the scope of work, technology selection, and financing. Following the earlier German 
involvement, the Texas FasTrac proposal included two lines linking Dallas with Houston and San 
Antonio estimated to cost $5.22 billion. Based on a review of German construction, the FasTrac 
consortium concluded that the 1989 TTA study estimates resulted in considerable error. By 2018, 
ridership would reach 11.7 million passengers annually and yearly revenue would exceed $500 
million according to the proposal. The Texas TGV proposal (initially known as the Texas High 
Speed Rail Corporation) featured French technology and planned for a three-phase approach 
linking Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio in a triangular shape. By 2018, the system would see 
22 million passengers providing about $930 million in revenue annually with an initial capital cost 
of $5.8 billion. The routes of these two proposals are seen in more detail in Chapter 7. 
Almost immediately, issues arose with both of the rail proposals. In 1990, THSRA 
adopted its own administrative requirements that prescribed the selection of a team of advisors to 
independently review the proposals. The advising consultants concluded for both applicants that 
they 1) demonstrated the need for HSR, 2) exhibited capabilities of implementing a HSR project, 
and 3) did not demonstrate financial plans consistent with the requirements of the Texas HSR 
Act. Additionally, TTI reviewed ridership estimates for both proposals and determined that the 
FasTrac projections, while understandable, were optimistic, while the Texas TGV projections 
were not comprehensible and overly optimistic. Most importantly, however, the Texas HSR Act 
dictated that public funds shall not be utilized for the project in any way, despite the public support 
both consortia required. Considering the shortcomings of the applications and criticisms by the 
independent reviewing groups, the project should have conceivably stalled at this point. Yet, 
these valuable feedback tools do not explain the rationale for awarding a franchise. The likely 
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deciding factor was a lead partner in the Texas TGV consortium making a bold declaration that 
the project could be built without public funds. 
The THSRA awarded the franchise in May 1991, with a primary requirement of 
generating a commitment for equity financing of $170 million before January 1993. Nearly 40 
scoping meetings took place in counties throughout the state while interagency operations 
sprouted. However, the looming litigation with Southwest Airlines hovered over the 
accomplishments of the THSRA and may have contributed to increased difficulty in attracting 
outside investors. Seeing this difficulty, THSRA extended by one year the deadline for equity 
financing. Texas TGV produced updated alignments within the year, but was unable to attract 
significant capital. As the extended deadline approached, Texas TGV delivered a memo to the 
Authority that the deadline would not be met. The months ahead (early 1994) saw Texas TGV 
terminate basic environmental studies and dismiss contractors while the THSRA determined its 
next steps. By August 1994, a settlement was reached to end the franchise agreement between 
THSRA and Texas TGV. 
The THSRA and Texas TGV experiment obviously relate most closely to any future HSR 
venture in Texas. While other regions may have more recent experience, none are as directly 
implementable or as instructive based on similarity. Some of the primary conclusions and 
recommendations based on different post-mortem analyses are as follows: 
 Planners must integrate rail into the planning process beyond merely promoting 
―intermodalism‖ or including additional modes in excess of prepared plans. Rail itself may 
be the best solution to identified issues, whether congestion, environmental impact, 
excess demand, or inadequate capacity, thus requiring a system-wide approach where 
rail has parity at minimum with other modes. Experience demonstrates that 
improvements in transportation require federal assistance. Federal programs reflect 
national priorities and provide leadership, thereby enabling and informing state-level rail 
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proposals that integrate and function well with one another. HSR will not survive 
politically as a stand-alone issue; aside from the Southwest Airline litigation with the 
Texas TGV project, a ―change in the traditional paradigms…will yield a change in the 
traditional alliances‖ (Burns, undated). Movement toward operations as ―transportation 
companies‖ rather than the ―airline industry‖ and the ―automotive industry‖ may remove 
enemies. 
 While planning may take place at the state level, implementation must occur at the local 
level. Modeling and planning tools certainly have a place in preparing for a HSR project, 
but cannot substitute for human contact that permits the public to buy in to the project. 
Merely listening, however, is inadequate; customer-based plans responding to needs 
allow for openness of data and information exchange, which in turn provides enhanced 
credibility, trustworthiness, and collaboration. Marginalized groups, including low-income 
households, people of color, and small communities in general tend to have inadequate 
control over the placement of transportation facilities. Soliciting input early with these 
groups may permit collaboration and/or compromise of the type that would have kept the 
Texas TGV project alive. 
 Segmentation provides an opportunity to break a massive project, such as Texas TGV, 
into more manageable pieces. The total dollar amount of a smaller segment may entice 
and enable both public and private sector funding more easily. Generally, a segmented 
approach will reveal that not all project sections have the same needs; as Burns 
(undated) puts it, ―Texas is not monolithic‖, and no single solution will solve the state‘s 
transportation issues, bringing credence to the notion that separate segmented 
approaches may be advantageous.  
 The state should not abdicate its role in planning transportation infrastructure. As an 
extension of government, presumably whose goal is to protect both citizens and the 
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environment, particularly related to transportation, the state DOT should maintain a 
strong planning role. The private sector, while a valuable partner, should focus on tasks 
most closely related to the primary outcome of profitability. Maintaining management by 
the state also prevents conflicts with eminent domain benefiting a private entity. 
 Employing existing rights-of-way to the fullest extent possible will limit impacts on 
landowners and limit costs. While technical issues affect the utilization of highway rights-
of-way or rail rights-of-way, reports indicate that from a safety standpoint, it is certainly 
feasible (Petersen et al, 1985). Still, existing rights-of-way have their own issues and 
should be carefully analyzed before drawing a conclusion. Small communities may prefer 
existing rights-of-way without realizing such an approach may have larger impacts in 
developed areas and may affect a greater number of public rail crossings. Based on the 
unfortunate safety record of non-separated rail crossings (approximately 800 incidents in 
2009, although this shows improvement over the previous ten years), grade separation is 
a must for any new HSR system. 
 It is not wise, nor maybe even possible to build a HSR system without some public funds. 
However, as public funding causes significant heartburn for many constituents (ignoring 
the fact that public funding is essential for all transportation programs, as none are able 
to fully support themselves), it may be possible to limit public expense through 
collaboration and participation with the private sector. Certain aspects of a HSR project 
may lend themselves more appropriately to state expense (right-of-way, planning), while 
others may be easy to share between the public and private sectors (signalization, 
electrification, construction). Finally, some expenses are likely best borne by the future 
HSR operator (rolling stock). Public contributions should reflect the degree of public 
benefit derived from a potential HSR system by monetizing reductions in air pollution, 
congestion, and travel time, among others. Generally speaking, the most efficient 
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transportation infrastructure policy promotes projects with the largest difference between 
public benefit and public cost. 
 Concept-state feasibility analysis by transportation planners will allow simple computer 
programs to assess the viability of a HSR system to meet assumed criteria. This allows 
transportation planners to deal primarily with transportation statistics while providing clear 
answers to potential planning options. Analysis of this kind on the Houston-Dallas/Fort 
Worth corridors indicates that the segment may be viable, warranting further 
investigation. 
 New HSR projects may benefit from minimum standards for the expenditure of public 
funds such as minimum NPV, maximum required/available passenger ratio, and 
minimum private sector rate of return. This may prevent the waste of public funds while 
maintaining flexibility for viable partnerships with the private sector. 
 HSR consortia may be better off with a diverse equity portfolio to guard against a single 
entity making unreasonable claims or promises, while the state should consider recent 
leadership changes within the companies associated with a franchise applicant. 
 The state should prepare to analyze the feasibility of all rail projects from both the public 
and private sector perspective. This process should become an integral part of the 
feasibility study process instead of outsourcing these tasks to the private sector. The 
state has a vested interest in evaluating private-sector feasibility so that it does not 
become a facilitator of HSR projects doomed to fail from the beginning.  
LESSONS FROM OTHER REGIONS AND STATES 
An advantage of limited action on HSR in Texas in recent decades is the ability to glean 
valuable lessons from other states about the planning and implementation process (or multiple 
processes, in some cases). While federally-designated HSR corridors (Figure 9 below) pass 
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through Texas, minimal action in these corridors thus far means the mistakes and challenges of 
rail projects in other federally-designated corridors will allow Texas to ideally bypass these errors 
and provide for smooth planning and implementation when such tasks are undertaken. This 
thesis focuses on four corridors specifically for their similar characteristics to Texas. California, 
Florida, the Midwest/Chicago Hub, and the Northeast corridors all exhibit similarly large 
population centers and large amounts of intercity travel. All the corridors feature various stutter-
steps in planning and implementation of HSR, although the reasons for these issues differ from 
corridor to corridor, thus allowing each corridor to provide different lessons, gathered and 
documented in various sources. 
 
 
Figure 9: FRA/US DOT designated high-speed rail corridors (FRA, undated) 
California 
Planned high-speed rail projects in California have neither lacked in scale or ambition, 
although none have yet come to fruition either. California undertook the first United States‘ foray 
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into high-speed rail in 1981 offering valuable lessons for similar Texas projects. The FRA 
identified the San Diego-Los Angeles corridor in early 1981 as a high-potential corridor for 
passenger rail service. Under its own impetus, the American High Speed Rail Corporation 
(AHSRC) proposed to construct, operate, and maintain a privately financed passenger train 
service with a $3.1 billion price tag. AHSRC moved quickly, developing a plan by March 1982 for 
a bullet train service that would connect the two cities in an hour by traveling parallel to Interstate 
5 and the populated Pacific coastline (see Figure 10 below). 
 
 
Figure 10: AHSRC proposed route for HSR in Southern California (Smith and Shirley, 1987) 
Citing the following reasons (Smith and Shirley, 1987), AHSRC estimated that 36 million 
passengers would choose the train, representing about 12% of trips made in the study corridor: 
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 highway congestion would dramatically increase over the next ten years, 
 gasoline prices would increase sharply, 
 population and population density would both grow in the corridor, 
 fares would be competitive with airline and Amtrak fares, 
 the system would reinforce local and regional transit system improvements, and 
 economic advantages resulting from capital expenditures, employment increases, and 
government revenue would materialize. 
An ambitious timeline dictated service on a portion of the route by 1987, with full service by 1990. 
AHSRC anticipated eighteen months to complete the environmental review process (both 
California Environmental Quality Act – CEQA – and National Environmental Protection Act – 
NEPA) by 1984 and seven years of design and construction culminating in full operations by 
1990. Meanwhile, legislation permitting the sale of $1.25 billion in tax-exempt revenue bonds for 
rapid-rail transit with speeds in excess of 120 mph also created confusion by appearing to exempt 
the project from CEQA, or at least disqualify typical state agencies from acting as the state 
environmental lead agency. Following much discussion and deliberation, Caltrans was chosen as 
the lead agency by August 1983 with FHWA taking the federal role in November of the same 
year. Subsequent scoping meetings identified stakeholders, cooperating agencies, and 
developed guidance for the consultant selected to complete the environmental review. 
Additionally, the public raised a number of environmental considerations at the public scoping 
meetings. Using findings from the scoping process, Caltrans adopted an optimistic timeline of 
twenty months for the environmental process at a planning meeting in May 1984. This meant that 
the submission of all technical data by AHSRC would result in commencing construction in 
September 1986, two years later than planned. 
AHSRC asked in November 1984 for the department to cease work on the environmental 
process for the project, citing a suspension of plans due to a lack of short-term financing (Smith 
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and Shirley, 1997). It is possible that potential investors saw the viability as highly dependent on 
optimistic and suspect travel forecasts, as criticism against AHSRC commented on the lack of an 
impartial ridership study. AHSRC only further fanned flames by refusing to disclose marketing 
and ridership studies. Public distrust seen in the development of the San Diego-Los Angeles 
corridor prompted high-speed rail advocates to create more credible forecasting processes 
(Olson and Roco, 2004). The project also generated several other valuable lessons for future 
high-speed rail projects: 
 Political diplomacy should be executed at all levels, and leaders should avoid decisions 
that will prove only temporarily expedient. The financing act in this project shows that 
such decisions may be adverse in the long term. 
 Open data processes should be maintained to permit effective discussion and debate as 
all parties are using the same information. Withholding of data invites skepticism, 
particularly from the public. Open data provides credibility and open communication; 
defensive actions in response to a lack of data erodes credibility. 
 Open communication between public and government agencies is essential, particularly 
at the local level. Keeping the loop closed through continuous feedback on raised issues 
provides community support through widespread debate and compromise, rather than 
quick, backroom bargains between the elite of society. 
 Florida 
Florida‘s experience with high-speed rail follows a story of both progress and regress 
over the course of more than three decades. In this time, public debate addressed the many 
obvious issues and arguments, but also managed to uncover important ideas beyond the 
immediate arguments. For this reason, the history of HSR in Florida provides comprehensive 
guidance that should inform all future projects in the United States, especially any in Texas. 
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Millions of dollars were poured into investments, studies, and proposals in Florida without any 
resulting construction. The Florida HSR initiative began with a 1976 mandate by the Florida 
legislature to investigate the feasibility of a system between Daytona Beach and St. Petersburg. 
The study concluded that HSR would be marketable in Florida if implemented in stages, and also 
proposed locating tracks within the median of limited-access highways. Governor Bob Graham 
initially kick-started the exploration of HSR service following his experiences with the Shinkansen 
in Japan in the 1980s by authorizing the creation of the Florida High Speed Rail Committee. This 
group released a report recommending development of public-private partnerships and using 
publicly-owned rights-of-way to provide a HSR system that was necessary to help the state to 
meet mobility needs. Also that year, the state legislature created the Florida High Speed Rail 
Commission, authorizing it to grant a franchise to build a privately funded and operated HSR 
system between Miami, Orlando, and Tampa. The commission received two proposals for service 
with estimated costs for both at approximately $2 billion despite a large disparity in estimated 
ridership (5.9 million and 3.7 million annually), with each proposal using different technology. Both 
proposals assumed public spending and/or real estate development rights. When it became 
obvious that no funding would materialize, one proposal was withdrawn while the other developed 
a convoluted arrangement of benefit districts, impact fees, and fuel excise tax increases that led 
Governor Lawton Chiles to reject the proposal in 1991 (LC de Cerreño, 2006). 
HSR exploration in Florida was thus effectively punted back to the Florida Department of 
Transportation (FDOT), which spent the next several years evaluating the feasibility of HSR 
corridors between the state‘s major cities. This was made possible by federal funding following 
the 1992 federal designation of the Tampa-Orlando-Miami corridor as a HSR corridor. Based on 
the results of these studies, FDOT affirmed a long-term commitment to HSR, establishing a 
dowry of $70 million annually for thirty years, making Florida‘s proposals far more attractive to 
private investors and attracting five new proposals for service in 1995. FDOT selected the Florida 
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Overland Express (FOX) consortium, which proposed building and operating a grade-separated 
new HSR system utilizing existing French TGV technology as one way to minimize risk. The 
capital costs not covered by FDOT or FOX equity would come from debt financing and revenue 
bonds. FDOT valued the project as an essential element of an integrated state transportation 
system that would be both environmentally and fiscally responsible in light of projected future 
state growth. Academic research also corroborated this inclination by the department. Just as 
preliminary engineering work commenced in 1998, a grass roots campaign against the bullet train 
arose, challenging ridership estimates, environmental issues, use of foreign technology, and use 
of scarce transportation dollars. Some concerns carried weight, particularly regarding lofty 
assumptions about relationships with airlines and diverted automobile trips. A subsequent US 
General Accounting Office review noted uncertainties in ridership and costs, as well as the 
crowding out of other projects eligible for federal TIFIA funds. Governor Jeb Bush did as prior 
governors had done, and terminated funding for the project with his election in 1999. 
FDOT returned to the drawing board, but determined that it would not give up on the 
prospect of HSR in the state, as the department remained convinced that an alternative to 
highways was still necessary. Moving toward an incremental approach, rather than an entirely 
new grade-separated system, Amtrak and FDOT issued the ―Florida Intercity Passenger Rail 
Service Vision Plan‖ that again focused on the Tampa-Orlando-Miami corridor (Figure 11), 
recognizing that operational and safety issues result in passenger and freight rail incompatibility 
above 80 mph. Simultaneously with the release of the Vision Plan, the legislature also crafted 
plans to bring the issue before voters through a constitutional amendment process. In 2000, 
52.7% of the popular vote directed the legislature to develop and operate a high-speed rail 
system. Soon after, the legislature also created the Florida High Speed Rail Authority (FHSRA) 
and a consultant‘s report to FDOT recommended initiating service with a minimum operating 
segment between Orlando and Tampa using the Interstate 4 median alignment. In 2002, a series 
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of reports completing preliminary engineering and environmental work and investment grade 
ridership analysis led the FHRSA to solicit proposals for the design, building, operation, 
maintenance, and financing of phase 1 of a high-speed ground transportation system between 
Tampa and Orlando. 
 
 
Figure 11:  Potential Florida HSR route used for preliminary planning and ridership study 
(HNTB Corporation, 2003). 
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By 2004, the FHSRA selected a proposal for a public-private partnership with Fluor-
Bombardier and a number of other members. The federal government had provided $13 million 
for planning and crossing upgrades, while the legislature‘s authorization of $14 million met a veto 
from Governor Jeb Bush, accompanying a warning that he would not support further HSR efforts. 
Through the work of anti-bullet train politicians, the constitutional amendment passed in 2000 also 
returned to voters, who decided to repeal the amendment in a collective change of mind in 
November 2004. The project remained effectively shelved for the next five years, only to be 
revived with much pomp and circumstance in 2009 by the Obama Administration. Pundits 
believed the Florida line had been targeted as the best opportunity for the administration to 
demonstrate benefits of HSR in the short-term, as the project could be constructed quickly and 
would be the first grade-separated electrified HSR system in the United States. The Federal 
Railroad Administration (FRA) provided $2.4 billion in grants to the state, all but covering 
construction costs. The 2010 election of Governor Rick Scott brought uncertainty to the project, 
although he did not take a position on the campaign trail. However, in the midst of an anti- ―big 
government‖ climate, it came as no large surprise when he chose to cancel the project in early 
2011.  
Following Florida‘s multiple instances of forward rail momentum only to be met with 
setbacks, several important ideas should guide future rail considerations: 
 Cost and financing remain a critical dilemma for HSR. As seen in the developments in 
Florida, the private sector preferred the state to bear more risk, while the state preferred 
the private sector to take on excess risk. If HSR is to ever be built, it will require public 
funds; yet, in a generally anti-tax state (and nation) where skepticism regarding public 
benefits abounds, securing such funds remains difficult at best. A broader framing of 
costs and benefits with ―no build‖ options must also take place, as this should include the 
cost of constructing capacity increases for other modes that will change economic 
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results. Finally, the myth that railroads can pay for themselves must be dispelled. Not 
only is this untrue, it also perpetuates myths that other modes cover their own costs. 
 A HSR project must define clear goals around which a consensus can be built. The 
argument over an incremental versus entirely new HSR system represents a larger 
uncertainty in Florida about the final goals for the project. Disagreement about the role for 
commuters and tourists with the system demonstrated lack of consensus, as well as 
general malaise from those advocates of a Miami connection that never seemed to be 
seriously considered as a part of any initial project phase. 
 Individual personalities, particularly political personalities, played a large role in the 
project storyline. Certain governors took strong stances for the project, while others made 
decisions that reset the project clock; party affiliation historically has not been an indicator 
of support. According to LC de Cerreño (2006), ―It is apparent from Florida that, given the 
time to develop and implement HSR, continuous leadership and support is critical. More 
importantly, this leadership and support needs to be more institutional in nature. Studies 
and plans often span several administrations and Florida clearly shows how easily such 
efforts can be curtailed by a single individual.‖ 
Midwest 
Perhaps lacking the public profile of other HSR endeavors in the United States, the 
proposals related to the Midwest/Chicago Hub nevertheless provide their own set of lessons. 
While other planned projects have focused on trains traveling greater than 200 mph within a 
single state, the Midwest proposals instead use 110 mph technology and stitch together a multi-
state web of Midwestern and Great Lakes cities via a central high-demand location (Chicago). 
The Midwest/Chicago Hub received federal corridor designation in 1991, and expanded several 
times since then to a current configuration of lines extending from Chicago to Minneapolis/St. 
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Paul (via Milwaukee and Madison), Kansas City (via St. Louis), Detroit, Louisville (via 
Indianapolis), and a triangular segment linking Chicago ,Cleveland (via Toledo), Columbus, and 
Cincinnati (see Figure 12). Together these lines bring the corridor to more than 2,000 miles in 
length. Various studies by state DOTS and private groups in the 1970s and 1980s assessed the 
technical and financial feasibility of HSR in the region, although this received a significant boost 
following a tour of Europe by government officials. 
 
 
Figure 12: Midwest/Chicago Hub rail corridors (Transportation Economics and Management 
Systems Inc., 2004) 
In 1996, pro-HSR legislators in multiple Midwest states established the Midwest 
Interstate Passenger Rail Commission in charge of the Midwest Regional Rail Initiative (MWRRI) 
while state DOT officials worked together to develop the Midwest Regional Rail System for HSR. 
These structural entities forged a strong relationship with FRA, Amtrak, US DOT, and states for 
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planning and providing passenger rail service. The plan encompasses 3,000 miles of track 
serving 60 million people (some of these lines are not federally-designated at present) with trains 
of varying speeds serving populated cities throughout the region. Even with regional-level activity, 
the state-level activities have been uneven, although the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) prompted most states in the region to engage in some level of 
planning for passenger rail to be eligible for federal grants. In all, states in the Midwest Regional 
Rail System received about $2.5 billion in ARRA funds (Federal Railroad Administration, 2010). 
Between 1998 and 2004, the MWRRI released a series of preliminary plans that identified 
technology options, estimated costs, and initial demand forecasts. From here, an intermediate 
speed of 110 mph throughout the system, hopefully driving down costs through economies of 
scale, moved forward as the preferred approach and was subject to a more complete market 
assessment that determined expected operating and capital costs, a strategy for capital needs, 
and completed benefit-cost analysis. The current 2004 plan recognized the sharing of freight 
infrastructure, performed capacity simulation, and developed a detailed infrastructure capital plan, 
among other things (Transportation Economics and Management Systems Inc., 2004).  
Despite the seemingly thorough approach, HSR in the Midwest still struggles to gain 
footing, particularly outside of Illinois. The midterm elections of 2010 may be the best evidence of 
this as gubernatorial candidates in two Midwest states campaigned against proposed train 
services that had received federal funding only months earlier. Based on the Midwest experience 
thus far, it is essential to keep a number of ideas in mind when considering HSR elsewhere (LC 
de Cerreño and Mathur, 2007): 
 Roles and responsibilities within the regional corridor are unclear, as some state DOTs 
heavily pursue planning and funding for improvements, while others seem to be 
uninvolved. Some state legislators and DOT officials lend support for the project, but the 
region lacks strong and consistent leadership. Projects operating across state lines, like 
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the Northeast Corridor, traditionally require federal leadership and guidance to prevent 
piecemeal development. Without a serious regional authority or equal commitment by 
involved states, implementation of HSR in the Chicago Hub will likely require a strong 
federal presence. 
 Sub-regional goals that merely promote connectivity and reduce travel times between 
certain cities must be emboldened and clarified at the regional level to prevent the 
inclusion of corridors that will produce little ridership and balloon costs. The benefits 
sought by the project need clarification, which will require the inclusion of other entities in 
discussions, including private railroads (who own much of the right-of-way) and 
environmental groups. These groups will also aid in sorting out overall regional project 
goals. 
 The Midwest regional rail plans give credence to the notion that if HSR is to succeed in 
the United States, it will likely take an incremental approach in many locations. Despite 
this, the difficulties of improvements (incremental and ―true‖ HSR) on shared ROW with 
commuter and freight trains abound. Yet, given political apathy and perceived risks with 
HSR unproven in the United States, an incremental approach may be the most feasible 
approach without a stronger commitment on both the part of the federal government and 
the states.  
Northeast 
Much can be said about rail in the Northeast Corridor, and with good reason. It is the only 
rail corridor in the United States with any operations above 100 mph, and it connects several of 
the nation‘s largest and most transit-oriented cities. The corridor is a major player in the intercity 
travel market and continues to capture the minds of researchers, rail professionals, members of 
the public, and politicians alike for its operational complexity, unique existence in a nation with 
 48 
meager passenger rail service, and perhaps yet untapped future potential. While some of the 
demographic and operational aspects of the corridor will be explored in Chapter 4, the corridor 
provides a unique experience in the planning of electrified passenger rail service in the United 
States. Because the history of the Northeast Corridor is rightfully complex compared to the other 
HSR corridors considered here, this abridged description will only highlight the major planning 
milestones in the corridor. 
Prior to Amtrak, the Pennsylvania Railroad provided the precursor to the passenger trains 
seen today. With the help of federal aid for new technologies, Metroliner service debuted in 1969 
operating at speeds above 100 mph between Washington and New York. Within just a few years, 
the deferred maintenance on the track infrastructure, which was not upgraded with the 
introduction of the new trainsets, took a toll on operations, resulting in late trains and reduced 
speeds. A similar scenario with the TurboTrain between Boston and New York took place. At first, 
great increases in speed caused the service to shine, but ongoing maintenance issues would 
eventually cause the operation to fold. Six years after the creation of Amtrak (1976), the corridor 
received a major federal boost with appropriations of $1.75 billion for improvements known as the 
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP). With little more than political rationale, goal 
travel times between Washington and New York, and New York and Boston were established for 
achievement by 1981. Unfortunately, this amount of funding was probably only about half of what 
was needed to make the corridor competitive with other modes. Work progressed slowly over the 
next decade, eventually achieving the goal travel times in the corridor. By 1986, the FRA 
considered the bulk of the work accomplished and appropriations shrank (LC de Cerreño and 
Mathur, 2007). 
A second phase of the NECIP was initiated in 1991 following a study by the Coalition of 
Northeastern Governors that determined improvements to the New York-Boston segment could 
be achieved at reasonable costs in the short-term. Led by Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ), more than 
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$1.5 billion in additional appropriations were directed to the Northeast Corridor (Figure 13) 
through 1995. By this time, major outstanding improvements that remained included the delivery 
of new trainsets constructed by Bombardier-Alstom and electrification of the system. Delays 
began almost immediately as unexpected conditions (including the Central Artery ―Big Dig‖ 
Project in Boston), safety incidents, and slow production impeded progress. More than three 
years behind schedule, Amtrak began HSR service in 2000, with many of the identified 
infrastructure improvements unrealized even by 2003.  
 
 
Figure 13: Primary Northeast Corridor routing (feeder routes shown in gray) (Cambridge 
Systematics, 2008) 
At present, a number of issues affect the Northeast Corridor. First, the corridor suffers 
from an institutional relationship where it is tied to Amtrak, and thus the future of Amtrak. Yet, the 
operations differ significantly from the remainder of Amtrak‘s long-distance passenger rail 
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services. Much debate exists whether the corridor should remain a part of the Amtrak network, as 
well whether the infrastructure and operations should be split. The overwhelming second issue 
revolves around operations and maintenance. Woefully under-maintained prior to Amtrak, the 
Northeast Corridor infrastructure currently faces a backlog of necessary improvements worth 
more than $5 billion (Northeast Corridor Master Plan Working Group, 2010). The corridor also 
faces extreme capacity issues, as no other segment of rail in the world operates such a variety of 
services with such a high volume (Cambridge Systematics, 2008). Yet, there is virtually no 
footprint available for increased capacity; additional right-of-way would need to be purchased or 
overhead track pursued in order to provide new capacity. Finally, the Northeast Corridor is a 
funding anomaly by rail standards and certainly by transportation standards. Where other modes 
receive funding through a combination of state DOTs, metropolitan planning organizations, or 
municipalities from the federal government, providing there is a state match, the Northeast 
Corridor receives only federal appropriations. To deliver a stronger regional tie to funding the 
Northeast Corridor, a greater state interest in the development of the corridor as well as a 
regional funding mechanism may be in order (Roth and Aggarwala, 2002). Measuring these 
issues against a theoretical Texas project at this juncture may not provide strong direction, but it 
does clarify the complications of working across state lines, something Texas would likely not 
face in the initial project phases, if ever. However, the capacity issues strike a similar note in 
Texas; even with minimal passenger rail traffic, the intense freight operations present the same 
general constraints, particularly at urban locations (Houston and Tower 55 immediately come to 
mind). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Passenger rail in the United States traces a volatile trajectory over time particularly at the 
national level where Amtrak faces nearly constant scrutiny. Specific regional experiments in 
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passenger rail also present a range of issues which are instructive for future forays in passenger 
rail in Texas. The Texas TGV project also demonstrates a series of structural and intellectual 
missteps that high-speed rail projects in Texas and nationwide should consider when analyzing 
feasibility of such service. These different projects show the importance of transparent planning 
processes that consult the public, independent analysis of project elements, and avoiding short-
sighted legislation aimed at hurried action without considering longer term consequences. 
Additionally, the political personalities play an essential role in project development, whether 
positive or negative. Through consultation with these previous HSR endeavors both inside and 
outside of Texas, the state hopefully will benefit by avoiding many of the perils that have plagued 
other projects elsewhere.  
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Chapter 3: High-Speed Rail in a Texas Geographic Context 
Initial consideration of intercity HSR in Texas spurs immediate questions about the 
appropriateness of such a system in the state. Analysis of these large scale and generic primary 
concerns, while generally non-technical, is essential to inform the population on the topic and 
obtain initial support. In this vein, this chapter considers some basic demographic and geographic 
concerns regarding the potential for HSR, including the population distribution in the state, the 
emergence of interwoven metropolitan areas (megaregions), city-to-city distances, urban 
population density, and HSR sub-regional impacts.  
STATEWIDE POPULATION PROFILE 
By most standards, the state of Texas is quite large. At more than 268,000 square miles 
in land area, the state is the second largest in the United States. It stretches nearly 800 miles 
along both the north-south and east-west axes, covering a wide gradient of climates incorporating 
vast arid plains, humid swampy coasts, rolling limestone hills, and dry mountainous desert. 
Placing it in a global context, Texas forms the world‘s twenty-seventh largest sub-national entity, 
and has approximately the same land area as France (including overseas possessions) (CIA 
2010). One result of this size is that Texas, despite featuring the second largest population of US 
states at twenty-five million and growing, has a relatively low population density, falling near the 
middle of ranked US states with an estimated 92.9 persons/square mile (US Census Bureau 
2010c). This places it behind Washington (98.4), just ahead of Alabama (91.9), and slightly above 
the US as a whole (86.0). Population density is a good fundamental measure of the potential for 
rail transportation demand as well as an indicator of urban form. It has generally been observed 
that population density positively correlates with high ridership of intercity passenger rail systems, 
based on the examples of rail in western European nations, as well as Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and China, although the exact nature of this relationship may not be entirely understood. 
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This empirical evidence from rail operations in other nations suggests that intercity passenger rail 
has little potential in the United States and Texas given that the population density is low 
compared to that of France (295 persons/square mile), Germany (594), and South Korea (1261), 
for example (United Nations, 2009). 
However, it is also important to consider the area encompassed in these density values. 
Much of west Texas (and the western United States) contains vast desolate stretches of land that 
likely would generate extremely minimal demand for rail service (or any transportation for that 
matter), yet still are included in these density values that are commonly used to evaluate the 
potential for HSR. Texas does not demonstrate a geographically balanced population profile. For 
example, the center of population is at Holland, Texas (about 10 miles east of Interstate 35 in Bell 
County), while the geographical center of the state is more than 100 miles to the west-northwest, 
near Brady. Specifically, the eastern half of the state (the Interstate 35 corridor and eastward) 
may contain more promise than the state as a whole. The eastern half of Texas is home to more 
than 21 million people or about 85% of the state‘s population and thus demonstrates a much 
higher density than the state as a whole. At approximately 174 persons/square mile (TxDOT 
2010b), this half of Texas exhibits the density of US states such as Indiana (176) and Michigan 
(177) (both part of the Midwest High Speed Rail initiative), and is somewhat close to that of Spain 
(236), which has implemented a well-patronized HSR system in recent years (Burnett, 2009). The 
Texas Triangle region, with corners defined by the urban areas of Dallas/Ft. Worth, Houston, and 
San Antonio achieves about 305 persons/square mile. TxDOT (TxDOT, 2011a) provides 
population and land area information for all of the state‘s twenty-five transportation districts, as 
well as for the individual counties comprising these districts. Using this information, one can 
calculate the population densities for these districts. In Figure 14, the lighter blue outline shows 
the region of the state for which the population density is 174 persons/square mile, while the 
darker blue shading indicates the area for which population density is 305 persons/square mile. 
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From the map, it is clear that this number may not equally represent all the catchment areas for 
intercity travel. Because many low-density counties west of Interstate 35 are included, it is 
possible that a better-defined region (e.g.,, one within an hour of a potential station perhaps) may 
yield even higher densities. In the case of the Texas Triangle region, this is true to an even larger 
extent as more dense counties in East Texas are excluded while less dense counties west of 
Interstate 35 are included.  
 
 
Figure 14: Areas considered for population density calculation (based on TxDOT, 2011a) 
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Figure 15 charts the population densities of nations currently operating, planning, or 
considering HSR, with different values for Texas included for comparison. Measuring national 
population density and immediately ascribing potential for HSR success oversimplifies the data. 
Two issues arise; first, just as neither Texas nor the United States demonstrates a balanced 
population profile, many other nations planning for HSR also fail to demonstrate this 
phenomenon. Thus, the densities reported are likely less than the densities in sub-national 
regions in which HSR exists or is in development. China may provide the best example of this, 
although Australia, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, and many nations in the Middle East show this as 
well. Second, population density, while perhaps a good measure of demand for HSR services, 
may more generally be an indicator of intercity transportation demand. The list in Figure 15 could 
easily be a list of density in nations with high intercity travel demand or high air passenger travel, 
with notable exceptions being populated island nations for which rail is geographically infeasible, 
and to some degree south Asian nations (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh) and select African nations 
(Nigeria, Kenya). Thus, the complexity of population density lies beyond rather arbitrary state 
borders.  
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Nation Population density 
(persons per square mile), 
as of July 1, 2010 
Monaco 61562.4 
Singapore 19293.2 






Viet Nam 686.1 









Czech Republic 344.7 
Denmark 333.7 
Poland 306.8 














Texas (Eastern Half) 174.0 
Ireland 164.8 
Iran  116.3 
South Africa 106.4 
Texas 92.9 
United States 83.5 
Laos 67.8 
Brazil 59.3 
Figure 15: Population densities of nations considering, planning for, or operating HSR 






Saudi Arabia 33.1 
Norway 32.8 
Russian Federation 21.7 
Canada 8.8 
Australia 7.5 
Figure 15 (continued): Population densities of nations considering, planning for, or operating 
HSR compared with Texas (United Nations, 2009) 
What, then, is the role of population density in the development of intercity rail? Certainly 
the United States and Texas should not abandon hope for intercity rail due to low large-scale 
population density. By that metric, the Sapsan service between Moscow and St. Petersburg 
should have long since failed, as Russia exhibits very low population density, yet the service 
operates at a profit and a high load factor (84.5%, Makarova, 2010). Instead, population density 
may reflect nuanced aspects of regional geography and demographics and their effects on 
intercity travel. In particular, a very populated city may significantly skew the population density of 
an otherwise unpopulated state or nation. Intercity travel demand attributed to state or national 
population density may in fact mostly represent the intercity travel demand for the highly 
populated areas. Thus, it is important to attribute the potential for intercity travel to a more 
disaggregated jurisdiction (city pairs, for example), rather than states or nations. Hence, the 
evaluation of demographics for cities to be potentially served by HSR provides a more specific 
and accurate perspective into rail success. Population density calculations for areas that might 
reasonably generate demand for intercity passenger rail show that although the state of Texas as 
a whole may not appear to be able to support such service, there are regions of the state, 
particularly the Texas Triangle, with densities comparable to successful international examples. 
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URBAN POPULATION DENSITY 
In light of the considerations in the previous section, the urban population density of 
Texas metropolitan areas compared with that of other metropolitan areas provides useful 
instruction about the potential for HSR. Amtrak‘s Acela Express is the most successful example 
of high- (or higher-) speed rail service in the United States. It links the five large metropolitan 
areas of Washington DC, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston via stations at city 
centers. Comparing the examples in the Northeast with Texas‘ largest cities yields a wide gap on 
many levels, including city history, urban development pattern, and legal planning and zoning 
capabilities. The application of a more focused microscope reveals large disparities between 
Texas cities and the major cities of the Northeast. The densities of the cities proper served by the 
Acela Express are all at least twice the densities of Texas‘ five largest cities. Baltimore, the least 
dense of the major cities (Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington DC are the others) on 
the Acela Express route, dwarfs Houston‘s density, at 7,889 and 3,872 persons/square mile, 
respectively. The population densities of Dallas, Austin, San Antonio, and Fort Worth are all 
subsequently less, with Fort Worth inhabiting 2,403 persons/square mile (US Census Bureau, 
2010). Like many demographic measures, population density does not explicitly dictate the usage 
of intercity passenger rail, but the positive correlation between the two is clear. 
Internationally, the correlation between financially stable, well-utilized HSR service 
becomes less clear. The density disparity between cities in wealthy nations in Europe and 
American cities clearly exists, although relative to the rest of the world, these cities have smaller 
densities. Cities in wealthy Asian nations tend to be far more dense than European or North 
American cities. Many of the world‘s densest cities exist in relatively poor, highly populated 
nations where vast urban slums are not uncommon. Clearly HSR does not exist in many of these 
places as substantial demand for high speed transportation does not exist. Alain Bertaud (2003) 
shows the great range of urban density in Figure 16. Thus, urban density does not solely 
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determine the demand for HSR, although amongst cities in nations with relatively developed 
economies, density does appear to influence the propensity for HSR trips. 
 
 
Figure 16: Population densities of selected international cities (Bertaud, 2003) 
Large disparities exist between Texas cities and cities linked by HSR in other nations. In 
a study of the relationship between HSR and city transportation connectivity characteristics, BB&J 
Consult (2010, for Union Internationale de Chemins, International Union of Railways) found the 
population density of various major cities served by HSR (Figure 17). These cities, too, exceed 
population density of major cities in Texas. The differences also show that the relationship 
between urban density and propensity to use rail may be uncertain. The population densities 
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within the proper administrative boundaries of Paris, Rome, and Ankara are not drastically 
different that those of major Texas cities. However, the differences between cities such as Seoul 
and Barcelona and Texas cities are stark. Thus, it appears that population density has a complex 
relationship with ridership potential, but nevertheless correlates positively overall. To further 
understand this relationship, the urban density gradient for these international and Texas cities 
may demonstrate a more clear connection. At present, lower population densities in Texas are 
probably a deterrent for HSR, although further detailed analysis for specific cities is needed. 
 
















San Antonio 1,313 
Austin 1,207 
Fort Worth 928 
 Figure 17: Population density of selected international cities served by HSR and major Texas 
cities (BB&J Consult, 2010 and US Census Bureau, 2010d) 
EMERGING MEGAREGIONS 
The notion of the Texas Triangle permeates the state‘s intercity passenger rail 
discussion, particularly high-speed rail. Megaregions are defined by multiple metropolitan areas 
whose boundaries have begun to blur, extending for distances of 300-600 miles in some cases. 
The geometry lends itself well to the success of intercity passenger rail because the multiple 
cities in the megaregion will likely operate as an interconnected network rather than a lone city 
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pair. Based on heavily used international examples, as well as some simple time-distance 
calculations, intercity passenger rail service appears to be ideal for distances 100 to 500 miles in 
length, and particularly so between 200 and 300 miles. Shorter distances are better suited for 
travel by car (or commuter rail if it exists), while air travel becomes more practical as distances 
approach and exceed 500 miles (Hagler and Todorovich, 2010). The barriers and inefficiencies of 
air travel over short distances are likely all too familiar to most Americans, who must endure long 
auto trips to outlying airport locations, cumbersome security procedures, early check-in times, 
and the effects of airport congestion and delays. However, as distances increase, the exceptional 
speed of airplanes gradually overtakes the relative advantage of rail. Megaregions in Europe and 
Asia demonstrate the greatest ridership with rail through an interconnected network of cities, 
although the northeastern United States also has elements of this as well. 
The integrated economic nature of the Texas Triangle (see Figure 18) continues to 
interconnect. Where the major cities in Texas once pursued more unique strategic industries, the 
economic lines between the cities have begun to fade as the ability to travel, communicate, and 




Figure 18: Approximate Texas Triangle Megaregion area (Zhang et al, 2007) 
As Zhang et al (2007) reported, some industrial competition has also arisen between the 
different metropolitan areas, particularly in high-tech, communications, and electronics sectors. 
An obvious overlap between the air carriers in the region also exists. The research also indicates 
that the economic sectors of specialty for each metropolitan area complement each other well. 
Exports from the entire megaregion are few in comparison to exports from the individual cities in 
the Texas Triangle. As indicated earlier, these cities contribute greatly to the overall state 
population and economic output. Thus, as the region continues to grow, implications for changes 
in regional planning exist, including possibly organizations beyond MPOs (metropolitan planning 
organizations) that have driven transportation planning at the local level for two decades. 
Determining megaregions such as the Texas Triangle still amount to an inexact science as no 
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official definitions exist. Zhang et al (2007) also suggest that changes to the definition of a 
metropolitan area (currently based on commuting patterns) may provide a more accurate context 
for transportation planning in a megaregion such as the Texas Triangle, particularly as the 
number of telecommuters increases. Travel time re-allocated from commuting likely contributes to 
increases in inter-city demand, which presents major implications for the development of high-
speed travel between the major cities in Texas: 
―When the entire Triangle is within the reach of a daily commute, it then becomes an 
integrated megaregion meaningful to individual households and firms. To households, 
accessibility to jobs, housing, and services would thus expand from individual 
metropolitan areas to the entire Triangle. Firms would also enjoy the benefit of increased 
agglomeration economies at the megaregion scale.‖  
Analysis utilizing a model by Schafer and Victor (2000) indicates that by 2050, high speed modes 
(air and rail) may absorb more than three quarters of the intercity mode share that includes auto, 
bus, and traditional rail. In order to prepare for the transportation requirements that such analysis 
presents, leaders must undertake substantial changes in land use planning and policy, including 
improved growth management legislation. This thesis addresses these challenges in more detail 
in Chapter 5. 
CITY-TO-CITY DISTANCES 
The existence of ideal intercity distances and the interconnected city networks in the 
Texas Triangle megaregion presents an opportunity in intercity passenger rail that is difficult to 
ignore. As mentioned earlier, cities within a range of about 100-500 miles, particularly 200-300 
miles, seem to generate the greatest demand and highest ridership. This is a function largely of 
travel time, which acts as a proxy for distance, depending of course on train speed. An 
empirically-derived logit model approximation for mode share for rail (in a rail vs. air split) defined 
by Jorritsma (undated) estimates that HSR may achieve a very high modal split for trips less than 
100 minutes, where it begins to drop off somewhat, although still maintaining a 50% mode split 
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for trips of 200 minutes (3 hours 20 minutes) (see Figure 19). Here, y represents rail mode share, 
where x is the number of minutes of travel: 
  
 




Figure 19: Graph of rail share of air-rail mode split 
The overwhelming issue with the model is that air and HSR do not comprise the only intercity 
modes; thus, the idea that rail might occupy 100% of the mode share between two points ignores 
all other modes being used, which could be numerous over a short distance. Assuming a typical 
average speed (75-150 mph, not a top speed) over the distance between Texas cities 
demonstrates that the large and medium-sized cities in the Texas Triangle generate a large rail 
share by this model, and therefore lie within an ideal distance of one another. At the most distant 
points, the cities of San Antonio and Houston are both approximately equidistant from the 
Dallas/Ft. Worth metropolitan area, with about 250 miles between city centers, requiring 
approximately 1h40 to 3h20 of travel time. More centrally-located cities also show potential for 
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intercity passenger rail based on distance, with Waco lying nearly 100 miles (0h40 to 1h20) from 
Dallas and 180 miles (1h12 to 2h24) from Houston, and Austin about 150 miles (1h00 to 2h00) 
from central Houston as well. This does not exhaust all corridors in the region, but does highlight 
the potential that geometry of Texas cities presents for intercity passenger rail (Butler et al 2009). 
The shortest highway distances between the fifteen largest MSAs in Texas are seen in Figure 20, 
where Texas Triangle segments are highlighted in blue. Other segments less than 300 miles in 
length linking cities outside the traditional Texas Triangle definition are highlighted in orange. 
These segments, most of which link Laredo, Corpus Christi, Beaumont, and the Rio Grande 
Valley, indicate that extensions from the Texas Triangle definition and any implemented HSR 
service within that Triangle should at minimum consider these metropolitan areas as well.  
 
 


















































































































































































Amarillo 478 637 765 503 636 361 418 596 444 609 119 728 493 423
Austin-Round Rock 478 238 325 100 192 192 573 162 67 232 368 300 79 102
Beaumont-Port Arthur 637 238 437 158 288 276 810 86 230 396 574 430 281 242
Brownsville-Harlingen 765 325 437 382 159 517 801 352 392 199 470 56 272 427
Bryan-College Station 503 100 158 382 237 165 660 95 72 318 415 364 165 85
Corpus Christi 636 192 288 159 237 377 691 207 255 141 325 152 143 287
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington 361 192 276 517 165 377 617 238 126 424 322 491 271 91
El Paso 418 573 810 801 660 691 617 730 595 602 344 745 548 610
Houston-Sugarland-Baytown 596 162 86 352 95 207 238 730 167 311 510 345 197 180
Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood 444 67 230 392 72 255 126 595 167 299 343 366 134 34
Laredo 609 232 396 199 318 141 424 602 311 299 498 143 154 334
Lubbock 119 368 574 470 415 325 322 344 510 343 498 618 382 345
McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr 728 300 430 56 364 152 491 745 345 366 143 618 236 401
San Antonio 493 79 281 272 165 143 271 548 197 134 154 382 236 181
Waco 423 102 242 427 85 287 91 610 180 34 334 345 401 181
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In 2009, TTI (Borowiec et al) further considered a number of demographic, demand, and 
capacity criteria in order to determine those intercity corridors in the state that were most in need 
of capacity upgrades in the coming years. These criteria included, among other things, total 
population, percent of population 65 and older, total university enrollment, current and expected 
growth in AADT, current and expected growth in air travel, volume-capacity ratio on roads, and 
average load factor for air traffic along each of eighteen corridors. This analysis by TTI confirmed 
the relative importance of the Texas Triangle corridors in the state. The Dallas/Ft. Worth – San 
Antonio (via Austin) corridor and the Dallas/Ft. Worth – Houston corridor achieved the highest 
evaluation scores, far exceeding the next highest performing corridor. However, further pointing 
to the strength of the region statewide, four of the top six corridor scores were for corridors in the 
Texas Triangle, including Houston – San Antonio and Houston – Austin in addition to the top two. 
Other national-level analysis by the Regional Plan Association evaluated city pairs based on 
larger scale characteristics including congestion, economic potential, and existing transit 
connections in addition to density and corridor length discussed here. Amongst some 27,000 
possible city pairs, Dallas/Ft. Worth – Houston scored tenth overall, with a number of other Texas 
city pairs, including Dallas/Ft. Worth – Austin, scoring lower (45
th
), although still worthy of national 
attention. The report notes that Texas city pairs displayed a lack of transit connections which 
lowered the scores (Hagler and Todorovich, 2010). Despite this, even in a national comparison, 
Texas corridors perform well, reaffirming the idea that the naturally formed layout of Texas‘ major 
cities presents an excellent opportunity to consider intercity passenger rail service. 
REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
HSR experiences abroad indicate that when implemented appropriately, the train system 
may enable greater inter-regional accessibility and spur additional economic development. As 
Blum et al (1997) argue, HSR extends the boundaries of a ―functional region‖ where a certain 
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geographical area shares a common market for labor and services, and a great deal of business 
transactions still rely on some degree of face-to-face contact. Effectively, HSR reduces trade 
barriers, increases distribution of real income, reduces monopolies, increases competitive 
markets, and increases firm mobility and choice of inputs (labor). As the economy of Texas 
continues shifting from manufacturing toward services, a greater number of adults will not only 
work (as the number of single-earner households falls), but will work in industries requiring social 
mobility and knowledge dissemination, requiring greater mobility than already exists. However, 
―the discussion about the net economic benefit of devoting public funds to HSR investment is 
usually too general and imprecise‖ (de Rus and Nobela, 2007), indicating that rationalization of 
public expenditure on HSR must be vetted through more careful, enumerated analysis. This may 
take the form of benefit-cost analysis, or environmental life cycle analysis, for example, but has 
grown increasingly complex as once ambiguous social costs and environmental costs are 
enveloped in such analysis.  
While much of the focus on HSR considers the links between large cities, the increase of 
HSR services also results in small- and medium-sized cities within an hour‘s travel time seeing 
increased integration into urban transport. Guirao and Soler (2009) documented the vast changes 
in transport habits of both commuters and tourists between Toledo, a small city of 78,000, and 
Madrid. New RENFE HSR service in 2006 shortened the trip from 60 minutes by commuter rail to 
30 minutes by HSR. The two cities, separated by approximately 70 km, have seen passenger 
traffic increase by 30%, including substantial increases in tourist traffic, despite the suburban 
location of the Toledo station. It is not clear if this increase is new induced travelers or merely a 
transfer of travelers from other modes; regardless, the reduction of less efficient modes (personal 
automobile and intercity bus) for either reason contributes toward achieving EU policy goals. As 
Facchinetti-Mannone (undated) points out, the infrastructure trade-off typically dictates the 
selection of city center stations versus exterior periphery stations in smaller cities. Compatibility 
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with existing lines (and therefore somewhat slower speeds) allows service at original, historic 
stations, while peripheral stations utilize new rail lines, thus reducing travel time and providing 
other benefits. As one might expect, central stations maintain lower rates of access by personal 
automobile and higher integration into the regional transit network. The restoration and/or 
implementation of HSR service at a central station enables an opportunity to strengthen the city 
core and reconnect with marginalized areas, whereas the fostering of new business park growth 
on city exterior fringes with a new HSR station appears more difficult, particularly in areas of 
industrial recession. Nevertheless, the increase in marketing-related trips between Paris and the 
Rhône-Alps region (Lyon) following the inauguration of the TGV service in the early 1980s 
indicates that proximity to HSR amounts to a ―bonus‖ for businesses. Even if those businesses do 
not relocate, activity appears to increase, perhaps with the opening of a branch location 
(Bonnafous, 1987) 
Obviously it is difficult to know what the exact regional economic impacts might be for 
HSR in Texas. Still, evidence from other areas suggests that the state‘s major metropolitan areas 
will benefit from increased competition in input markets, including labor, and greater ease of 
mobility will soften any trade barriers that currently exist within the state. Cities presently linked as 
leisurely weekend trips or single-day business trips likely would see a shift toward daily commuter 
activity, as seen in Toledo, Spain. Such a shift may result in changes in land use in addition to 
economic development. The California HSR system currently in planning stages anticipates 
significant commuter populations from Riverside to Los Angeles and/or San Diego, Palmdale and 
Bakersfield to Los Angeles, and various Central Valley cities to the Bay Area. While the major 
reasons for this include a jobs-housing imbalance and expensive home prices in the major 
coastal metropolitan areas (Cervero, 2003), which don‘t generally afflict Texas cities so 
drastically, the flexibility to live in central Waco, College Station, or Austin, and commute sans 
automobile to Dallas, Houston, or San Antonio may have interest, particularly to those otherwise 
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relegated to settling in suburbs under the ―keep driving until it‘s affordable‖ mentality. Station area 
development in a number of domestic and foreign examples indicates that large-scale 
transportation investment, such as HSR, linked to well-planned station area development can 
yield valuable results such as consolidation of economic activity, improvement in economic 
health, improvements to the built environment, and positive gains in public transportation use and 
reductions in environmental impact (Nuworsoo and Deakin, 2009). Considering the economic 
development and redevelopment goals of major Texas cities for their respective downtowns and 
CBDs, the coordination of these efforts with HSR planning could be a boon for increased density 
and sustainable transportation in the urban cores of Texas cities.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The population distribution across Texas shows conflicting potential for HSR in the state. 
Although the state shows a low population density, more detailed analysis of the eastern half of 
Texas shows that population characteristics more closely reflect those of regions with well-used 
rail services in both the United States and abroad. The urban densities of Texas cities fall short of 
those in other cities abroad, but again demonstrate a need for a more nuanced analysis, as the 
differences in densities range greatly. Implications for the HSR in the emerging Texas 
megaregion demonstrate a net positive aspect for potential rail implementation, as rail will help to 
further stitch together the megaregion through transportation infrastructure. Partially responsible 
for the development of the megaregion, the city-to-city distances in Texas show that rail likely 
would achieve a high share of the modal split between cities. Finally, the regional economic 
impacts of HSR may alter city-suburb dynamics, allowing businesses to expand service areas 




Chapter 4: Potential High-Speed Rail Intermodalism 
The integration of HSR into different urban settings remains one of the largest 
uncertainties in both the United States and Texas. Evidence from other notable systems suggests 
that high urban connectivity and intermodal development correlates positively. More importantly, 
as shown by Givoni, Rietveld, and Brons et al (2000, 2007, 2009), the accessibility of a railway 
station can be a factor in determining if rail is chosen as a travel alternative. Furthermore, a high 
demand elasticity exists for rail travel with respect to station distance. In concert, these two 
findings imply that rail use may be enhanced through improved accessibility. This also supports 
the generic concept that intermodality promotes the integration of different transportation modes 
and associated services along an entire travel chain.  With HSR considered competitive with air 
over short distances, one wonders why air travel in the United States and Texas remains so 
popular despite relatively poor non-automobile connections to the nation‘s airports. Still, all well-
utilized examples of HSR exist in places with generally higher connectivity and modal variety than 
currently exists in Texas, indicating that at minimum, the impact of intermodal connections on 
HSR passenger patronage is non-negative. Exploration of Texas‘ potential in urban transit, 
intermodalism, and regional connectivity to airports yields important considerations for the future 
of HSR. 
URBAN TRANSIT  
The extent and variety of transit services plays an important role in defining a city‘s 
intermodal connectivity, and likely the demand for potential high-speed rail services. Little debate 
exists regarding the United States‘ deficiencies in urban transit use and high dependence on 
personal automobiles. Here too, Texas cities fall short. San Antonio currently holds the dubious 
claim of the most populated city in the United States without rail transit, a title formerly held by 
Houston. Arlington, midway between Dallas and Fort Worth, held the title for the largest American 
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city (at about 375,000 and growing) with no public transportation of any mode until 2008 
(METRO, 2008). Meanwhile, according to the 2009 American Community Survey (US Census 
Bureau, 2008), transit ridership in all the five major cities in the Northeast corridor connected by 
Acela Express is at least 15%, with all five cities falling in the top fifteen in the United States. With 
the top cities largely existing on the east and west coasts, with the exception of Chicago, no 
Texas cities are in the top 50. Houston, Dallas, and Austin citizens patronize transit at about 5%, 
while San Antonio and Fort Worth are lower at about 3.5% and 1.4%, respectively. These values 
should come as no surprise; they‘re perhaps slightly low by large city standards in the United 
States, but nevertheless close to the national average (5.0%).  
More striking is the relatively low use of alternative modes in the United States when 
compared on an international scale. As noted in Chapter 1, increases in wealth and income 
typically result in demand for faster transportation, which explains rapid increases in automobile 
ownership and use in developing economies, that is, until some saturation point is reached. Thus, 
large scale growth in automobile ownership decreases once a national economy reaches a 
relatively wealthy stage. Even amongst wealthy nations in Europe, Asia, and Oceania, the United 
States demonstrates that it leads by far in automobile ownership and use, and trails dramatically 
in transit use. The New York MSA, by far the highest in worker transit use in the United States at 
about 30%, pales in comparison to Stockholm (55%), Tokyo (49%), and Seoul (60%), for 
example (Kenworthy and Laube, 1999). From an intermodal standpoint, the percentage of 
workers who walk and cycle to work is even more dismal in the United States. Using recent data 
from Paris (not necessarily an archetype European bike haven), more than 30% of worker trips 
were by foot; the New York metropolitan area, again the highest in the United States, achieved a 
very modest 6% (INSEE Ile-de-France 2010, US Census Bureau, 2010d). Reasons for this 
yawning gap in use of alternative modes abound, including historic development patterns, 
existing density gradients, national energy and transportation policies, and merely the presence 
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of transit facilities themselves. Even while Texas cities compare reasonably with other major 
United States cities in multimodal transport, addressing some or all of these limiting issues may 
permit Texas cities to achieve gains in multimodalism aligning them more closely with 
international peer cities, many of which exhibit well-integrated multimodal HSR services.  
A major deterrent to transit and multimodal connectivity is the lack of a defined 
development pattern for many Texas cities. Houston may epitomize the land use and 
development conundrum, as it infamously continues to grow without any formal zoning 
regulations (this and other legal issues will be addressed in more detail later). The larger issue 
may be that outside of incorporated municipalities, counties have little formal land use zoning 
authority in Texas. Thus, it has historically been quite easy to partition and develop land without a 
large-scale plan, only to then see that land annexed by a nearby municipality that would need a 
highly compelling argument (and likely a war chest legal budget) to evict residents and rezone. 
Ergo, it makes sense why Houston, for example, has only about 70,000 residents and 140,000 
jobs within a 2 mile radius of the city center, far below other very large cities. The city is known for 
exhibiting multiple business districts, all loosely connected via freeways. Though Texas cities may 
desire intercity passenger rail services, the lower densities and minimal transit usage would likely 
be a detriment to the service‘s success. The most highly demanded examples of intercity 
passenger rail exhibit high transit use and formally planned land development. 
On the other hand, car-centric transportation in Texas may be reaching a turning point. In 
the last twenty years, multimodalism, particularly transit, progressed significantly in connecting 
the state‘s sprawling metropolitan areas. Since 1983, Dallas Area Rapid Transit (DART) has 
pursued an aggressive system of HOV lanes, bus routes, and light rail, with rail service 
commencing in 1996. While the agency‘s bus ridership is not insignificant at about 130,000 daily 
riders, the relatively rapid expansion of rail services may be DART‘s most notable achievement. 
DART currently operates 45 miles of rail on 3 lines serving nearly 60,000 passengers per day. 
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The ridership of this system has surpassed many older light rail systems, including those of 
Baltimore, San Jose, and St. Louis (APTA, 2010), and will operate about 90 miles of rail by 2015. 
DART will enhance its intermodal operations with these expansions, as the new routes 
encompass connections to both Dallas Love Field and Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airports, as 
well as a link to the Denton County Transit Authority‘s ―A-Train‖ commuter rail in Carrollton. By 
these measures, DART may be the most rapidly expanding transit provider in the nation. 
Improvements to transit are not limited to the Dallas area, although the success of rail transit 
elsewhere in the state is limited. Houston METRO services some 230,000 daily riders, with 
express commuter buses utilizing regional HOV lanes, as well as a small light rail line in the 
central part of the city (APTA, 2010). This light rail line, although only about 7 miles in length, has 
the second highest ridership per mile of all light rail systems in the United States (APTA, 2010). 
Furthermore, METRO plans to complete five new rail segments, initiate cross-town BRT service, 
and upgrade or construct twelve intermodal transit centers within the next two years. San Antonio 
and Austin are also pursuing new transit approaches, with the opening of Capital Metro‘s 
commuter rail service in Austin, and the construction of the VIA‘s Fredericksburg Road BRT in 
San Antonio. These improvements to transit operations and facilities are amidst the adoption of 
alternatives by planning agencies that produce a limited increase in VMT and promote higher 
density and less sprawl. Unfortunately, even with these upgrades on the horizon, Texas 
metropolitan areas still lag behind their peer metropolitan areas in transit use and multimodalism. 
Despite mimicking some characteristics of successful rail operations elsewhere, Texas cities 
must begin to embrace fundamental changes in access, land use, density, and development 
patterns in order to maximize the potential for intercity passenger rail in the state. 
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AIRPORT AND LOCAL RAIL INTERMODALISM 
The primary rationale for rail connections at airports is the need to transport passengers 
to and from an airport to begin and end an air travel journey. Yet, this relegates rail as an ancillary 
function of airlines and airports, whereas it could contribute a more integral part of the air 
transport network. Development of HSR services could further enhance this role (Givoni and 
Banister, 2006). Additionally, rail does not suffer from a significant negative public perception to 
the degree of other forms of transit (seen in Hine and Scott, 2000, and elsewhere). Because rail 
connections at Texas (and United States) airports are underdeveloped at best, this concept 
presents a twofold set of goals for airport intermodalism. First, the development of transit 
connections at airports must take a forefront role in airport planning and enhancement. As no 
entirely new greenfield airports are likely to be constructed in the United States any time soon 
(the most recent was Denver International Airport around the turn of the century, preceded by 
Dallas/Fort Worth International in the mid-1970s), transit connections, especially rail, must be 
integrated into existing airport planning regimens to promote local intermodalism. Second, 
airports should also consider integrated HSR connections for their potential to enhance regional 
connectivity and multimodalism, perhaps replacing some short-haul air traffic. The next two 
sections will analyze these two policy objectives. 
The nation‘s airports, as notable origin and destination centers, provide some of the best 
examples of potential intermodal connection opportunities. Intermodal connections at airports 
would boost transit utilization, which would likely contribute to greater success of HSR in a broad 
sense. American airports display a wide range of intermodal connection success. Combined 
public mode share for rail, buses, and vans is nearly 20% for San Francisco, New York, Boston, 
and Washington Reagan. Only for Atlanta and Washington Reagan is the specific mode share for 
rail above 10% (Coogan, 2008). While this may only comprise a modest number of passengers, 
for many cities these numbers exceed the rate of public transportation use substantially. Still, 
 75 
these rates of transit use in accessing American airports continue to be lower than many peer 
airports abroad. Analyzed extensively by ACRP Report 4, nineteen European and Asian airports 
achieved 20% transit use for access. As noted in the ACRP Report, the trends in airport transit 
use display considerable nuances not necessarily related to airport passenger volume. Instead 
market research indicates that air travelers with trip ends in downtowns or transit-rich areas are 
far more likely to use transit at the airport. Central business districts attract business travelers, 
who utilize transit more than vacationers or families. Limited numbers of connections and shorter 
duration of connections contribute to higher transit use as well. High service frequency also 
contributes favorably to airport transit use. Four major types of rail links with airports appear to 
exist (see Figure 21 below), as defined in Givoni and Banister (2006), and will be applied 
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Figure 21: Types of airport rail connections (Givoni and Banister, 2006) 
Texas airports substantially lack connectivity at present. A mere 6% of passenger mode 
share is comprised by public modes for Dallas/Ft. Worth, for example. Neither airport is served by 
rail transit, although DART does have plans to construct a new light rail line that will reach 
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Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport by 2015 (Leigh Fisher Associates, 2002 and DART, 2010). 
Dallas Love Field lies remarkably close to a new DART rail line, yet the line does not interface 
with the terminal, certainly a lost opportunity for DART, Dallas Love Field, and the region as a 
whole. Metropolitan transit providers serve some of the other commercial airports in the state, 
mostly by bus service (see Figure 22). 
 
Airport Mode Frequency Notes 
DFW Bus (DART) 
 
 
Trinity Rail Express 




minutes (No Sunday), 
15 minutes 
Serves Irving and 
parking lots, transfer 
to terminal bus 
Transfer to terminal 
bus at CentrePort 
station 
IAH Bus (METRO) 
 





Downtown to IAH 
 
Downtown to IAH 
Express Service 
AUS Bus (Capital Metro) 45 minutes  
SAT Bus (Capital Metro) 30 minutes  
ELP Bus (Sun Metro) 30-45 minutes  
DAL Bus (DART) 20 minutes Transfer to DART rail 
at Inwood/Love Field 
station 
HOU Bus (METRO) Approx. 20-30 
minutes 
 
BRO Bus Approx. 60 minutes Transfer to S. Padre 
Island Wave Bus 
CRP Bus (RTA) 5 hours  
HRL Bus (Valley Metro) Approx. 60 minutes  
MFE Bus (McAllen Transit) 60 minutes  
    
Figure 22: Transit connections at Texas airports 
This information suggests that Texas airports must do more to prepare for intermodal connections 
for the future. Texas airports perform well at present, with increasing passengers and constant 
needs for expansion. They do not face many of the spatial constraints of other similar airports 
nationwide and worldwide. But, with increasing passenger frustration with air journeys and 
decreasing willingness to drive, as well as metropolitan air pollution issues (noted in Mahmassani 
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et al, 2001), planning should begin soon for air-rail connections in the state, as the state‘s airports 
risk losing any competitive edge to other international gateways stateside and abroad. The IARO 
Best Practices Guide (1998) offers the following as reasons to consider rail links to airports: 
 Resource efficiency – emissions, land take, and vehicle life all tend to be better by train 
 Traffic jams unlikely on rail 
 Benefits to airport neighbors with elimination of vehicles from roadways nearby 
 Higher quality of customer service, reflecting both the airport and the journey 
 Higher perception of airport status 
 Reduced need for parking, permitting more space for development nearby (or not) 
Travelers in Texas‘ major airports indicated through surveys seen in Mahmassani et al (2002) 
that willingness exists to use alternative airport access modes, particularly transit and rail. This 
ranged from 20% to 74% in Austin and Houston, respectively. Willingness to use rail to access 
airports ranged from 8% to 28% in Austin and Houston, respectively. Because this information is 
based on a stated preference survey, however, it must be considered with caution as 
respondents frequently state one action and perform another, typically showing overly optimistic 
predictions of personal future transit use. Encouraging intermodalism at airports may involve 
relatively simple, inexpensive treatments that prioritize high-occupancy modes and vehicles. As 
stated in ACRP Report 4 (2008), ―All too frequently, the traveler who chooses more efficient, 
higher occupancy modes from the airport is sent to an outer curb, unprotected from weather, with 
little in the way of accurate information or services.‖ Improvements could include designating 
interior curbs as high-occupancy drop-off and pick-up zones or covering passenger waiting areas 
to protect from the elements. Improved signage and information about vehicle arrivals could 
easily enhance intermodal services. Perhaps intuitive, making rail an attractive mode requires a 
fast and seamless process in traveling from train to plane (or vice-versa); the best examples co-
locate air and rail terminals in the same building, but on different levels (Givoni and Banister, 
 78 
2006). Enhancing airport intermodalism requires action beyond creating a station or a stop at an 
airport as a second thought. Effective intermodal services integrate the mode and modal 
information into the airport setting (seen internationally in Figure 23 below), with direct access to 
stations or stops and thus require some architectural prioritization. These steps may not be 
revolutionary, but to overlook them in the design of airport layouts will severely limit airport 
intermodal potential for the length of the airport‗s life.  
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Airport Passengers (12 
months ending 
February 2011) 
Rail Connection Distance to CBD 
Atlanta (ATL) 89,497,347 Yes (Heavy Rail) 7 miles 
Beijing (PEK) 74,849,249 Yes (Heavy Rail) 20 miles 
Chicago O’Hare (ORD) 66,528,691 Yes (Heavy Rail) 17 miles 
London Heathrow 
(LHR) 
66,101,510 Yes (Heavy Rail) 14 miles 
Tokyo Haneda (HND) 64,511,475 Yes (Heavy Rail) 9 miles 
Los Angeles (LAX) 59,162,148 No 16 miles 
Paris Charles De 
Gaulle (CDG) 





57,008,407 No (Planned Light 
Rail) 
21 miles (Dallas), 25 
miles (Fort Worth) 
Frankfurt (FRA) 53,468,915 Yes (Heavy Rail 
and HSR) 
8 miles 
Denver (DEN) 52,310,145 No (Under 
Construction) 
25 miles 
Hong Kong (HKG) 50,867,241 Yes (Heavy Rail) 21 miles 
Madrid (MAD) 49,902,011 Yes (Heavy Rail) 8 miles 
Dubai (DXB) 47,764,900 Yes (Heavy Rail) 3 miles 
New York Kennedy 
(JFK) 
46,642,833 Yes (Heavy Rail) 12 miles 
Amsterdam (AMS) 45,718,899 Yes (Heavy Rail 
and HSR) 
6 miles 
Jakarta (CGK) 44,913,287 No (Planned Heavy 
Rail) 
12 miles 
Bangkok (BKK) 43,229,242 Yes (Heavy Rail) 16 miles 
Singapore (SIN) 42,723,394 Yes (Heavy Rail) 11 miles 
Guangzhou (CAN) 41,541,601 Yes (Heavy Rail) 17 miles 





40,387,619 No 20 miles 
Las Vegas (LAS) 39,614,518 No 5 miles 
San Francisco (SFO) 39,447,524 Yes (Heavy Rail) 13 miles 
Phoenix (PHX) 38,813,450 No (Under 
Construction) 
3 miles 
Figure 23: Texas‘ major airports‘ and peer airports‘ rail connections (Airports Council 
International, 2011) 
TEXAS AIRPORT RAIL CONNECTIONS 
From a local and regional transportation network perspective, airports contribute 
significantly to travel demand as major activity centers. In the United States and Texas, an airport 
serving 45 million passengers annually may contribute as many as 5 million VMT daily. Officials 
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charged with developing congestion management strategies or air quality improvements, for 
example, cannot ignore the impact of airports. Improvements to ground access also contribute to 
increased capacity and efficiency at airports (Coogan, 2008). Understanding successful airport 
connection attributes, however, shows that developing a highly successful airport rail connection 
is far from exact science. In addition, airport intermodal stations carry relatively high expenses; 
the Miami Intermodal Center is estimated to cost $1.8 billion. The range of factors identified in the 
previous section indicate that the degree to which each individual factor impacts success for a 
connection at a particular airport changes depending on the particular airport scenario. In light of 
this and the poor airport rail connections at present in Texas, the following will consider a number 
of factors in evaluating the potential plans (if any) and opportunities for rail connections at Texas‘ 
major airports (more than one million annual passengers). 
Austin 
Access to Austin Bergstrom International Airport via rail continues to be a discussion that 
began with the opening of the new airport in the 1990s. Rail right-of-way parallel to TX-71 
entering the airport from the west-northwest appears in the latest version of the Airport Master 
Plan, with a conceptual station near the existing terminal, though likely not in the existing Barbara 
Jordan Terminal building. Some interest in recent months has been generated by the City of 
Austin Urban Rail initiative, which visualizes connecting the airport to the center of the city via 
Riverside Drive with 10 minute headways. The connection to the airport would likely fall into a 
second phase of the urban rail plan if it moves forward. Other opportunities near the airport 
include the two rail lines owned by Capital Metro (one is the current Red Line commuter route, 
while the second is the conceptual Green Line commuter route extending to Manor and Elgin), 
although these would require acquisition of right-of-way to extend to the airport. Finally, an old rail 
spur from the UP main line passing through central Austin exists roughly parallel to TX-71 and 
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Burleson Road extending toward the airport, and could provide another option for a rail 
connection. As passenger rail is proposed for the main UP line (Lone Star Rail), perhaps the spur 
will be useful for an airport connection to the central sections of Austin or a rail station proposed 
in the Seaholm district. As the airport lies east of the city, and is inconvenient for future HSR 
heading to the city center (except for perhaps a line from the east, such as one to Houston), the 
potential for HSR is limited.  
Dallas Love Field 
Dallas Love Field sits approximately 5 miles northwest of downtown Dallas in an urban 
low-rise area. DART opened a new light rail line close to the airport in late 2010, with bus service 
on twenty minute headways connecting the airport to the Inwood light rail station. Originally DART 
considered an in-terminal stop for the light rail, but this was determined to be prohibitively 
expensive, possibly jeopardizing federal grants for the project. As a result, the airport can neither 
fully capitalize on its location near the center of the city, nor its location near a light rail line. Any 
reconfiguration of the infant light rail line is likely to come at least several decades in the future at 
the earliest. With the quality of Love Field‘s terminal facilities declining over time, the airport 
recently adopted a modernization plan for which construction is underway. Coincidentally, the 
City of Dallas pursued a feasibility study for an automated people mover between the Burbank 
DART light rail station and the terminal, requiring tunneling underneath one runway. The 
consultant team found the connector to be feasible, with the preferred alternative including an in-
terminal station, although as is typical with ―last mile‖ connections, it is expensive, with estimates 
above $400 million. Love Field‘s opportunities for HSR are limited. First, the tight urban 
configuration of the air field may prohibit new rail lines for a potential HSR connection. 
Additionally, as the preferred model from abroad tends to connect HSR to large hub airports 
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(Paris, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, as seen in López-Pita and Robuste, 2004 and elsewhere), a 
corridor orientation with a Dallas-Fort Worth-bound trajectory would likely receive priority. 
Dallas-Fort Worth International 
Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) is the busiest commercial airport in the 
state. After nearly four decades of existence, the airport at long last has begun actively pursuing 
regional rail links. Beginning at the north entrance to the airport, the former Cotton Belt rail line 
passes nearby creating an opportunity to link the airport with northern Dallas suburbs, 
northeastern Fort Worth suburbs, and central Fort Worth. Planning for the rail line between DART 
and the Fort Worth Transit Authority is not temporally aligned, meaning the split project will not 
likely be completed in unison. Additionally, the DART extension from the Green line through 
northern Irving and Las Colinas will enter DFW at the northern end, allowing for an excellent 
transfer opportunity between rail lines and the airport. Conventional wisdom would suggest 
integrating the facility into the terminal. Yet, a tolled parkway bifurcates the airport, acting as a 
barrier to adjoining rail lines approaching from opposite sides. Current plans for the Cotton Belt 
line indicate separate lines operating from Fort Worth and Dallas requiring a change of train at the 
airport. To encourage the greatest ridership possible, unifying the operations on this line would be 
the optimal approach. This would also limit the necessary station infrastructure to two rail lines 
aligned at the DFW station (the Cotton Belt and the DART Orange line), rather than three. 
Considering a HSR station at DFW, an essential element of any HSR plan in the state given the 
best practices from abroad, the potential for flight substitution (considered in depth later on), and 
the population of the region, the integration of rail at the airport becomes further disjointed. As all 
proposed HSR services in the state approach DFW effectively from the south (Fort Worth is 
southwest, Dallas is southeast), a highly desirable fully-integrated airport rail station with the 
previously mentioned services may be impracticable. Even if a future HSR station acts as a stub-
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end, which may have potential, tracks will require tight radius curves in and/or out of the airport. If 
the station were oriented east-west, trains would still turn toward the CBD of either Dallas or Fort 
Worth. Furthermore, any non-north-south station configuration, given the north-south orientation 
of International Parkway, would necessitate tunneling of some type under terminals and/or 
runways. Given these large-scale constraints, however, the airport does not suffer from a 
cramped footprint. Planned with substantial expansion room, the airport owns more than 28 
square miles of land area (some 20% larger than the island of Manhattan), at about 8 miles north-
south and 4 miles east-west, thus allowing some freedom with development and changes in land 
use. With regional growth and sprawl creeping toward the airport, the airport boundary has 
become increasingly well-delineated by abrupt lines of buildings and carefully angled roadways, 
which would provide some challenge with new airport rail access. The Trinity Rail Express, 
operating on an old Rock Island rail line, provides the closest to existing rail access to the airport. 
The service operates between Dallas and Fort Worth, with a stop in an industrial area five miles 
south of DFW‘s center, conveniently known as ―CentrePort‖. Not necessarily a strategic 
intermodal opportunity in itself, the station location approximately marks the midway point 
between the airport and central Arlington, which houses multiple professional sports facilities and 
theme parks, undoubtedly a large source of transportation demand, and thus may be an element 
in a larger scale corridor, possibly even a HSR corridor.   
El Paso 
Texas state boundaries insisting otherwise, El Paso historically and geographically may 
have more in common with New Mexico. Las Cruces, New Mexico is the only city of any size 
within 100 miles of El Paso, which lies at the extreme western tip of Texas along the Rio Grande. 
Any future rail connections to the city likely would terminate in El Paso after traveling parallel to 
the Rio Grande from Albuquerque. The airport lies approximately five miles east of central El 
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Paso just south of Fort Bliss. An abandoned rail spur to the base parallels Robert E. Lee Road 
and Airway Boulevard connecting with the main UP rail lines closer to the international border. 
This section of rail passes adjacent to the airport and may provide an opportunity for future rail 
linkage should the city or region pursue such a project.  
Houston Hobby 
Houston‘s Hobby Airport occupies a square piece of land approximately 10 miles 
southeast of downtown Houston in a mixture of residential and industrial land uses on the edge of 
Houston‘s denser core. Rail connections to Hobby, while not inevitable, have made only minimal 
progress since the commencement of rail transit in Houston. However, the Hobby Master Plan 
indicates and briefly describes the footprint for a light rail station facing the terminal entrance from 
across Airport Blvd. Additionally, prior to enacting phase two of the METRO Solutions plan, 
METRO (Harris County Metropolitan Transportation Authority) published some planning maps for 
rail in Houston indicated that a Hobby airport connection may exist in a future phase three. 
Hobby‘s potential for ―accidental rail links‖ may be the highest of the major airports in Texas. As 
Houston is replete with rail lines and regional commuter rail planning is underway, Hobby may 
find an opportunity in the near future to link itself to the rest of the city via rail. Two relatively low-
volume freight rail lines considered for commuter rail implementation pass within approximately 
two miles of the airport, generally aligned southeast-to-northwest toward central Houston, with 
BNSF Mykawa Subdivision rail spurs approaching the airport property from the west. 
Opportunities for HSR station implementation may be slim given the location of the airport. 
Unless routes continue past downtown Houston to Galveston, they will not travel out of the way to 
locate near Hobby airport to/from downtown. If trains do continue to Galveston, a stop near 
Hobby may be feasible if using existing rail rights-of-way. The lessons from abroad indicate that 
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the location of HSR stations at airports tends to work best at hub airports, likely leading to a 
prioritization of a connection to Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport before Hobby.  
Houston Bush Intercontinental 
Situated on Houston‘s north side approximately twenty miles from the downtown area, 
Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) serves the second highest number of passengers of 
commercial airports in the state. Much like Hobby, IAH currently does not connect to the regional 
transit network via rail, but the idea remains in the collective mindset of city airport planners. 
Unfortunately, the concept has progressed little. The latest airport Master Plan briefly mentions 
and budgets for light rail planning such that a rail line will eventually connect to the airport, but a 
conceptual alignment was not included. The same planning maps from the METRO Solutions 
plan mentioned for Houston Hobby airport earlier also shows a continuation to IAH of the north 
light rail extension currently under construction. The route, although certainly an approximation, 
appears to follow existing roads, likely using rights-of-way or easements. Also as with Hobby, two 
existing UP rail corridors pass in close proximity to the airport, each within about four miles of the 
airport terminal, creating a future opportunity to link the facility with rail either through shared track 
or parallel alignment limiting land taking. As for future HSR alignment utilizing the airport, IAH 
may capitalize by its geographic location in a corridor between central Houston and points north 
and northwest (Waco, College Station, the Woodlands, Dallas-Fort Worth, even Austin to some 
extent). To establish a HSR station at this busy hub airport would require little deviation, if any, 
from a direct corridor link with any of these cities. While IAH does not have the available land of 
its in-state benchmark competitor DFW, it nevertheless occupies a relatively low-density area with 
dispersed suburban residential splotches. A preferred in-terminal link, in concert with the Master 
Plan, would entail some degree of tunneling under runways and likely the terminal itself. Because 
two runways at IAH operate essentially perpendicular to all others and the terminal is surrounded 
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by runways, connecting to IAH without some degree of tunneling is likely impossible. Alignment 
near either the southern or eastern approach to the airport (John F. Kennedy Blvd. or Clayton 
Pkwy) may limit this to some degree. 
San Antonio 
San Antonio International Airport‘s location alongside a rail corridor seven miles north of 
downtown San Antonio may enable intermodal facility development before the other larger 
airports in the state. Land use and physical constraints also limit the ability of the airport to 
expand and rail service may enhance the airport‘s capacity without the need for excessive land 
taking, freeway realignment, or earthwork that would accompany new airside and/or landside 
facilities. At present, no concrete plans exist to connect the airport via public transit, although the 
VIA Transit Smartway SA transit planning process considers a possible future light rail connection 
to downtown San Antonio operating north-south along San Pedro Ave. The alignment appears to 
be purely conceptual thus far. The existing UP line under consideration for passenger rail service 
between San Antonio and Austin (Lone Star Rail) likely provides the best example of a single 
―accidental rail connection‖ in the state and grants the airport its best possibility for an intermodal 
link. The latest airport master plan acknowledges the rail line and future passenger service, but 
makes no specific arrangements. The plan provides for future land acquisition near the rail line 
south of Interstate 410, where rental car operations currently take place. The spatial constraints 
for the airport may limit the otherwise optimal opportunity for air-rail intermodalism. As two 
freeways and the UP line essentially bound the airport on three sides such that one of the two 
perpendicular runways aligns parallel with the rail line, a preferred in-terminal rail station 
arrangement might see extreme difficulty. Truly a last-mile problem, a runway, a major freeway, a 
several blocks along a side street separate the terminal and the land marked for an intermodal 
station. While HSR experiences indicate that connections at a regional airport like San Antonio 
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(rather than a hub like DFW or IAH) may not be ideal, the opportunity with the likely utilization of 
the nearby UP rail line for future passenger rail service, possibly of HSR quality, should not be left 
unimplemented unless dictated by extreme circumstances.  
REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY: AIR-RAIL SUBSTITUTION AND INTEGRATION 
Outside of measuring local connectivity at airport nodes, airport-rail integration deserves 
consideration in its own right at a regional level, as this holds a great opportunity for Texas. As 
with interactions between many other mode pairs, rail both competes with and enhances air 
operations. Over shorter distances, rail offers a time advantage, but as distances and travel time 
increase, air travel gradually overtakes this advantage. European examples (Barcelona-Madrid, 
Paris-Lyon, and Frankfurt-Köln, most notably) as well as Acela Express demonstrate that short 
haul air travel can be measurably impacted and/or eliminated by the introduction of HSR service. 
In addition to providing the time advantage over short flights, four major motives exist for 
intermodal integration at airports (Vespermann and Wald, 2010). First, related to customer needs 
and service quality, rail services provide increased reliability, comfort, and punctuality when 
compared to buses or personal cars. Second, air-rail integration enhances an airport‘s catchment 
area leading to higher passenger numbers. Third, these advantages may result in increased 
airside capacity for a given airport when rail acts as a feeder service for airlines by replacing short 
haul flights (such as many in Texas). Gates and landing slots can be reassigned to longer 
distance flights (commonly these utilize larger aircraft, thus increasing airport capacity). Finally, 
the higher occupancy of rail systems is more space efficient for accessing congested airports 
than roadways and parking lots, and thus promotes increased landside capacity. Texas stands to 
gain from air-rail integration, particularly in the second and third items, which will be the focus of 
this section. 
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The large number of regional flights operating throughout the state between the major 
hub airports in Dallas/Ft. Worth and Houston and the state‘s many small- and medium-sized cities 
provide an opportunity for successful air-rail integration. Degrees of both competition and 
complementarity exist. Competitive markets between air and HSR need not necessarily link HSR 
at airports at either end, as the user will select the mode providing the greatest perceived utility at 
the lowest generalized travel cost (Janic, 2003b). Examples of this include London-Paris, Paris-
Brussels, Washington-New York, Madrid-Barcelona, and Tokyo-Osaka. Complementarity 
between air and HSR can be established at airports with a high number of connecting 
passengers, typically occurring at hub airports for major airlines. As previously mentioned, hub 
operations for American Airlines (DFW) and Continental/United (IAH) provide an excellent 
laboratory for such an experiment, as these are two of the largest air hub operations in the United 
States. Of three generic HSR-air complementarity schemes seen in Janic 2003b, the collection of 
passengers by HSR for short-distance segments then distributed to longer distance air travel at a 
hub airport presents the most likely scenario for Texas. While linking two hub airports via HSR 
may be useful, this implies two connecting operations (air-rail and rail-air, one at each hub) for a 
three-segment trip, which is both burdensome to passengers and generally unlikely in practice in 
this scenario, as DFW and IAH serve very similar sets of destinations.  
Well-developed HSR may potentially divert millions of air passengers annually within the 
Texas Triangle region. The extensive hub operations at DFW and IAH as well as the large 
number of intercity flights on point-to-point carrier Southwest Airlines amount to a substantial 
number of passengers. Using BTS Top 100 Data (BTS, 2011a) from 2008 (which should be close 
to present data given the economic dip of 2009-2010), nearly eight million annual passengers 
enplaned and deplaned within the major airports in the Texas Triangle (see Figure 24). 
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Dallas Love 284,180 
Dallas-Fort Worth 584,206 
Houston Hobby 136,627 
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Dallas Love 508,253 
Dallas-Fort Worth 129,688 

















Dallas Love 90,842 
Dallas-Fort Worth 406,270 















Dallas Love 318,048 
Dallas-Fort Worth 593,336 
Houston Hobby 135,697 
Houston Intercontinental 374,085 
  TOTAL 7,813,040 
Figure 24: Annual commercial air passengers between major Texas Triangle airports (BTS, 
2011a) 
Complementarity between air and rail in Texas might take the form of HSR replacing 
short-distance distribution or collection flights from the major hub airports, linked to connecting 
flights originating or destined for other destinations at a greater distance. This would play the 
largest role in the smaller airports in the region, perhaps eliminating short-haul flights from cities 
such as Waco, Beaumont, College Station, Longview, or Laredo to larger airports with more 
extensive long-distance air services. Some small airports currently subsidize operations to 
minimize losses on connecting regional jet service (Gregg County Regional Airport, 2011); 
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eliminating these inefficient services makes sense both for airlines and smaller communities‘ 
budgets. According to Top 100 data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, an additional 
600,000 passengers flew between Waco, Killeen, College Station, and Beaumont to either DFW 
or IAH in 2008. The short duration of these flights and the type of small aircraft utilized means 
these flights are best-suited for substitution by rail. The potential for rail to substitute air trips 
to/from cities generally thought to be just outside the Texas Triangle (including Laredo, Tyler, 
Longview, Corpus Christi, and Wichita Falls) would increase this number even more. Janic 
(2003a) describes the specific effects of air transport when substituted for rail, which will be 
analyzed in more detail in Chapter 6. These include: 
 decreased operating costs: marginal operations costs for air are higher than for rail, 
although this falls with increased distance, 
 decreased energy consumption, 
 decreased time-to-distance cost ratio, and 
 decreased air pollution: this is not constant throughout for either mode, but nevertheless 
over a wide range of journey distances, rail averages lower emissions of most types of 
pollutants. 
 
To maximize complementarity, multimodal terminals are a necessity at hub airports, 
timetables of rail and air services should coordinate with one another, and through ticketing 
should exist across the two modes. Foreign experimentation with these ideas has occurred 
although it is limited. Lufthansa and Deutschebahn (DB) experimented with an air-rail 
arrangement, including through ticketing and baggage services, between Frankfurt Airport and 
the cities of Köln and Stuttgart. While the experiment did demonstrate the ability to replace air 
travel with rail between short distances, it also displayed the difficulties of baggage mobility 
between the two modes in a modern era of transportation security concerns. The newest ICE 
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trains on the route do not feature baggage compartments and must use modified passenger 
compartments. Secondly, the load/unload time for baggage challenges the tight schedule of rail 
operations, requiring quick work during short scheduled stops. Finally, foreign baggage must 
clear customs, requiring customs stations at train stations. Lufthansa abandoned the baggage 
check concept in 2008 after passengers displayed only nominal interest in the service over the 
previous four years compared to the larger logistical challenges presented by the concept. 
Attempts at through ticketing in the United States have achieved some success, although at a 
limited scale. Continental Airlines (soon to be United) partners with the Amtrak and the Acela 
Express service to allow airline ticket booking to certain cities served by Amtrak in the Northeast 
for a combined ticket price using the rail station at Newark International Airport (EWR). Members 
of the SkyTeam airline alliance also took a similar approach to ticketing for SNCF (Société 
Nationale de Chemins de Fer, French National Railways) rail segments in Europe to match 
transatlantic flights. The service has since ceased as Air France considers operating its own HSR 
services competing with SNCF. The ability to purchase joint tickets removes a significant mental 
barrier to the intermodal process, although such arrangements require substantial planning and 
coordination across the two different operations. Issues that affect one may not (and perhaps 
should not) affect the other; weather immediately comes to mind as one area affecting air more 
substantially than rail. The integration of reservations systems presents a large operational 
challenge to the providers, and is a primary reason that more airlines do not interface with 
European rail services at Frankfurt, Paris, or Amsterdam. As noted in ACRP 31 (2010), ―it is 
essential to activate the individual modes‘ strengths and to combine them optimally…‖ although it 
also noted that ―the complete abandonment of air service in response to the introduction of very 
high quality rail service is very rare‖ and HSR substitution for air travel in the United States will 
only take place as a part of a complete program. Additionally, as congestion continues to build on 
the state‘s metropolitan area roadways, the development of alternative modes to and from 
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airports is increasingly important. Airports are certainly not the only opportune locations for 
intermodal facilities, but provide an excellent proxy for measuring multimodal connectivity within a 
city. Furthermore, the specific air-rail interface successes seen abroad provide the best example 
for such connections at major airports in the United States, and Texas specifically. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Texas cities display a notable lack of multimodal connectivity. Urban transit systems 
remain woefully underdeveloped compared with those in peer cities, although the systems appear 
to be slowly gaining ridership and growing in service area. The expansion of urban transit and 
multimodal connectivity benefits the potential for HSR in Texas as it provides the opportunity to 
choose from a greater number of modes of travel perhaps more convenient for certain trips. 
Interfacing HSR with airports plays a particularly important role in the urban and regional 
connectivity framework because airports are major trip producers and attractors. Internationally, 
rail connections at airports contribute to enhanced regional connectivity, whether for HSR or 
urban heavy rail transit. Similar connections would benefit Texas airports and a potential Texas 
HSR system by replacing short-haul air trips and effectively increasing airport capacity without 
new terminal or runway construction. Because Texas airports will likely only explore expansion 
and reconstruction, instead of new greenfield development, it is important to integrate planning for 




Chapter 5: Spatial and Legal Considerations 
Perhaps nothing excites and ignites the public more regarding a transportation 
investment than the distribution of maps with lines depicting possible alignments for a proposed 
project. Of course, transportation planners eventually remove all but one option from 
consideration through several levels of analysis as a part of federal and state environmental 
requirements, but the potential to change the existing landscape by constructing a new rail line, 
for example, particularly in rural areas, may cause the greatest contention amongst the populace. 
Spatial issues rarely transcend projects, causing some difficulty. Even major improvements to 
existing corridors occur infrequently, and the primary issues are hardly ever the same from one 
project to the next. Instead, the lessons from to multiple projects suggest methods for the 
facilitation of spatial issues and optimizing the outcome of the public outreach process. This 
chapter presents basic information about the spatial requirements for typical rail systems, the 
limitations of the rail footprint on land, and the political issues with land taking, primarily eminent 
domain.  
EXISTING GUIDANCE FOR CORRIDOR GEOMETRY 
With HSR still in infancy as a mode in the United States, guidelines for the geometric 
alignment of corridors continue to evolve, although some degree of federal guidance exists 
alongside industry standards. As for any mode of transportation, safe and comfortable operation 
requires facility design allowing consistent speeds and limited acceleration and deceleration. The 
Code for Federal Regulations (CFR), a set of standards and regulations enabling federal acts, 
provides fundamental guidance for horizontal track geometry in Section 213, subpart C. Here, the 
same standards apply to all track speeds and have been in place since 1971, thus pertaining to 
the six classes of track defined at that time for operations below 110 mph. The designation of 
track classes coincided with the development of Amtrak and a reorganization of the federal 
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relationship with private freight railroads (see Figure 25). Emphasis on freight rail in the United 
States since resulted in designations only recently of track classes appropriate for successful 
passenger rail operations. Peterman et al (2009) note that outside the Northeast Corridor, most 
passenger and freight trains operate with speed limits of 79 mph because track is owned and 
operated by freight railroads whose trains operate most economically at slower speeds. This 
results in a twofold challenge for passenger operations on freight rail. While most US railroad 
rights-of-way have curvature and gradients that could accommodate speeds up to 125 mph with 
track and signal upgrades, this requires more investment than freight railroads will willingly make. 
In particular, FRA safety requirements for the highest speed tracks (classes 8 and 9) stipulate 
grade separation and practice indicates the inclusion of safety fencing (seen in subsequent 
diagrams), resulting in access issues for existing freight customers and faster service than is 
economical for freight. Meanwhile, passenger services require high speeds for success. Rail 
speed limits resulting in non-competitive travel times with auto or air travel severely limit the 
potential ridership of passenger rail service. Hence, dedicated tracks and right-of-way become 
essential elements for HSR service in Texas, as lower maximum speeds (e.g., 79 mph) will 
attract minimal ridership. The need for dedicated tracks and right-of-way for HSR means that the 





Speed Limit  
Freight Passenger Grade 
Crossings 
Excepted < 10 mph Not allowed Permitted 
Class 1 10 mph 15 mph Permitted 
Class 2 25 mph 30 mph Permitted 
Class 3 40 mph 60 mph Permitted 
Class 4 60 mph 80 mph Permitted 
Class 5 80 mph 90 mph Permitted 
Class 6 110 mph Permitted 




Class 8 160 mph Not permitted 
Class 9 200 mph Not permitted 
Figure 25: FRA track classifications and regulations (CFR, 2011) 
Additional classes of track (classes 6, 7, 8, and 9) for high speed operation (110 to 200 
mph) were added in the late 1990s with subsequent subtle changes to the standards seen in 
subpart G. This subpart provides guidance on maximum speed in curved sections, right-of-way 
requirements, superelevation limits, track gauge, and track stiffness requirements, among many 
others. The American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Right-of-Way Association 
(AREMA) represents industry standards by publishing the Manual for Railway Engineering, which 
has recently begun inclusion of a chapter on HSR systems. A work in progress, this AREMA 
chapter currently contains a number of blank sections to be completed as the guidelines develop, 
with current horizontal geometry guidelines addressing topics similar to those in the federal CFR 
added in 2005.  
CURVE GEOMETRY 
Engineering for curved rail segments differs little from that for curved road segments. 
Assuming a train maintains constant safe speeds on a track segment, passenger lateral 
acceleration, and therefore passenger comfort, dictates the critical design elements of a curved 
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segment. The superelevation (also known as ―cant‖ in Europe and elsewhere) describes the 
difference in elevation between the interior and exterior rails on a curve. Lateral acceleration that 
results on curved segments necessitates superelevation except at very low speeds. Basic static 
analysis shows that a vehicle traveling at velocity V in curve of radius R experiences lateral 






This acceleration may have a number of negative effects, including: 
 passenger discomfort, 
 displacement of loads, 
 risk of overturning in combination with strong lateral winds, 
 risk of derailment from a wheel flange climbing the track, and 
 high lateral forces on the track, causing undue track damage. 
Superelevation counteracts the lateral forces that may lead to one or more of these results. The 
level of elevation to counteract the lateral forces, known as the equilibrium elevation, is found 
using the following formula, recommended by AREMA and others: 
            
where E is the equilibrium elevation in inches, V is the velocity in mph, and D is the degree of 
curvature. In practice, the equilibrium elevation is reduced by up to 25% to counteract the 
potential discomfort that may result if a train stops on a superelevated section of track, as 
passengers can realistically undergo some minor discomfort without negative consequences. The 
maximum achievable elevation for high speed track is generally considered to be six inches, 
although this may be slightly higher for ballastless tracks. D, the degree of curvature, is defined 
as the angle subtended by a 100-foot chord. Simple arithmetic shows the following relationship 
between degree of curvature and radius (in feet): 
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Generally, for high-speed trains, the desirable curves will have a degree of curvature of one or 
less, indicating that curves at full speed may have radii of more than a mile (5280 feet). 
Underbalanced elevation (providing a ―cant deficiency‖) results when the equilibrium elevation is 
greater than the actual superelevation, indicating a lateral force toward the outside of the curve. 
Current FRA Track Safety Standards limit the underbalanced elevation to three inches, although 
waivers for high speed equipment have been granted for up to five inches. Active tilt trains, such 
as Acela, Talgo, or the Swedish X2000, may be permitted up to nine inches of underbalanced 
elevation by the FRA. The California High Speed Rail Authority used the guidelines outlined 
above to calculate the minimum curve radii for the California HSR Project currently in its planning 
stages, with three scenarios: a desired scenario with larger radii and smaller superelevation (four 
inches), a minimum radii scenario (six inch superelevation), and an exceptional scenario (seven 
inch superelevation, as observed in a few instances in foreign HSR systems). Figure 26 provides 
the minimum radii based on superelevation limits calculated for these three scenarios: 
 
Minimum Radii Based on Superelevation Limits 
Speed (mph) Desirable (ft) Minimum (ft) Exceptional (ft) 
250 45,000 28,000 25,000 
220 35,000 22,000 19,500 
200 30,000 18,000 16,000 
186 25,000 16,600 14,000 
175 22,000 14,000 11,200 
150 16,000 10,000 8,200 
125 10,500 7,000 5,700 
Figure 26: HSR curve radii based on superelevation values (CHSRA, 2009) 
RIGHT-OF-WAY AND WIDTH REQUIREMENTS 
Few authoritative recommendations exist for HSR right-of-way. Currently no guidance 
exists from federal agencies or industry groups, although as made clear in the Texas Rail Plan 
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(2010), UP mandates the additional purchase of right-of-way and 50 feet separating passenger 
and freight rail tracks if they are to operate in parallel. While noting that a right-of-way safety plan 
must provide guidance to mitigate risks for a HSR corridor, the FRA provides no strict guidelines 
and even admits that limited information exists for shared right-of-way scenarios, such as with 
highway corridors (FRA, 2009b), despite the inevitability of right-of-way sharing in future HSR 
projects in the United States. Turning to examples from abroad, as well as California HSR 15% 
design specifications and the Texas TGV project, the right-of-way requirements for HSR show a 
need for perhaps surprisingly little space (see Figures 27-30 below). The selected cases adapted 
from Lindahl 2001 show very similar values to those for the system planned in California and the 
beleaguered Texas TGV (see below). At the narrowest – in an aerial structure – a cross-section 
of the California system shows about 50 feet necessary for side-by-side tracks (although a 
concrete column shows an above-ground footprint of about 17 feet in width). The footprint 








Figure 28: At grade cross-section for California HSR project (Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2009) 
In the context of other HSR projects around the globe, the cross-sections for these railways 
appear to be very typical, if not slightly wider than typical. All are based on a standard rail gauge 
(4 ft 8.5 in or 1435 mm), with approximately 14-16 feet (4.6-4.9 m) between track centers for co-
located tracks. Minimum curve radii are also nearly the same across the different examples, 
again showing their similarity. Plans from the Texas TGV proposal show similar dimensions: 
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Figure 30: At grade cross-section for Texas TGV project (Texas TGV Consortium, 1991) 
The elevated structure schematic for the Texas TGV project demonstrates a likely minimum width 
for a dual track rail segment. The cross-section omits emergency walkways and places each 
track approximately equidistant from the center of the platform and the outer edges of the 
platform. Concrete piles appear in the Texas TGV drawing, showing that the column footprint 
actually does not describe the entire ground level impact of HSR. In all likelihood, the width of 
below-surface concrete pilings closely matches the above-ground width of the structure to allow 
for stability, although the diagram does not explicitly show below-ground dimensions.  
Implications of the right-of-way requirements for HSR thus include the potential to 
accommodate additional transportation growth through less land take than necessary for highway 
or air modes, although this tends to be site-specific.. The marginal impact of additional traffic on 
intercity highways and the land used by those highways, although real, is very small. This is 
especially true with large road traffic volumes in Texas. Marginal improvements and road 
expansions alleviate proportionally less traffic congestion with each subsequent improvement. 
Unless entirely new highways are constructed, the barrier effects on communities also likely 
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remain unchanged, showing a very small marginal social impact. Marginal impacts of additional 
flights at the major airports in Texas also remain small. Because major airports already exist, air 
transport tends to be in a favorable position relative to HSR with respect to land take. Additionally, 
unlike many of the other busy airports in the United States, Texas airports generally do not face 
expansion restrictions due to proximate urban development or physical elements (e.g., water, 
mountains), which would otherwise enable a case for HSR. Janic (2003a, 2003b) reports that 
HSR requires approximately 2-3 ha/km of track (which, when converted, amounts to a cross-
section of about 65-100 feet, which was confirmed earlier), while an airport requires about 30 
ha/km of airside infrastructure such as runways and taxiways, the major land requirement for 
airports. Based on research from the EU, Janic further reports that the intensity of these land 
uses are comparable, with 3.23 and 2.86 million pass-km per year per ha of taken land for air 
travel and HSR, respectively. While the exact analysis method is unknown, analysis comparing 
typical land transportation capacities between rail and road shows that rail uses land with 
anywhere from six to five hundred times the efficiency of freeways. Taking data from TxDOT, 
approximations for freeway width based on design specifications and empirical data from Google 
Maps, and typical approximations for passenger volumes for both automobiles and rail, the land 
use efficiency for transportation carry capacity of HSR can be shown to far exceed that of 

















Freeway 100 60000 1.89 13,608,081 3.0 
200 60000 1.89 6,804,041 1.5 
300 60000 1.89 4,536,027 1.0 
Rail 35 24 400 78,994,758 17.4 
35 720 400 2,369,842,746 522.4 
50 24 400 55,296,331 12.2 
50 720 400 1,658,889,923 365.7 
75 24 400 36,864,221 8.1 
75 720 400 1,105,926,615 243.8 
100 24 400 27,648,165 6.1 
100 720 400 829,444,961 182.9 
Note: 24 trains per day  = 12 trains in each direction with two-hour headway, 720 trains 
per day = 360 trains in each direction with four minute headway, 400 pass/train 
represents 66% load factor for 600-seat train 
Figure 31: Land space efficiency of transport carrying capacity 
The efficiency values here show a wide range depending greatly on the demand for HSR service. 
The vehicle demand for a freeway is obtained using average annual daily traffic (AADT) data from 
TxDOT along a rural segment of Interstate 35 between Waco and Temple (approximately 60,000 
daily vehicles). Of course, comparing a theoretical HSR system to an existing freeway system 
means marginal improvements to the freeway (e.g., freeway expansion alternatives) will always 
appear more advantageous given the incremental costs of an entirely new rail system. Still, given 
that the expansion of a single freeway lane in each direction (24 feet total at minimum) requires 
an area in which the column footprint of an aerial HSR structure would fit, the superior space 
efficiency of HSR must be given due consideration. Indeed, with the expense of a freeway 
expansion approaching the cost of HSR, failure to consider HSR as an option for corridor 
improvement may be a missed opportunity. TxDOT estimates it will spend $9.7 billion (in 2006 
dollars) to complete planned improvements to the I-35 corridor, adding in most cases an 
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additional lane in each direction, yet providing only 27% of the additional capacity required by 
2025 (TxDOT, 2010d). The total cost of additional required capacity is estimated at more than 
$36 billion (in 2006 dollars) by 2025. The potential cost of rail, while unknown, is likely of this 
same magnitude; the estimated cost of the California HSR project is $45 billion, and as shown, 
HSR provides far greater transportation carrying capacity per unit of land take than freeways at a 
comparable capital cost. 
LAND USE AND ZONING 
The inextricable relationship between land use and transportation revealed through 
research in the last two decades shows that transportation heavily impacts community character, 
neighborhood quality, job density, accessibility, land values, and housing prices. Additionally, 
enormous implications due to unsustainable increases in automobile transportation have shifted 
the interaction of both policy areas. Kenworthy and Laube (1999) show that increases in motor 
vehicle ownership correlate with declines in population density. As Robert Cervero (2000) 
observes, 
―Lower densities reduce transit usage, which leads to cuts in services which in turn 
provoke even higher car ownership. Insidiously, sprawl and car dependency feed off one 
another.‖ 
As shown in Chapter 1, the increasing demand for travel, overwhelmingly by autos, recently 
reached a plateau in the United States. Although representing many societal trends, this plateau 
at least partially represents a public wearisome of increasing auto dependence and increasing 
auto commute times. This societal decision point marks an excellent opportunity for alternative 
modes to intercept the trajectory of increasing sprawl in favor of shifts toward greater urban 
density and reduced urban sprawl. HSR, when appropriately designed and aligned with changes 
in public policy, provides a once-in-a-generation opportunity for a large-scale transportation 
investment that will further realign the land use and transportation relationship in the United 
States, much as the interstate highway system did in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
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A section of Chapter 3 commented on the ability of HSR to spur local and regional 
economic development in the urban cores of Texas cities. Including Houston‘s unusual non-
zoning land use controls (Qian, 2010), Texas municipalities possess the zoning tools to 
encourage development that might synergistically interact with rail stations in city centers. Texas 
cities have shown interest in innovative transit-oriented development (TOD), or at minimum 
transit-adjacent development. Urban planning instructors and transit-oriented development 
officials frequently point to the fairly successful Mockingbird Station along the original DART line 
north of downtown Dallas, if for no other reason than the obvious juxtaposition with the auto-
oriented nature of the city. Unlike counties in Texas, which act as limited functional agents of the 
state, municipalities (cities) like Dallas may zone for various land uses, such as those guiding 
TOD, provided the zoning regulations follow the guidance of a comprehensive municipal plan. 
Section 211 of the Texas Local Government Code states that generally a municipality may 
regulate: 
 the height, number of stories, and size of buildings; 
 the percentage of a lot that may be occupied; 
 the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces; 
 population density; 
 the location and use of buildings, other structures, and land for business, industrial, 
residential, or other purposes; and 
 the pumping, extraction, and use of groundwater by persons other than retail public 
utilities. 
Texas municipalities also exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over unincorporated areas outside 
the city limits, with the intent of promoting the public health and welfare of those persons living 
adjacent to a municipality (Local Government Code Sec. 42). However, municipalities may not 
subject any area under extraterritorial jurisdiction to zoning regulations stated above (Local 
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Government Code Sec. 212). Implicitly, when municipalities annex those unincorporated areas 
developed with no zoning regulations under county jurisdiction, the existing land uses are 
―grandfathered in‖. Such an arrangement means that urban areas attempting to limit sprawl must 
have stronger tools at the regional level to guide (or even prevent) development in unincorporated 
areas. Cervero (2000, 2003) highlights the successful regional planning efforts of Georgia, 
Florida, and Maryland, for example, to guide smart growth in those states. Regional- or county-
level zoning authority in concert with city zoning encouraging density in Texas cities must 
accompany the development of HSR for it to transform the land use-transportation relationship. 
Otherwise, as observed in multiple media outlets (i.e. New York Times, the Transport Politic, 
Wired) HSR development will only sustain the sprawling urban reality of the present. 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
Among the more well-known tools used by government entities to craft transportation 
corridors and economic development is eminent domain. While ―eminent domain‖ colloquially 
may refer to the purchase of any land for a public purpose, the actual definition specifies the 
seizure of land by a government entity for public use with due compensation, yet without consent 
from the private property owner. Thus, while land acquisition may comprise a substantial portion 
of a transportation project‘s budget (as seen in Chapter 7), it does not imply all land purchases 
occurred without owner consent. Nevertheless, eminent domain remains an important aspect of 
transportation corridor development in Texas for HSR. Indeed, as noted in ―Curve Geometry‖ 
earlier, high speed trains require massive radii to travel both fast and comfortably. Such curvature 
requirements, at least for the train velocity needed to succeed in Texas, do not match the curves 
of any other transportation infrastructure, except for perhaps certain limited access freeway 
segments. This implies that those rural areas where trains achieve the highest speeds will require 
land acquisition, possibly through eminent domain. The Texas Statutes extensively delineate land 
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acquisition through eminent domain. Specifically, Chapter 21 of the Texas Property Code governs 
eminent domain legal proceedings and the required communication occurring between property 
owner and the particular state or local government agents. The Local Government Code and 
Transportation Code denote particular passenger rail-related entities and purposes that are 
enabled with eminent domain rights by the state: 
Local Government Code 
 Municipalities may ―exercise the right of eminent domain for a public purpose to acquire 
public or private property‖ for various purposes including ―the providing, enlarging, or 
improving of a…railroad terminal...‖ or for ―any other municipal purpose the governing 
body considers advisable.‖ (Chapter 251) 
 County uses of eminent domain are less explicitly defined, but still state that ―a county 
may exercise the right of eminent domain to condemn and acquire land…[for] public 
purpose authorized by law.‖ (Chapter 261) 
 Acquisition of property (through eminent domain if necessary) by municipalities is 
permitted within the county in which the municipality lies as well as the municipal limits for 
the purpose of a ―public way‖, as well as for alterations to railroads. (Chapter 273) 
 Elimination of slums or blight are considered ―matters of state policy and concern that 
may be best addressed by the combined action of private enterprise, municipal 
regulation, and other public action through approved urban renewal plans.‖ 
Improvements necessary to eliminate slum or blight conditions are ―public purposes for 




 Railroads may ―exercise the power of eminent domain for the purposes…necessary for 
the construction and use of its railway, stations, and other accommodations necessary to 
accomplish company objectives‖ including acquiring land for ―right-of-way.‖ (Chapter 112) 
 Electric railways, corporations chartered with the purpose of constructing, acquiring, 
maintaining, or operating electrified lines between municipalities in the state for 
transportation of freight or passengers may ―exercise the power of eminent domain with 
all the rights and power granted by law to a railroad company‖ provided that right-of-way 
does not exceed 200 feet in width. (Chapter 131) 
 Intermunicipal Commuter Rail Districts, state entities linking major cities by rail, may 
exercise the power of eminent domain provided the acquisition of property ―is a public 
necessity and is necessary and proper for the construction, extension, improvement, or 
development of commuter rail facilities and is in the public interest.‖ However, this does 
not apply to land under TxDOT‘s or MTA‘s jurisdiction or a rail line owned by a common 
carrier or municipality. Statutes also require that districts, ―to the extent possible…use 
existing rail or intermodal transportation corridors for the alignment of [their] system.‖ 
(Chapter 173) 
 Municipal grade-crossing improvements, permitted in municipalities of 100,000 people or 
greater, may require the acquisition of property. A municipality may ―exercise the power 
of eminent domain to acquire…any property…necessary‖ for grade-crossing 
improvements, including ―removing and relocating railroad tracks.‖ (Chapter 317) 
 Regional Mobility Authorities are authorized to study, evaluate, design, finance, acquire, 
construct, maintain, repair, and operate transportation projects that are included in 
applicable MPO plans and consistent with both the statewide transportation plan and 
statewide transportation improvement program (STIP). ―The department [TxDOT] may 
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condemn property [through exercise of eminent domain] that is a part of a transportation 
project of an authority if the property is needed for the construction, reconstruction, or 
expansion of a state highway or rail facility.‖ (Chapter 370) 
 Metropolitan Rapid Transit Authorities (MRTAs) retain the ability to acquire, construct, 
develop, own ,operate, and maintain a transit system within the authority territory. An 
authority may ―acquire by eminent domain any interest in real property‖ but may not 
―unduly interfere with interstate commerce or authorize the authority to run an authority 
vehicle on a railroad track that is used to transport property.‖ (Chapter 451)  
 Regional Transportation Authorities may, for the construction, repair, maintenance, or 
operation of [a] public transportation system, ―acquire by eminent domain any interest in 
real property‖, provided such action takes place with the approval of the municipality or 
county with jurisdiction. (Chapter 452) 
 Under the general powers and duties of TxDOT, the department may not ―use eminent 
domain for a purpose…that unduly interferes with interstate commerce or establishes a 
right to operate a vehicle on a railroad track used to transport property.‖ (Chapter 455) 
 Coordinated County Transportation Authorities may, ―as necessary or useful in the 
construction, repair, maintenance, or operation of a public transportation system, use a 
public way [and] acquire by eminent domain any interest in real property‖, provided it is 
done with the approval of the municipality or county with jurisdiction. (Chapter 460) 
 
These statutes indicate a wide capability for the use of eminent domain for land acquisition in rail 
projects. The primary deficiency within these statutes is the lack of clear authority for interurban 
passenger rail transportation. Special districts, such as intermunicipal commuter rail districts and 
interurban electric railways, provide a necessary avenue for passenger rail project development 
and dictate integration with urban area transit systems. However, the statutes governing transit 
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systems for small and medium-sized municipalities and counties do not address rail, and are 
written assuming bus-only operations. While presently accurate, such provisions do little to plan 
for any future rail operations and demonstrate a crucial gap in eminent domain legislation, 
particularly for cities such as Waco, Bryan/College Station, Temple, and San Marcos. These 
cities‘ transit providers, certain to be linked to a potential Texas passenger rail system, currently 
have no legislative guidance on eminent domain related to rail. Identifying future corridors for 
HSR in Texas will likely utilize powers granted to intermunicipal commuter rail districts and 
interurban electric railways, although given current gaps in rail governance, it is reasonable to 
expect that statutes will be clarified and enhanced. With the geometric requirements for HSR 
necessitating land acquisition, future implementation of HSR plans will likely induce a flurry of 
legislation specifically identifying the rights of the state and private property owners in rail 
corridors. The public has a historically critical eye for state land acquisition, even if for public 
benefits, probably meaning this will develop into a major issue in the future for HSR beyond 
recent developments (see Chapter 8). 
 HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN HIGH-TENSION WIRE CORRIDORS 
Stemming from the spatial challenge of locating right-of-way for HSR corridors, high-
tension electricity wire corridors deserve consideration. Since the transportation literature appears 
thin on the topic of co-locating both transportation and high-tension wire corridors, the idea 
deserves further research. A feasibility study by the Maryland DOT in 2002 highlights important 
issues and examples nationwide of such arrangements. The advantages and concerns of using 
such utility corridors may include: 
 Reduced need for clearing forested areas. Many transmission rights-of-way have been 
cleared to allow for sag and/or sway of power lines. The incremental impact of 
constructing a transportation facility in the same right-of-way could be less than that of 
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undisturbed land. The number of environmental permits required may be less than for an 
undisturbed corridor. 
 Brownfield development. Many high-tension electricity corridors qualify as brownfield, and 
thus may qualify for particular development opportunities. Transportation facilities may 
make better use of the underutilized land.  
 Concentrated linear land use. By utilizing high-tension wire rights-of-way, the socio-
economic issues caused by the intrusion of a new transportation corridor and a utility 
corridor will be lessened through their combination. However, neighborhoods tend to 
accept utility corridors more easily than transportation corridors, meaning this advantage 
may be limited. 
 Transportation facility geometry. High-tension wire corridors tend to be long and straight, 
which matches the profile of HSR geometry. Issues would come with curves. Utility 
corridors can abruptly change directions, whereas a high-speed train requires large radii.  
 Increased costs. The co-location of the two uses may result in increased construction or 
maintenance costs for each out of the necessity to continue to provide both access and 
safety barriers 
 Electrical interference. Electromagnetic interference may disturb electronic 
communication devices required for train operation. Interference depends on a number of 
climate and weather variables, but the design of ―Faraday Shields‖ may address 
concerns at a high cost. 
High-tension corridors may provide a feasible alternative to new land acquisition in rural areas for 
HSR corridors. A number of these utility corridors cross the central section of Texas and co-
location of rail in the corridor would require minimal deviation from an ideally straight path 
between cities. These utility corridors tend to avoid urban areas. However, closer to urban areas, 
trains operate more slowly and must navigate more nimbly, meaning that the utility corridors may 
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play less of a role. Certainly further investigation is needed, as such an arrangement would 
require a unique relationship between utilities and the rail operator, but an initial consideration 
seems to bear possibilities.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As the United States delves into HSR, the importance of developing corridor design 
guidelines will become increasingly valuable. At present, no complete guidelines exist, although 
the FRA does provide recommendations based on 9 classes of track broken down by speed up to 
200 mph. In addition to the implications of this on corridor curvature and alignment, the right-of-
way requirements for corridors also pose challenging questions for the identification of routing. 
Based on estimated right-of-way requirements, rail demonstrates much higher transportation 
carrying capacity than roadways, although the marginal improvements needed at present sway 
the case for roads as only incremental improvements are possible. Land use and zoning 
regulations may provide the essential tools for cities to guide transportation corridor development 
that also promotes density and limits sprawl. Limitations on the role of counties, however, will 
hamper the ability to achieve such goals. Eminent domain will play an important role in the 
inevitable land acquisition required for transportation facilities, and thus careful analysis and 
improvements to eminent domain legislation will be necessary to simultaneously please the public 
desire for personal land ownership and adequate transportation facilities. The potential use of 
utility corridors provides one approach that may enable HSR to undertake long straight, rural 
track segments with minimal land acquisition.  
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Chapter 6: Emissions, Energy, Safety, and Economics 
Coinciding with the effects of HSR on limited spatial resources, environmental factors 
also impact the success of HSR systems. Increasing concerns regarding use of fossil-based 
energy, climate change, and the implementation of sustainable transport practices (among other 
facets of human life) necessitate environmentally-conscious analysis of HSR vis-à-vis other 
modes already subjected to this analysis. A great many factors influence environmental 
measures of transport, including load factor, energy source, vehicle properties, and 
manufacturing. In addition to these factors, the safety implications for HSR cannot be overlooked. 
HSR play an important role in transport policy acting as one of several tools to achieve local, 
regional, or national goals for energy efficiency, environmental awareness, reduced transportation 
expenses, increased safety, and cost-effective transportation networks. The ability to 
simultaneously accomplish such goals while also achieving an increased need for higher-speed 
modes, discussed earlier, indicates that HSR should not be overlooked for its large first-glance 
price tag. However, to be clear, the implementation of HSR, all else equal, versus a do nothing 
scenario creates environmental burdens. But, if these burdens can be substituted for the even 
larger environmental burdens of existing transportation infrastructure, then the implementation of 
HSR produces net environmental benefits. The stream of returns HSR provides to society as a 
whole may indicate that it is a worthwhile investment, even if does not come cheaply in the short 
term. 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY COMPARISON 
Energy efficiency of transport greatly affects the use of natural resources, individual 
transport expenditure, and the impacts of energy price fluctuations on the nation‘s transportation 
portfolio. Because of greater energy efficiency when compared to more commonly used modes, 
rail may provide quantifiable improvements in overall energy use at a large-scale. Implications for 
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this range dramatically from the individual level to the global level, but generally represent an 
opportunity cost where decreased transport expense as a result of energy efficiency means 
expenses in other more preferred areas, perhaps health care or education (Woodcock et al, 
2007). Rail is measurably more efficient than most other common modes in terms of energy 
consumption. Nevertheless, as cautioned in the Transportation Energy Data Book (Davis and 
Diegel, 2010): 
―Great care should be taken when comparing modal energy intensity data among modes. 
Because of the inherent differences among the transportation modes in the nature of 
services, routes, available, and many additional factors, it is not possible to obtain truly 
comparable national energy intensities among modes. These values are averages, and 
there is a great deal of variability even within a mode.‖ 
Still, despite the complexities in multimodal energy efficiency comparison, numerous sources 
arrive at similar results. When considering average energy use in operation, it appears that rail 
carries some advantage. This advantage greatly depends on several factors, including passenger 
load factor, trip distance, and vehicle dynamics. Yet, it can be illustrated very simply by 
considering a typical street with a personal automobile, a streetcar, and a bus. Space 
requirements aside, a personal auto with 5 passengers operates with greater energy efficiency 
than a streetcar or a bus carrying those same 5 passengers. Yet, depending on trip type, 
destination, time of day, and numerous other factors, on average the streetcar will carry a greater 
percentage of overall capacity. Personal autos, with an average occupancy of 1.59 persons are 
operating at approximately 32% (the ―load factor‖) of capacity (for a 5-seat vehicle), whereas a 
60-person-capacity bus or streetcar (that likely does not require 12 times the power of the 
personal vehicle) operating at 50% capacity consumes less energy per occupant than a personal 
car. 
This presents an interesting issue regarding energy efficiency. While rail likely provides 
an excellent opportunity to substitute longer-distance trips from less efficient auto or air modes, it 
also must operate at a somewhat higher load factor in order to achieve tangible benefits. Thus, it 
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is essential to operate rail lines that will generate significant ridership. As stated by Álvarez 2010 
regarding the successful AVE service in Spain: 
―…the main advantage of the AVE is not that it consumes less energy and emits fewer 
greenhouse gases than the conventional train. The main advantage is that, thanks to its 
speed, it is capable of attracting a high percentage of travelers away from energy-
inefficient modes of transportation, such as aircraft and private cars. ― 
It appears that operating busses may be even more efficient than operating rail in some corridors. 
This delves into previously addressed social stereotypes related to certain modes. Generally, it is 
thought that busses may never achieve ridership of comparable rail lines because of a stigma of 
inferiority associated with busses. Recent efforts in bus rapid transit (BRT) technology may begin 
to overcome the stereotypes that continue to plague urban buses. 
Based on observed occupancy of the vehicles of different modes, it should be expected 
that a HSR system of average load factor would out-perform automobiles of average load factor 
on the same route. See Figure 32 for examples of energy efficiency across modes. Observed 
load factors on various HSR systems indicate that load factors of approximately 50%-80% are 
typical (Network Rail 2009). This is somewhat less than airplanes (65%-90%, average 82% in the 
United States for the twelve months ending February 2011, BTS, 2011a), although greater than 
automobiles in 100-mile-or-greater scenarios (1.89 passengers per vehicle, equivalent to about 
38% load factor in a five-seat automobile, NHTS, 2009). With transport comprising the largest 
single end-use energy category at approximately 30% of overall energy use in the United States, 
of which 96% is petroleum-based (Davis and Diegel, 2010 Transportation Energy Data Book), 
shifts in transport energy consumption have large implications for overall energy use at a national 
and international level as fossil fuel resources dwindle and effects of greenhouse gases resulting 
from those fossil fuels become clearer.  
 117 
Mode Energy Use Unit Source Notes 
TGV 0.19 kWh/pass-km Janic 2003  
ICE 0.22 kWh/pass-km Janic 2003  




Car 0.48 kWh/pass-km AG Álvarez 2010  
Coach (Bus) 0.12 kWh/pass-km AG Álvarez 2010  
Plane 0.54 kWh/pass-km AG Álvarez 2010  
Conventional 
Train 
0.26 kWh/pass-km AG Álvarez 2010  
HSR 0.19 kWh/pass-km AG Álvarez 2010  
Airbus A320-
200 
0.425-0.248  kWh/sec-km Janic 2003 300 km/1200 km 
TGV 0.106-0.141 kWh/sec-km Janic 2003 200 km/1200 km 
Car 3437  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Personal truck 3641  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Motorcycle 1875  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Bus Transit 4348  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Air 2995  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Amtrak 2398  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Rail Transit 2521  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Commuter Rail 2656  BTU/pass-mi Transportation Energy 
Data Book 2010 
 
Human (60 kg) 
on Bicycle 
0.056 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003)  
Human Walking 0.2 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003)  
Intercity Train 0.59 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003)  
Boeing 747 1.06 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003)  
Urban Bus 1.11 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003)  
Car 1.43 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003) (4 passengers, 
long journey) 
Concorde 5.0 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003)  
Car 5.0 MJ/pass-km Smith (2003) (1.15 
passengers, 
urban commute) 
Rail (electric) 0.19 MJ/pass-km Dey Chaudhury (2010)  
Rail (diesel) 0.18 MJ/pass-km Dey Chaudhury (2010)  
Figure 32: Estimates of energy use of various transport modes 
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EMISSIONS 
Evaluating transportation‘s impact on the environment involves an increasingly complex 
analysis subject to some degree of subjectivity. The scope of environmental analysis regarding 
transportation primarily encompasses exhaust emissions, noise, water, and climate change, 
although also extends to include land take, health impacts, and safety implications. Because of 
the variety of environmental factors considered and their greatly varied effects, a common 
measuring stick is necessary against which to measure impacts. Yet, evaluation in terms of 
monetary units, by far the most common measurement, requires significant assumptions as the 
level of scientific knowledge and certainty exists amidst controversy (assigning monetary value to 
human life, for example) (Givoni, 2007). In light of the state of practice and the intent of this thesis 
to lean toward broad scale comprehension of rail-related issues, the environmental section 
merely aims to assess important environmental measures and qualitatively understand potential 
impacts of rail. Thus, addressing varying environmental concerns of different pollutants 
constitutes the focus of this section.  
Nitrous Oxides (NOx) 
While not a result of electrically-propelled HSR, NOx results from the combustion of fossil 
fuels and contributes to local air pollution at ground level and climate change when emitted at 
high altitudes (EPA, 2011). Thus, HSR substitution of air travel, a substantial contributor of 
tropospheric NOx, provides an opportunity to reduce emission of this particular pollutant. With the 
average take-off/landing cycle (operations below the troposphere) taking less than ten minutes of 
flight time, the contributions to global warming become the larger concern (Givoni, 2007). 
Nevertheless, local NOx accumulations affect respiratory functioning and impact local ozone 
development. Shown in Chester (2010), the extent of NOx emissions over the life cycle of a HSR 
system greatly depends on the electricity source and the passenger load of the different modes. 
Relative to automobiles, HSR with the current mix of electricity sources appears to see slight 
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advantages. This is further confirmed by acomparison of existing services between Paris and 
London by Givoni (2007). Currently NOx concentrations in Texas and the United States meet 
existing EPA National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). However, NOx reacts with volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs) in sunlight to form ground level ozone (―bad‖ ozone, versus ―good‖ 
ozone occurring 10-30 miles above the earth) that causes a variety of respiratory-related 
maladies. Ground level ozone also damages crops and ecosystems. According to the EPA, 
ozone reduces crop production by approximately $500 million annually. Emissions from industrial 
facilities, power generation facilities, vehicle exhaust, gasoline vapors, and chemical solvents 
contribute VOCs and NOx to the ground level atmosphere. Currently Texas‘ two largest 
metropolitan areas, Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington and Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, as well as the 
Beaumont-Port Arthur area fall into nonattainment for NAAQS in ozone concentration, although 
the areas have seen modest improvements since 2000. Based on revised 2008 standards for 
ozone concentration, TCEQ notes that the Austin, San Antonio, Victoria, Corpus Christi, and the 
Longview-Tyler Northeast Texas Compact Area fall under near non-attainment, with some of 
these areas subject to early action to hopefully forestall seemingly impending non-attainment 
status (see Figure 33 below). 
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Figure 33: Air quality non-attainment status in Texas counties (TCEQ, 2010) 
Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) 
SO2 irritates respiratory function and contributes to acid deposition. Approximately 93% 
of SO2 emissions in the United States result from power plants (73%) and industrial processes 
(20%) through the combustion of fossil fuels (EPA, 2011). Both the construction and operation 
phases of HSR thus create SO2 emissions, while combustion engines in automobiles and 
airplanes only emit substantial quantities in vehicle construction, and small quantities in 
operation. Thus, as observed in Chaudhury (2003), the comparison of corridor SO2 may be 
infeasible with power plants for electrically-powered HSR existing elsewhere, although larger 
scale emissions measurement should still occur. SO2 presents the primary pollutant for which 
HSR demonstrates a substantial disadvantage. For HSR to obtain favorable levels of SO2 
emissions compared to other modes, implementation of a clean energy mix must take place. 
Givoni 2007 estimates 35.4 grams/seat of emitted SO2 for a HSR journey between London and 
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Paris compared with only 2.9 grams/seat of emitted SO2 for an air journey, based on the existing 
energy mix. Chester (2010) evaluates the life-cycle environmental impact for the 2030 operation 
of the proposed California HSR system using the current electricity mix in California versus a 
―clean energy mix‖ and arrives at this same general conclusion, with auto modes seeing similar 
values to airplanes. Analyzed in full detail later, the electricity mix in Texas, largely comparable to 
California, would require a substantial overhaul to achieve SO2 emission levels that improve on 
current auto and airplane emissions of SO2. Currently Texas metropolitan areas meet NAAQS for 
SO2 concentration.  
Particulate Matter (PM) 
Particulate matter (PM) comprises a category of pollutants including both solids and 
liquids smaller than 10 micrometers in diameter that cause a number of ailments acting solely or 
when bonded with NOx and SO2. Potential effects encompass respiratory ailments, aggravated 
asthma, chronic bronchitis, irregular heartbeat, and non-fatal heart attacks when particulates 
lodge deeply in lungs. Fine particles (smaller than 2.5 micrometers in diameter) contribute to 
urban visibility issues (haze), changes in acidity in bodies of water, and affect the well-being of 
sensitive forests and crops. Additionally, with transport by wind and rain, deposition on stone 
fixtures occurs; these fixtures (many of them buildings and monuments of regional and national 
significance) then see degradation and damage as a result (EPA, 2011). Particulate matter 
results from the combustion of fossil fuels and thus concentrates in areas of industrial operations 
and population. As a result, electrically-powered HSR contributes minimally to this outside of 
electricity generation. However, because of regulations by the EPA on particulate emissions, auto 
and airplane emissions of particulates remain low as well. Both Chester (2010) and Givoni (2007) 
support the notion that HSR contributes lower particulate emissions to the environment compared 
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with airplanes and automobiles. Currently no areas in Texas exist in non-attainment for SO2 
concentration.  
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
Among the greenhouse gases, CO2 contributes most substantially to global warming and 
climate change. At approximately 30% of overall emissions, the transport sector is the single 
largest contributor of carbon emissions, largely a result of the overwhelming use of fossil fuels 
described above. As such, it is essential to evaluate CO2 emission impacts from rail. While much 
political debate continues in the United States regarding climate change (it appears a majority of 
Americans accept global warming, although support for the cause and effects show markedly less 
consensus), numerous other nations abroad include HSR implementation as an essential 
component of transport policy aiming to reduce emissions and limit climate change potential 
(European Commission, 2011). Simply stated, the impacts of global warming include climate 
change, which will likely lead to greater variability in weather patterns, rising sea levels, and other 
effects whose overall impacts are expected to be negative and will impose a social cost (IPCC, 
2007). CO2 forms a vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions and exhibits the greatest 
availability of data; analyzing the impact of HSR as a modal alternative within the realm of 
greenhouse gas emissions thus requires prioritization of CO2 consideration (Givoni et al, 2009). 
As when comparing energy consumption of different modes, comparisons of CO2 consumption on 
a modal basis requires many assumptions, and analysis changes depending on factors such as 
load factor, electricity source, route traversed, and vehicle type. The literature, however, appears 
to agree fairly uniformly that HSR use at present emits less CO2 than other intercity modes (see 
Figure 34 below). Similar to many other emitted pollutants, a comprehensive life cycle analysis 
that considers the construction and electricity source of transport operations provides a more 
accurate estimate of the holistic impact of HSR implementation on the amount CO2 emitted into 
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the environment and can estimate breakeven points for different project alternatives. This chapter 






Air (London-Paris) 43,265  Givoni and Banister (2006) (grams total) 
Air Airbus A320 42.5-60.7 Givoni et al. (2009) 100/70 load factor, 
London to Paris 
Airplane 34.0 Hayashi et al 2005 Operation 
Airplane 171 Smith 2003 65% load factor 
Domestic flight 191 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
Plane 169.1 Álvarez 2010  
Short range aircraft 117.2 Kageson 2009  
Average motorbike 106 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
Long-distance buses 19.1 Kageson 2009  
Bus/coach 69 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
Coach 32.3 Álvarez 2010  
Car 113.0 Álvarez 2010  
Car/Taxi 104 Givoni et al. (2009)  
Cars (combustion) 45.8 Kageson 2009 20% biofuels 
Electric Cars 53.0 Kageson 2009  
Average car 130 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
Average diesel car 124 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
Motor Vehicle 141 Smith 2003 1.7 
passengers/auto 
Passenger car 31.7 Hayashi et al 2005 Operation 
Electric Trains 54 Givoni et al. (2009)  
HSR 7.2-14.4 Givoni et al. (2009) 50/100 load factor, 
London to Paris 
Diesel Trains 69 Givoni et al. (2009)  
Fast Trains (150 km/h) 14.6 Kageson 2009  
HSR (280 km/h) 20.6 Kageson 2009  
Conventional Train 37.9 Álvarez 2010  
HSR 26.7 Álvarez 2010  
HST (London-Paris) 7,194.0  Givoni and Banister (2006) (grams total) 
Light rail/tram 78 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
London Underground 65 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
National Rail 60 Dept. for Transport, 2008  
ICE 27.515 Janic (2002)  
TGV 4.011 Janic (2002)  
High Speed Trains 42 Smith 2003 50% load factor 
Rail (diesel) 13.41 Dey Chaudhury (2010)  
Rail (electric) 25.57 Dey Chaudhury (2010) Existing energy mix 
Shinkansen 3.9 Hayashi et al 2005 Operation 
Superconduction MAGLEV 13.0 Hayashi et al 2005 Life Cycle Analysis 
Ordinary Railway 5.0 Hayashi et al 2005 Operation 
Tohoku Shinkansen 16.0 Hayashi et al 2005 Life Cycle Analysis 
Tokaido Shinkansen 5.4 Hayashi et al 2005 Life Cycle Analysis 
Figure 34: Carbon emissions of various transport modes 
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IMPACT OF ENERGY SOURCES 
As stated in the consideration of emitted air pollutants above, the contribution of those 
pollutants by HSR varies greatly on local electricity source. Highlighted earlier, though the 
vehicles themselves may not emit because the combustion of fuel does not take place locally, the 
impact of operating a train causes concentrated emissions at the energy source, a power facility 
or plant in this case. Thus HSR implementation without related changes of electricity source 
provides improvements in localized emissions perhaps along a heavily traveled auto corridor, but 
realizes minimal gains and possibly losses in emission reduction at a larger national, 
multinational, or global scale. Without delving deeply into tangential energy policy issues, this 
section considers different energy sources and the relationship with transport. Reported in Givoni 
et al (2009) and Lenzen (2008) in Figure 35, the carbon intensity of various energy sources 
demonstrates a clear advantage for non-fossil fuels. 
 
g CO2/kWh  Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Wind Photovoltaics Hydroelectric 
Givoni et al (2009) 876 590 370 16 0 0 0 
Lenzen (2008) 863 -- 577 60 21 106 15 
Figure 35: Carbon intensity of primary energy sources (Lenzen, 2008) 
Based on this information, one can easily see the differences in carbon emissions by using 
different energy sources and how emissions from a HSR system rely heavily on the energy 
source.  
Implementing a clean energy mix to minimize emissions requires a complex mixture of 
political momentum through support of business organizations, environmental groups, and local 
residents. However, government (state or federal) may enact policies encouraging lower emitting 
energy operations but likely cannot physically construct the necessary power facilities. Texas‘ 
action on renewable energy in some ways leads the nation despite a long history of affiliation with 
oil and gas industries. All multinational energy companies demonstrate a strong presence in 
 126 
Texas, yet Texas currently leads the nation in wind power capacity and generation (AWEA, 
2010). Texas Senate Bill 20 enacted in 2005 shows the state sees a future with renewable 
energy, mandating 10,000 MW by 2025 (State Energy Conservation Office, 2011), an interesting 
approach considering most states have mandated a proportion of overall electricity generation as 
renewable, rather than simply an target quantity. Substantial constraints on power delivery exist 
however, meaning much capacity goes unused. Texas‘ support of renewables could reflect a 
desire to avoid limiting construction of fossil fuel plants. Texas‘ energy portfolio shows substantial 
change over the last decade, although more than 80% of the state‘s energy still derives from 
fossil fuels (see Figures 36 and 37 below). The role of the state‘s energy policy does not merely 
impact transportation; transportation contributes a high amount of energy use and carbon 
emissions, but by no means a majority. Developing a renewable energy portfolio that enables 
clean electricity for all uses, including industrial, residential, commercial, and transport uses will 
pay dividends long in to the future by reducing volatility in price, consumption, availability, and 
limiting environmental impact. 
 
 Generation (%) Capacity (%) 
 1999 2009 1999 2009 
Coal 39.2 35.0 26.6 19.7 
Petroleum 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Natural Gas 47.9 47.6 64.9 64.9 
Other Gases 1.1 0.9 0.2 0.2 
Nuclear 10.2 10.4 6.3 4.8 
Hydroelectric 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.7 
Other Renewables 0.4 5.3 0.4 9.4 
Other 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 










 1999 2009 1999 2009 1999 2009 
Coal 654 406 237 101 146,105 144,008 
Petroleum 55 6 24 1 2,327 1,776 
Natural Gas -- 1 237 84 106,553 97,075 
Other Gases -- -- 5 5 NR NR 
Other Renewables 12 6 5 7 NR NR 
Other -- -- 3 -- -- 5 
(note: ―—― indicates a non-zero value less than 0.5, ―NR‖ = not reported) 
Figure 37: Emissions for Texas electricity sources (US DOE, 2011) 
SAFETY, NOISE, AND SECONDARY HEALTH IMPACTS 
Comprehensive analyses of the effects of HSR on health and environmental topics could 
stand alone as thorough research activities. However, seeing as this thesis aims to provide broad 
scale implications of HSR within a Texas context, it will only briefly consider the impacts on 
safety, noise, and human health related to HSR. Safety improvements over existing modes 
provide one of the most tangible benefits of HSR. High-speed trains in operation worldwide 
exhibit exemplary safety records, especially compared to other modes of transportation. Perhaps 
as a result of these records, data availability in the international literature is limited. In the history 
of high-speed trains, several minor incidents have occurred, but only a single accident resulted in 
substantial loss of life. Indeed, as Levinson et al (1997) note, the existing safety rates of HSR 
systems mean that in practice, no risk of an accident exists. Japan Central Railway reports that 
no fatalities or casualties have occurred in forty-five years of commercial service, and SNCF 
(parent operator of TGV in France) reports a similar record, with no fatalities in high-speed 
service since commencing operations. SNCF trains have seen a limited number of fatalities (less 
than 50) at lower speeds, although these still are incredibly minimal statistically speaking, with 
SNCF carrying approximately two billion passengers on TGV trains alone since 1981. The slim 
literature on rail safety suggests that the implementation of HSR utilizing dedicated high-speed 
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rail lines with full grade separation and security fencing makes for a mode of transportation with 
marked improvements in casualties over automobiles.   
When compared to other popular modes of transportation, HSR (and perhaps rail in 
general) show an opportunity for vast gains in safety over automobiles in particular, but other 
modes as well. Not surprisingly, the number of fatalities in automobile crashes exceeds the 
number in all other modes in the United States. Remaining relatively constant over the last four 
decades, about 40,000 to 45,000 fatalities occurred in traffic crashes (including fatalities to 
automobile occupants, and exterior pedestrians and/or cyclists) in the United States, although 
preliminary data indicates this dropped dramatically in the last few years to about 35,000 or 
below. Most vehicle fatality subcategories remained constant or fell slightly over that same time 
period except for light trucks (which includes SUVs), which roughly doubled from 1980 to 2005 
before falling slightly (BTS, 2011b). Modal fatality rates indicate similar gains to be made from 
rail. The National Safety Council, using data from the various modal DOT offices, reports that 
over ten years, the average death rate for passenger trains in the United States was 0.05 per 100 
million miles traveled, less than 10% of the rate for passenger vehicles, at 0.72 per 100 million 
miles traveled. The rate for passenger vehicles has fallen in recent years, however, so this 
average value does not represent a long-term trend. Still, the rate for 2008 of 0.55 still exceeded 




Figure 38: Death rates in the United States by passenger travel mode 1999-2008 per 100 
million passenger miles (National Safety Council, 2011) 
The effect of HSR on the vehicle fatality rate is uncertain at best. The limited data and research in 
this area demonstrates the lack of knowledge about how HSR use might substitute for vehicle 
trips. However, Texas vehicle fatality rates, currently above the national average (TxDOT 
Tracker), indicate that further research coupled with HSR implementation may cause a drop in 
transportation fatalities yet unpredicted by existing automobile safety-promoting policy measures. 
Noise emanating from high-speed trains also poses an incredibly tangible environmental 
impact. ―Noise‖, of course, opens a door of subjectivity, as noise might be best described as 
―unwanted sound‖, which varies depending on the individual. Using the assumption that all 
transportation sounds cause discomfort to some substantial portion of the population at minimum, 
evaluating the extent of those transportation sounds becomes an important task. Noise generated 
by HSR derives from three primary sources: the wheel-rail interaction, the aerodynamic 
movement, and electrification equipment (FRA, 2005). Many variables affect the impact of noise, 
including the quality, the volume (sound intensity), and the duration to name a few. The sound 
intensity levels for HSR, in general, differ minimally from those for airplanes, and slightly exceed 
values for highways. A major difference for noise emanating from HSR is the location where such 
noise takes place. As noise increases with speed, trains generate minimal noise during the 
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departure and arrival sections of a trip near stations in highly populated areas. Noise generated at 
cruising speed, approximately 90-100 dB(A), or roughly the same as a jackhammer or heavy 
truck traveling on a highway, causes substantially greater concern, particularly if trains pass 
through populated areas at cruising speeds. This reinforces the need to utilize existing corridors 
in urban areas. Not only will this limit excessive land take, but also unify transportation noise in a 
single corridor, rather than creating additional noise impacts that do not currently occur. As 
Levinson (1997) points out, noise varies based on location, and because of this location, 
theoretically influences land values. Research on land values near transportation corridors shows 
mixed results, where locations relatively near a valuable transportation connection may increase 
value slightly, although immediate access may decrease value because of noise, vibration, or 
unwanted commercial activity. 
The impacts of a transportation corridor on a community addresses the growing body of 
research known as Environmental Justice (or ―EJ‖), where analysis focuses on the 
disproportionate impact of transportation infrastructure on communities of high ethnic and racial 
diversity, lower household income, and lower educational achievement. Increasingly, research 
indicates that the built environment influences human health, welfare, happiness, and economic 
output, with transportation corridor placement and design playing a major role.  
Humans develop as a joint product of intrinsic characteristics and external experiences 
over a lifetime. Transportation infrastructure forms a substantial component of these external 
experiences, as the built environment contributes to social changes and shifts in human behavior. 
This thesis does not aim to analyze the effects of HSR on human health, as the intersection of 
transportation infrastructure and health is an exploding academic topic in its own right (a simple 
search produced more than 100 relevant papers on the topic published since 2000 alone). That 
said, with limited development of HSR relative to other modes, particularly in the United States, 
the effects of trains on societal health are far less clear than those for automobiles and roadways. 
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As noted by Banister et al (2007), the physical inactivity associated with car trips contributes 
greatly to increased obesity rates and more than 3% of deaths worldwide. Indeed, recent data 
indicates that more than one-third of American adults are obese (BMI ≥ 30) and more than two-
thirds are overweight or obese (BMI ≥ 25) and these rates have increased dramatically over the 
last two decades (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Making short trips by foot 
or bicycle to those modes instead of using automobiles would enable most people to ―achieve 
recommended levels of physical activity‖. Walking or cycling segments attached to trips using 
trains or transit may also achieve this. Because HSR success appears to hinge on the existence 
of developed transit systems (noted earlier) and dense land use that allows for effective walking 
and cycling trips, HSR may make secondary contributions to more physically active trips, and 
therefore combat auto-related public health epidemics. Deakin and Nuworsoo (2009) describe the 
opportunities for redevelopment and infill with the California HSR project, particularly in the 
centers of medium-sized cities. They note that while an opportunity exists, a new focus must be 
created to take advantage of the opportunity including offering a variety of housing options and 
improving local access by foot, bike, and public transit. HSR‘s existence alone will not enable the 
necessary changes. With Texas urban areas generally embracing pro-growth low-density 
suburban policies, such opportunities linked to HSR for denser, more sustainable, healthier 
development may be great in Texas. Plans for increased density and multimodality in city centers 
indicate a willingness by Texas cities to consider land use and sustainability policies as well as 
subsequent human health effects related to transportation. 
The health impacts of the emitted substances from fossil fuel combustion also require 
attention of transportation and public health officials. Noted earlier in this chapter, a number of 
potential health impacts occur as a result of various pollutants. Although the exact number of 
deaths attributable to these pollutants is difficult to know primarily because of many different 
emission sources and the wide range of resulting diseases, more than 600,000 Americans died in 
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2000 from cancer, respiratory diseases, and cardiovascular diseases, which all may be partially 
attributed to emitted pollutants from vehicles. Litman (2003) reports that the number of deaths 
attributed to transportation pollutants appears to be about the same as for traffic crashes. This 
addresses an ethically difficult topic, as assigning value to a human life lost due to the 
transportation system is a challenging and evolving task. Nevertheless, the loss of human life 
results in large economic impacts, and the implementation of transportation infrastructure that 
reduces the number of lives lost due to obesity, emissions, or crashes results in benefits for 
society as a whole.  
COMPARING ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Microeconomics instructs that all goods have some value as a result of scarcity. This 
value is usually approximated in monetary terms, allowing for measurement and comparison 
between different trade-offs over a particular time period. For transportation, these goods include 
travel time, safety (value of life), and pollutant reduction, among others. These goods, or 
―benefits‖ are important goals for society. However, when analyzed against the infrastructure cost 
of achieving these objectives, they may become infeasible, particularly if costs exceed the value 
of benefits. Among multiple project alternatives, this analysis provides a method to prioritize 
certain best-performing alternatives. To be certain, this is not the only approach to measure the 
economic effectiveness of a particular project, but it may be the most comprehensive. Other 
methods include economic impact analysis and cost effectiveness measurements. de Rus and 
Nombela (2007) note that for benefit-cost analysis procedure, it is important to remember that ―all 
transport modes produce negative environmental effects and accidents. The question is whether 
the overall balance favours HSR against road or air transport…the net balance depends on 
whether the base case is to expand existing roads or airports, or to build new infrastructure.‖ To 
illustrate the procedure, the following is a typical model measuring the social profits (including 
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environmental benefits) from rail derived from time savings and generated demand, and setting 
aside benefits from additional rail capacity in the long term, the subsequent reduction of road 
accidents, and road and airport congestion, which are more subject to local corridor conditions: 
 
∫ [ ( )     ( )] 
 (   )    ∫    






where Q is a derived transport demand; B(Q) are annual social benefits of the project variable 
with Q; Cq(Q) is annual maintenance and operating cost variable with Q; Ct is annual fixed 
maintenance and operating cost; T is life of the project; r is the social discount rate; and Θ is 
annual growth of benefits and cost which depends on Q. If the value of the above equation is 
greater than the infrastructure construction costs, the project has a positive net present value 
(NPV) (de Rus and Nombela, 2007).  
This model, as noted, makes significant assumptions that may not be valid for a particular 
scenario (only focused regional research will indicate whether reduction of road congestion will 
occur or the degree of indirect economic impact, for example). Nevertheless, it indicates the 
nature of evaluating the benefits and costs of implementing HSR. Certainly, the larger social 
benefits (e.g. travel time savings to HSR passengers, reduced congestion, increased revenues, 
automobile accident reduction, reduced emissions, indirect labor and housing market effects, 
etc.) of HSR are real, valuable, and important, for reasons previously described. However, the 
environmental portion of the benefits likely amount to a relatively small portion of overall benefits 
when economic impact values are also evaluated. A variety of cost-benefit analyses for HSR 
demonstrate this, but perhaps the most instructive for Texas is a proposal from French National 
Railways (SNCF) for HSR in Texas, submitted to the FRA in 2009 as a part of the Request for 
Expressions of Interest (RFEI) process. In the submission, a basic financial feasibility benefit-cost 
analysis estimates an overall rate of return of 9.2% over the life of the proposed project (through 




(millions of dollars) 
Percent 
(benefits only) 
Passenger revenue 14,493 56.2% 
Benefits to HST 220 passengers 6,493 25.2% 
Benefits to highway travelers   
Auto congestion reduction 3,283 12.7% 
Auto accident and pollution reduction 821 3.2% 
Benefits to air travelers   
Air delay reduction 465 1.8% 
Air pollution reduction 257 1.0% 
Total benefits 25,811 100% 
COSTS   
Capital 10,755  
Operation and maintenance 2,720  
Total Costs 13,475  
Net Present Value (Benefit – Cost) 12,336  
Benefit/Cost Ratio 1.92  
Socio-economic Rate of Return 9.2%  
Figure 39: Financial feasibility benefit-cost analysis for proposed Texas HSR system (SNCF, 
2009) 
In this example, the environmental benefits (pollution reduction) only amount to about 3% of 
overall benefits. Important to note is that this analysis does not include all possible benefits, 
including the benefits of reduced greenhouse gases or reduced travel time, as a means to be 
conservative in its assumptions. Additionally, the ―benefits to HST 220 passengers‖ are not 
enumerated in this chart, but include primarily reductions in travel time. Inclusion of greenhouse 
gas reduction monetary benefits would likely result in environmental benefits forming a larger 
overall portion of the total benefits, although this is difficult to calculate because the approximate 
value of carbon, the primary greenhouse gas, is uncertain at best. In addition, the secondary 
economic benefits in terms of direct and indirect wages, employment, business activity, and 
income are not included. Typically benefit-cost analysis does not include these benefits, but they 
nevertheless bolster the argument for or against project implementation because of their large 
impact. This financial feasibility benefit-cost analysis for SNCF takes the position of return on 
investment to measure the feasibility of a HSR project. When completed from a government 
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perspective, the passenger revenues are not included, as these represent a transfer between 
entities.  
The broad implications for HSR on energy policy, environmental impacts, and other 
externalities indicate that, as a mode, HSR may greatly contribute to policy goals if implemented. 
However, many of these areas remain in early stages of analysis, despite the relative age of rail 
in transportation history. As demonstrated here, the range of impacts by all transportation modes 
continues to grow, and no one mode serves as a panacea. Rather, Texas officials must place 
different modal alternatives, including HSR, within the local, regional, national, and even 
international context and evaluate those alternatives for a great variety of factors, including those 
only briefly examined in this section. While certainly not an ideal option in all scenarios, 
preliminary consideration of these factors appears to indicate that HSR likely improves on many 
currently existing scenarios and deserves serious consideration as a future transportation 
improvement for Texas in the face of heightened issues surrounding energy use, environmental 
degradation, safety, and human health. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The impacts of transportation on the natural environment and subsequent effects of fossil 
fuel consumption also have a nuanced role in the implementation of HSR. Energy efficiency 
comparison between transportation modes represents complex analysis relying on many different 
variables, but based on typical load factors and energy source mixes at present, HSR 
demonstrates a potential for large gains in transportation energy efficiency. Of course, these 
gains can only be truly realized if the energy source for electric-driven trains includes those with 
limited emissions from fossil fuel consumption. Limiting emissions from transportation is important 
because those emitted pollutants cause human health defects and contribute to global warming, 
although the effects of that phenomenon are inexact. Additionally, the implementation of 
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transportation modes that encourage healthy human lifestyles may aid in reduction of obesity and 




Chapter 7: Corridor Evaluation 
As discussed in chapter two, many different proposals to link Texas cities via high-speed 
passenger rail generated varying degrees of public and political interest in the state. Since the 
first studies issued in the 1980s, the proposed corridors evolved into many different forms, with 
advocacy groups selecting and promoting particular alignments. While this report covers 
proposals discussed in the last four decades linking the entire Texas Triangle region, and 
numerous additional variations certainly exist, all the studied proposals (and likely many of those 
not evaluated here) feature several particular elements despite their many evolved forms: 
1. The Texas Triangle is the basis for service, for many of the reasons developed in 
Chapter 3 and 4. The population, density, and city spacing of the Triangle cities makes 
them the best candidates in the state for rail service. For those proposals built in multiple 
phases, the Dallas-Houston leg of the system acted as the primary phase.  
2. All proposals envision a connection at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. Because of 
DFW‘s role in dispersing statewide air traffic to other states and beyond through a large 
number of connecting flights (discussed earlier), all proposals believed that providing a 
high-speed rail connection at DFW would benefit travelers and airlines alike. Not all 
proposals include a stop in downtown Dallas and/or Fort Worth, but all include a station 
at DFW. 
3. Stations in the medium-sized cities of Bryan-College Station, Temple-Killeen, and Waco 
are included in all proposals. 
4. San Antonio and Austin (and intermediate cities) are directly and linearly connected. No 
proposal prescribes an indirect, nonlinear route connection between the two cities. 
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In order to further understand the implications and costs of high-speed rail corridors, five of the 
primary past corridor proposals and a sixth corridor modification proposed by the author are 
considered and evaluated using a simple analysis on the basis of cost and distance.  
PROPOSED ALIGNMENTS 
Texas Triangle (Hal Cooper) 
Submitted to TxDOT by Triangle Railroad Holding Company (Hal Cooper Jr, President), 
this proposed route (Figure 40) includes connections to the South Central and Gulf Coast 
corridors as seen in the National Plan for High-Speed Rail promoted by the Obama 
Administration. This particular corridor under consideration is the most ambitious of the proposed 
passenger rail corridors (as it includes several interstate commuter rail and single-tracked 
passenger rail corridors), with double track connecting the major cities in the Texas Triangle 
region. The primary route of the system follows the I-35 corridor passing through San Antonio, 
New Braunfels, San Marcos, Austin, Round Rock, Georgetown, Temple, Waco, Hillsboro, and 
Waxahachie. From here, the proposed configuration splits into two rail routes extending to 
downtown stations in Dallas and Fort Worth, with an additional line connecting the two cities with 
an intermediate station at DFW. The other major legs of the proposed route connect Houston with 
the Dallas-Fort Worth area and Austin. The first line heads eastward from Austin, passing through 
Elgin, Giddings, Brenham, and Hempstead before meeting the second rail line on an approach to 
downtown Houston from the northwest side of the city. The second line heads southeast from 
Waco toward Houston, passing Marlin, Hearne, Bryan-College Station, and Navasota before 
joining the Austin leg at Hempstead for the approach to Houston. 
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Figure 40: Texas Triangle (Hal Cooper) proposal approximate alignment (Cooper, 2009) 
Texas “T-Bone” 
Texas High Speed Rail and Transportation Corporation (THSRTC) primarily promotes 
this alignment which connects the major metropolitan areas in the Texas Triangle region with a 
high-speed rail corridor in a rough backward lowercase lambda (λ) shape (Figure 41). The main 
leg of the corridor parallels I-35 and serves the major cities between DFW and San Antonio. It is 
unclear if the route plans for stations in all the major cities in the corridor, but for simple sketch 
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planning purposes of this chapter, it is assumed to be mostly the same as the Triangle Railroad 
Holding Company proposal. Of particular note is that the route appears to avoid downtown 
stations in both Dallas and Fort Worth, instead opting for an airport-only regional station at DFW. 
The secondary leg of the route extends southeast from Temple-Killeen to Bryan-College Station 
and the Houston area, again opting for a station only at IAH and no downtown Houston station. 
Among the corridor concepts explored here, this proposal likely requires the fewest miles of track 
construction, although it is comparable to the Texas TGV ―New Corporation Preferred Alignment 
discussed below. Throughout this alignment, THSRTC envisions elevated, dual direction double 
track permitting trains to travel at speeds of 200 mph or greater.  
 
 
Figure 41: Texas T-Bone proposal approximate alignment (THSRTC, 2010) 
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Texas TGV Initial “Modified” Alignment 
This alignment is one of two alignments that were initially considered by the Texas TGV 
Corporation in the 1990s. The first version of the alignment omitted the cities of Waco and Bryan-
College Station but eventually a modified alignment included them. This modified alignment is 
considered here as these cities are minimal deviations from the original alignment and would 
likely generate significant additional ridership. Again connecting the major cities in the Texas 
Triangle, this proposal imagines a triangular track arrangement in the interior of the triangle 
formed by I-10, I-35, and I45, with vertices to the south, northwest, and northeast of Dallas-Fort 
Worth, Houston, and San Antonio, respectively (Figure 42). Each of these junctions is then 
connected by a single track corridor to the center of the nearest major city. Navarro, Hockley, and 
San Marcos serve as the junction points where the single track splits into the two legs of the 
triangular arrangement. Of note in this proposal is that the shortest route from Austin to Houston 
requires travelers to head southbound for a short distance before turning east toward Houston; 
for all other proposals here, travelers would head northeast or east for some distance before 
turning toward Houston. Texas TGV divided the plan into three phases, with the Houston-DFW 
link forming the first phase, the Navarro Junction-San Antonio segment as phase two, and the 
remaining section from San Marcos to Hockley Junction completing the system as phase three. 
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Figure 42: Texas TGV franchise application approximate alignment with alternatives (Texas 
TGV Consortium, 1991) 
Texas TGV Corporation “New” Preferred Alignment 
The Texas TGV New ―Corporation Preferred Alignment‖ appears to be a compromise 
between the initial modified alignment seen in Figure 42 and the Texas FasTrac proposal, which 
was not carried forward when that organization was not granted a franchise. This compromise 
proposal features three corridors emanating from a central node situated approximately 
equidistant from the three cities forming the vertices of the Texas Triangle. This central node is 
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tough to place exactly, but appears to be located in central Milam County near the town of 
Cameron. Each corridor extends from the central node to Dallas, Houston, or San Antonio 
through a secondary city (Waco, Bryan-College Station, and Austin, respectively, Figure 43). 
Such an arrangement means that the total trackage in the region is the least of the options 
evaluated in this research, but also likely leads to the longest travel times between major 
endpoint cities. Also of note for this alignment is the absence of a station in the Killeen-Temple 
area, one of the metropolitan areas along the I-35 corridor. 
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Figure 43: ―New‖ Texas TGV franchise approximate alignment (Texas TGV Consortium, 
1991) 
Texas “Mini Triangle” 
Gaining some attention on the Internet, this idea connects the interior Texas Triangle 
cites of Austin, Bryan-College Station, and Waco in a triangular form with a city at each vertex. 
From each of these city vertices, a track segment extends to one of the major Texas Triangle 
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metropolitan areas (San Antonio, Houston, and Dallas-Fort Worth, respectively). This alignment 
attempts to maximize the interior cities served en route between the major metropolitan areas 
without major deviations from a straight line route. For example, by deviating slightly from the 
direct Dallas-Houston route, this alignment picks up potential riders at stations in Waco and 
Bryan-College Station (Figure 44), yet this deviation adds minimal distance compared to the 
straight line route. Connections in the Dallas and Houston metropolitan areas are made at 
downtown stations as well as the major airports. This proposal bears resemblance to the Triangle 
Railroad Holding Company proposal seen before, with two major differences. The Triangle 
Railroad Holding Company proposal provides a segment between Ft. Worth and Waxahachie not 
seen in this alignment, while the mini-triangle alignment creates a direct connection between 
Austin and Bryan-College Station en route to Houston. The Triangle Railroad Holding Company 
proposal plans a more direct route from Austin to Houston bypassing Bryan-College Station.  
 
 
Figure 44: Texas Mini-Triangle approximate alignment (Burleson, 2009) 
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Alternative 6 
The final alternative alignment blends the idea of the mini-triangle and the Hal Cooper 
proposal by creating direct links between Austin and Houston as well as Austin and College 
Station via the burgeoning suburbs of Round Rock and Georgetown. Conceptually, this alignment 
attempts to create as direct a route as possible between the larger metropolitan areas, with minor 
deviations from straight line routes, while facilitating direct route between the major cities and the 
minor cities on the interior of the Texas Triangle region. The only minor metropolitan area without 
direct routing with the major metropolitan areas is Killeen-Temple, which would require traveling 
either south to Georgetown or north to Waco in order to embark toward Bryan-College Station or 
Houston (Figure 45).  
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Figure 45: Alternative 6 approximate alignment 
EVALUATION TOOL AND METHOD 
HSR requires significant financial outlay. Because of this cost and its intense scrutiny, it 
is in the best interest of planners and engineers to analyze possible routes to determine the most 
cost-effective approach. In order to provide more information for determining the financial 
feasibility of these six alignments, this thesis used a simple network optimization approach to 
estimate the cost of the segments of each alignment. In this approach, stations in each alignment 
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alternative acted as nodes. Between nodes, 3 possible arcs represented each of 3 routing policy 
options, each with slightly different costs. The costs for each routing represented a unit cost per 
distance multiplied by the distance along that particular node. The first routing option takes a 
direct geographic path between two nodes (stations), representing the extreme case of obtaining 
all new right-of-way (ROW) and heavy utilization of eminent domain. Such a routing also leads to 
the shortest overall distance by far, intuitively resulting in the shortest travel time, thereby 
encouraging demand for service. This routing option costs the most, as expected. The second 
routing option uses existing ROW for highways and roadways. Given the wide highway ROW in 
rural and suburban areas, the marginal land quality immediately adjacent to these facilities in 
rural and suburban areas, and the reduced costs due to limited use of eminent domain, such an 
approach deserves consideration. Nevertheless, costs exist even though the land purchase 
expenses are reduced. Finally, the third option follows only existing track, reflecting an 
arrangement either for trackage rights, or alignment immediately adjacent to track requiring either 
no land taking or very limited land taking. This hypothetical scenario anticipates the cheapest 
marginal cost of infrastructure. Many successful intercity passenger services use corridors shared 
with other transportation infrastructure and rail operations based on limiting the dispersion of 
environmental effects and this third routing option reflects such an arrangement. However, such 
an arrangement would probably limit the speeds of passenger service on these lines, and thus 
could not achieve the high speeds that may be necessary to attract substantial ridership. This 
approach does not seek to address ridership where benefits from passenger rail would be 
realized, but merely demonstrates the cost implications of different passenger rail alignments.  
With each alignment alternative broken down by segment, various tools were used to 
calculate the distance using each of the three routing options. Direct distance measurement in 
Google Maps provided the distances used in the first routing option. The second routing option 
required the use of Mapquest‘s ―shortest distance‖ option for calculating road directions between 
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stations. Road directions are assumed to be the same as the potential shortest path of existing 
highway ROW. The final routing option used ArcMap in GIS to find the shortest rail route between 
marked stations. In the case where tracks did not pass immediately adjacent to a station, the 
distance along a perpendicular line between the nearest rail segment and the station was also 
included in the final value. Once all three values were input in a series of Excel spreadsheets, the 
capabilities of the Solver function provided the lowest cost option for each alignment alternative 
using a mixture of the different station-to-station segments.   
Station Locations 
Locating stations required substantial assumptions as many rail stations proposed in 
these alignments do not currently exist. For those cities with existing rail stations, primarily for 
Amtrak services, those existing stations served as the segment endpoints. For those stations not 
centrally located, a central point selected in the city near a rail line served as the station location. 
In the case of suburban stations or airport stations, a station point located near the airport 
centroid marked the segment endpoint, while suburban stations locations were selected primarily 
by visual inspection based on more detailed alignment literature, proximity of existing rail lines, 
and roadway alignment.  
Estimated Costs 
Estimated costs for HSR construction vary greatly. The costs represent variety in physical 
geography, extent of eminent domain utilization, labor costs, and structural complexity. As 
reported by Campos and de Rus (2009), of the 45 HSR projects in operation, construction costs 
ranged from $18 million per mile to $80 million per mile, with an average of $36 million per mile. 
The right of way requirements for these projects are unknown. Comparatively, the US 
Congressional Research Service (Peterman et al, 2008) reports that costs for incremental track 
improvements, as opposed to new dedicated guideway, to Midwestern rail lines range from $4.1 
 150 
million per mile to $11.4 million per mile, while the cost of reducing travel time on Amtrak‘s 
Northeast Corridor by only thirty minutes between New York and Boston amounts to $31 million 
per mile. The Government Accountability Office (2009) also reports a similarly wide range of 
values ($22 million per mile to $132 million per mile), although this also includes Maglev 
proposals, for which data are limited as only one system (Shanghai Airport Maglev) operates at 
present. Perhaps the best comparison, the proposed California HSR project estimates 
construction costs of approximately $65 million per mile, which appear to be on the high side 
based on international comparison. Regardless, land acquisition, the primary variable measured 
in this corridor evaluation, sums to a nontrivial portion of construction expenses. According to 
AASHTO (2002), approximately 4% of federal funding went to land acquisition in 1999, while 
SNCF‘s EOI (2009) submitted to the FRA estimates land acquisition will comprise 6% of overall 
initial capital costs. Campos and de Rus (2009) verify these values by noting that planning and 
land costs ―may be substantial in some projects…but they often represent a sunk component, 
between 5% and 10% of total investment.‖ These numbers do not directly indicate the difference 
in marginal project costs from the different ROW options, all else equal, which is the strict 
intention of this corridor evaluation, but do demonstrate the need to thoroughly investigate land 
acquisition expenditures for a particular project. 
Information on ROW acquisition costs for rail projects is exceedingly slim in the United 
States, as no new greenfield passenger rail projects have been constructed in decades, except 
for perhaps segments of the New Mexico Rail Runner operating between suburban Albuquerque 
and Santa Fe1. Thus, this evaluation relies on information from proposed projects as sources. 
                                                     
1 The most pertinent examples of rail right-of-way acquisition by public agencies for passenger 
rail projects include sections acquired from BNSF for the New Mexico Rail Runner and Union 
Pacific for the Utah Transit Authority Front Runner service described in Loftus-Otway et al (2007). 
Additionally, this source notes the rough average figure of $1.2 million per mile commonly cited 
for corridor purchase. These examples, though few in number, may assist in rail corridor planning 
and feasibility analysis.  
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The California HSR project segment from Fresno to Bakersfield anticipates constructing 
substantial new greenfield tracks to avoid cutting through the centers of communities and cities 
along the existing BNSF tracks. Though alignments have changed slightly since 2009, the 
California HSR Authority anticipated that 10% of the segment costs between Fresno and 
Bakersfield would come from land acquisition (CHSRA, 2009). Put differently, land acquisition for 
tracks requiring new rights-of-way contributed an additional 11% of segment costs. Similarly, the 
SNCF proposal indicates that their routing would ―wherever possible, follow existing rail 
transportation facilities rather than new corridors‖ (SNCF, 2009). As stated earlier, SNCF 
estimates land acquisition will amount to about 6% of overall construction costs, or an additional 
6% (approximately) on top of segment construction costs using existing rights-of-way. Given the 
substantial error in these estimates, 10% and 6% were used in calculations. Thus, to optimize for 
the minimum possible cost, the use of new ROW sees a 10% cost premium (multiplier of 1.1), 
use of existing ROW sees a 6% cost premium (multiplier of 1.06), and use of existing tracks sees 
no cost premium, with a cost multiplier of 1. This is merely to state not that the use of existing 
tracks and/or their rights-of-way has no cost, but rather to illustrate that very similar construction 
undertaken in the other two right-of-way scenarios costs more. Some ambiguity exists, especially 
because of the comparison of service along existing tracks unlikely to permit speeds above 150 
mph at most, and other alignments that might feasibly permit service as fast as 250 mph. 
However, the California project is instructive here as well with a great majority of the track 
placement for that project occurring alongside BNSF tracks, indicating that HSR above 150 mph 
may be able to operate within the geometry of existing tracks.   
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RESULTS 
Based on input data for the distances utilizing three different right-of-way methods, the 
optimization procedure found the lowest-cost routing combination for each alignment alternative, 




















































































































































































































































































































8.0 219.0 34.0 4.0 37.0 5.8 13.0 528.0 60.2 643.4 
Texas T-Bone 
(THSRTC) 
4.1 135.8 30.1 0.9 7.1 1.6 8.0 351.8 68.3 458.5 
Texas TGV Old 1.9 131.6 19.8 0.1 0.4 0 10.0 533.8 80.2 665.8 
Texas TGV 
New 
3.0 106.9 23.1 2.0 86.9 18.8 4.0 269.2 58.1 463.0 
Texas Mini-
Triangle 
2.1 215.1 37.2 1.3 30.8 5.3 11.3 333.1 57.5 579.0 
Alternative 6 6.9 285.0 39.0 1.1 28.9 4.0 12.9 417.6 57.1 731.5 
Figure 46: Lowest cost rail alternative routing optimization results 
The results show a marked trend for utilization of existing track, with a much more reserved use 
of direct new ROW segments and existing highway ROW segments. This is not entirely 
unexpected, as these routings carry higher costs per mile. However, a great many of the rail 
segments are longer in mileage than their direct ROW or existing highway ROW counterparts. 
The relative similarity in distance covered by highway ROW to direct new ROW results in the 
most significant surprise. Highway ROW distances closely matched those for direct new ROW, 
yet cost less. Initial inclination suggested highway ROW would dominate the three categories as it 
is both highly direct and not the most expensive.  
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The portion of either direct routing or highway ROW routing never exceeds the length of 
routing along existing tracks. The Alternative 6 and the Texas Mini-Triangle alignment produce 
the greatest portion of routing not along existing tracks, at 42.9 and 42.5 %, respectively, 
although most of the other alignments display similar values. The only exception to this trend is 
the Texas TGV Old alignment, which uses 20% of routing not along existing tracks. As this 
alignment was originally developed based on existing rail lines, this does not come as a large 
surprise.. The interaction between direct ROW routing and existing highway ROW routing does 
not display any clear trends, although the number of segment selected for each of these routings 
remains low in all cases. In only the Texas TGV New alignment are more than 50% of the 
segments selected from non-existing track segments. In all alignments, the length of the 
segments selected for direct ROW exceeds the length of selected segments for existing highway 
ROW. The Texas Triangle (Hal Cooper) alignment uses the greatest number of segments along 
existing highway ROW although the Texas TGV New alignment uses the greatest segment length 
of existing highway ROW. All six alignments use segments from all policy options. Generally 
speaking, limited subdivision of segments takes place. This is somewhat surprising, although 
given the linear relationship between segment length and cost, based on simple multipliers, not 
entirely mystifying. Ten of the possible eighteen total segment selections result in subdivision with 
this optimization procedure. The procedure itself performed well with no major issues in 
processing, despite outcomes not exactly as expected.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This optimization procedure and the subsequent results provide basic guidance for 
policymakers regarding HSR in Texas. Assuming the cost premiums for direct and existing 
highway ROW are relatively accurate (not a trivial assumption, given the small amount of data for 
HSR projects, especially in the United States, and the historic potential for cost overruns for 
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infrastructure projects), it is obvious why the pursuit of operation on existing tracks or in existing 
rail ROW is an cost-effective option. Indeed, as the results show, the routing for all six 
alternatives overwhelmingly favors existing rail lines. This is not necessarily surprising as many of 
the alignments, particularly the older schemes, developed based on existing rail corridor 
alignments. However, this analysis does not consider the institutional arrangements that must 
occur between railroads and passenger rail entities that tend to be quite difficult to negotiate. 
Additionally, this suggests that agencies should not explicitly avoid direct routing through new 
ROW, despite the painful public headache that tends to result from such proposals. Although 
utilized lightly in the optimization procedure, all six alignments nevertheless include direct ROW 
segments, indicating such an approach generates tangible benefits. These benefits become more 
explicit with more complex analysis of ridership and travel times. Similarly, agencies tending to 
avoid using existing highway ROW should re-evaluate such stances. This simple exercise 
demonstrates that use of existing highway ROW, although not necessarily a primary routing 
element, should play a significant role in HSR routing, even if it does not comprise the majority of 
an alignment. Given the widespread state and federal highway system, it should not surprise 
officials that these highways ought to contribute to the alignment of HSR for a minimized cost. 
Considering the relatively difficulty of obtaining new ROW and compromising with freight 
railroads, which this optimization does not evaluate, the use of highway ROW becomes an even 
more attractive option. However, no element of securing, planning, and implementing a HSR 
project of the scale needed for Texas is inconsequential and costs reflect this. Roughly estimating 
capital infrastructure construction cost (including land acquisition) using a value of $50 
million/mile, the six alignments evaluated here require hefty investments of approximately $25-40 
billion. Realizing a project of such magnitude requires a far more complex array of analysis in 
addition to simple alignment cost minimization, although this exercise generates conclusions for 
HSR alignment that officials cannot responsibly avoid.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Texas displays many decades of interest in HSR with several different proposed 
alignments for rail linking the major cities in the Texas Triangle. In order to provide information 
about the feasibility of these alignments, minimizing the costs of these alignments using three 
policy options – direct routing through all new land acquisition, routing along existing highways, or 
use of existing rail tracks – shows that based on loose land acquisition costs from proposed 
projects, existing rail may be the most feasible approach. However, the different corridors also 
utilized a number of directly-routed segments, particularly when circuitous existing rail resulted in 
lengthy alignments. Although not a major component of any of the optimal routings, existing 
highway ROW provided a section of many corridors. More accurate cost information may provide 
different optimized corridor alignment selections, but likely will continue to demonstrate that all 
three policy options deserve consideration for implementing HSR in Texas.    
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Chapter 8: Political Realities 
No topic instigates political squabbles quite like transportation infrastructure. The 
tangible, utilitarian nature of transportation infrastructure affects the general population on a daily 
basis, subjecting millions to the effects of both its successful design and faulty nuances. Because 
of this, the exchange between politicians and the public as a whole regarding transportation 
infrastructure represents a highly functioning democratic discourse that many other political 
issues fail to achieve. This highly functioning discourse results in individual politicians frequently 
acting as catalysts both for and against transportation development. Rail does not lack for this 
relationship, as seen in the earlier Chapter 2 examples of the relationships between state 
governors and particular rail projects. All levels of government in the United States have recently 
engaged in the most active political exchange regarding rail in decades. In addition to introducing 
the topic to the already volatile political arena, because rail is generally underdeveloped relative 
to other modes in the United States, a great deal of misunderstanding about rail fuels an even 
greater volume of discourse. With rail subject to such a volume of discourse, this chapter 
analyzes the impact of political exchange on the feasibility of HSR in Texas for the near future.  
RECENT NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
As noted in Chapter 1, interest in rail is not a new phenomenon, although the amount of 
passenger rail action and momentum at various levels of government in the last five years marks 
the most action certainly since the approval of ISTEA and possibly since the formulation of 
Amtrak in 1971. Unfortunately spurred by a deadly train collision in Southern California, the 
Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act (PRIIA) of 2008 ushered in a period of 
consistent political attention to passenger rail continuing to the present. The subsequent 
economic recession elicited several responses from the federal government, including the 
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) in early 2009, which contained $8 billion in 
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state grants for HSR projects among a collection of other spending on healthcare, social services, 
infrastructure, and fiscal relief for states, as well as approximately $300 billion in tax relief 
(Recovery.gov, 2011).  Despite comprising less than 1% of the overall cost of the act, the HSR 
grant allotment arguably generated far more discussion than any other single item, particularly 
because it embarked on substantial funding for a theretofore very marginal aspect of 
transportation appropriations, as seen in the introduction. By June 2009, the FRA launched the 
High-Speed Intercity Passenger Rail (HSIPR) grant process with federal HSR appropriations that 
also took place for FY 2010-2011. Initial pre-applications for the program showed enormous 
interest, as 40 states and the District of Columbia requested more than $100 billion through 278 
applications (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2011). The first round of awards totaling 
nearly $8 billion provided another shot of adrenaline to passenger rail, with projects in California, 
Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio, Florida, Washington, and North Carolina emerging with the largest 
grants by the end of January 2010. Rail projects planned with these funds included new service, 
faster service, increased service reliability, planning and environmental studies, and track 
rehabilitation and improvements, indicating the commencement of a wide-ranging, truly 
nationwide passenger rail program (FRA, 2010). As with many transportation issues, political 
challenges to the FRA grant program arose almost immediately. Just like with previous projects 
covered in Chapter 2, state governors continued to play a large role in shaping rail progress in the 
United States. In fact, the topic became a campaign issue for many, and a campaign centerpiece 
for a few (http://www.notrain.com, for example). This campaigning, combined with the FY2010 
HSIPR grant announcements, the November elections, and the prompt rejection of grants by 
newly-elected governors of Ohio and Wisconsin resulted in a tumultuous three months for 
passenger rail in the United States. Dust appeared to settle following the elections. President 
Obama, using his 2010 State of the Union address as a platform, announced his intention to bring 
a $53 billion nationwide passenger rail plan to fruition. Only days later, however, this juxtaposed 
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the announcement that Florida‘s newly-elected governor had decided to return Florida‘s 
approximately $2.5 billion in federal grant money marked for the Tampa-Orlando rail segment 
despite overwhelmingly positive economic impact analyses and opposition from within his party in 
the Florida legislature (Share, 2011). These returned funds provided enough for an unplanned 
third round of grants in May 2011. Through the three rounds of HSIPR grants, Texas amassed 
$21 million in grants, of which $15 million provides for a study of a Dallas-to-Houston corridor. 
HSIPR grants met a quick demise in the next session of Congress, meaning this third round of 
grants may be the final federal disbursements for the foreseeable future, despite being an 
―otherwise good grantmaking process‖ (GAO, 2011).  
STATE DEVELOPMENTS  AND THE TRANS-TEXAS CORRIDOR 
Since the failure of the Texas TGV project in 1994, a number of smaller proposals and 
advocacy groups have maintained enthusiasm even as interest of leaders and the public at large 
has withered. Unlike substantial movement at the federal level and in select other states (e.g. 
California, Illinois, North Carolina, Florida, Washington, and Michigan primarily), Texas 
progressed slowly on passenger rail in the last five years, as evidenced by the relatively small 
federal grants awarded. However, within the last decade, the Trans-Texas Corridor (TTC) project, 
which proposed a series of multimodal corridors crisscrossing the state, brought high-speed rail 
back to the public light for the first time since the Texas TGV project. Texas Governor Rick Perry 
envisioned a broad system comprised of toll roads for trucks and passenger cars, utility lines, and 
both freight and passenger rail built by private interests. TxDOT officially abandoned the project 
concept by 2009, however, after substantial public outcry, particularly from landowners and 
environmentalists, in favor of more traditional piecemeal planning for individual corridors. The 
primary issues included massive land takings, large expense, the implementation of privately 
financed toll facilities, and the foreign ownership of those private financiers, many of the same 
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groups that brought down the Texas TGV project years earlier (Rutter, 2011). Despite its 
unpopularity and large-scale flaws (some corridors had a planned width of more than 1200 feet), 
TTC set forth one of the first comprehensive new transportation visions for the state in decades 
(Booth and Hutto, 2004). With a more focused scope and scale, greater public input, and 
increased understanding regarding toll facilities, the project may have progressed beyond lines 
on a map. As a concept, rail appears to enjoy support from Texans, as evidenced by the many 
proposals seen in Chapter 7 from different advocates over the state‘s history. The Texas Rail 
Plan process also gauged support for passenger rail. Questionnaires at public meetings 
throughout the state and online revealed a high degree of support for implementing high-speed 
rail service and coordinating passenger rail service with transit. While not statistically significant, 
as these were not random samples, but rather self-selected responses, these results still indicate 
the relative priority of these particular rail program elements compared to others in the 
questionnaire. Support for implementation of HSR, not surprisingly, was highest in the Texas 
Triangle metropolitan areas. More than 50% of respondents in Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, and 
San Antonio marked HSR implementation as a high priority (see Figure 47 below). Yet, despite 
various degrees of support scattered around the state, a number of institutional and political 




Figure 47: Support for passenger rail elements at Texas Rail Plan (TxDOT, 2010c) public 
meetings 
Put simply, passenger rail has not been a transportation priority in Texas; only in 1991 
was the merging of the Department of Aviation, the Motor Vehicle Commission, and the State 
Department of Highways and Public Transportation formally renamed the Texas Department of 
Transportation (TxDOT, 2011b). Despite much evidence to the contrary (see Chapters 3, 4, and 
6), benefits in terms of environmental quality, energy efficiency, cost, connectivity, and economic 
development resulting from passenger rail received merely passing consideration from the state 
populace in recent years. Many citizens and politicians have accepted long-distance rail services 
at the national level and local commuter or transit services at the regional-urban area level, but 
see no need to prioritize inter-regional services linking the two systems. This is partially due to 
structural defects. Federally-mandated regional Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) do 
not necessarily create interfacing plans with other MPOs unless there are shared geographic 
boundaries. Limited state support for sub-state entities also challenges inter-regional 
transportation planning such as that required for passenger rail (Zhang et al, 2007). Counties, for 
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example, possess extremely limited power in Texas, whereas municipalities are permitted far 
more control to plan and zone (see Chapter 5). From a state bureaucracy standpoint, not until 
2009 did TxDOT consolidate rail offices and operations in the Division of Rail, bringing TxDOT in 
line with other large state DOTs. TxDOT‘s brief 2005 rail plan recently underwent an update that 
satisfied federal and state requirements, although the plan largely took the form of a statewide 
inventory, given no established vision for the future of rail in Texas up to that point. While the 
bureaucratic rearrangement takes a step in the direction of passenger rail progress, the state still 
lacks a prominent and visionary passenger rail champion in the legislature or elsewhere. What 
the Trans-Texas Corridor lacked in technical acumen and public support, it may have possessed 
in strictly visionary terms. The idea quickly penetrated the federal transportation discourse and 
gained notoriety, even if for its flaws, something that certainly cannot be specifically said about 
passenger rail in the state. Until a knowledgeable and willing individual steps forward in the 
political limelight, the state appears to continue reliance on grassroots advocacy and a biannual 
legislature with other priorities than to promote passenger rail. 
RAIL ADVOCACY 
Even with a large presence throughout the state, rail (both freight and passenger) has 
been largely ignored by state agencies until very recently. Several grassroots rail advocacy 
organizations in the state have continued to promote rail in the face of state government inactivity 
on the topic although they generally do not support a single vision. Of particular note is the Texas 
High Speed Rail and Transportation Corporation (THSRTC). Chaired by Tarrant County 
commissioner Gary Fickes, THSRTC advocates for a rail system that is ―capable of moving 
Texans at speeds in excess of 200 miles per hour‖ (THSRTC, 2010). Involved in the organization 
is a wide variety of elected officials, enthusiasts, economic development representatives, and 
academic personnel, particularly related to the Texas A&M University system. THSRTC actively 
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promotes the conceptual ―Texas T-Bone‖, the rail routing considered in the Chapter 7 corridor 
evaluation. Regional advocacy also exists outside the Texas Triangle region, especially in east 
Texas. Originally founded in 1994, the East Texas Corridor Council (ETCC) now comprises 35 
different municipalities in support of rail improvements in the region. Citing future increases in 
freight and passenger traffic on both roads and rails, inadequate regionally-subsidized air service, 
and slow Amtrak train speeds, the ETCC has pursued and won federal grants to improve the 
existing corridor and its connections from Texarkana and Shreveport to the Dallas/Ft. Worth area, 
incorporating the cities of Longview, Tyler, and Marshall (ETCC, 2010). The awarding of a 
$740,000 federal grant to study higher speed passenger rail service in the corridor is a major 
accomplishment for both the organization and the region. The Texas Rail Advocates (TRA) also 
promote passenger rail in Texas. Established in 2000, TRA more generally encourages 
improvements to both passenger and freight rail in Texas. Dallas businessman Peter LeCody 
chairs the organization following experience working with the I-35 Corridor Advisory Committee, 
the Texas Rail Plan Steering Committee, and the National Association of Rail Passengers. 
Among the more significant achievements of the organization is the hosting of an annual 
Southwestern Rail Conference in Dallas. Through these efforts and others, TRA works toward its 
stated goal of ―…accelerat[ing] Texas‘ economic growth and enhanc[ing] the quality of life 
enjoyed by its people by advancing development of rail service to its full potential as a carrier of 
freight and passengers‖ (TRA, 2010). While not necessarily wielding substantial power in the 
political process, these grassroots rail advocacy organizations continue to instigate fruitful 
discussion about rail improvements in the state of Texas, even if these improvements are 
somewhat minor in the statewide context. With no clear political champion for passenger rail in 




HSR operating above 125 mph necessitates dedicated tracks and unique right-of-way. 
This utilization of land for public good causes anguish for the public, as it fundamentally conflicts 
with a basic American tenet valuing uninhibited ownership of property, specifically land and a 
single-family house on that land. Even if a bit whimsical, the high value that Texans place on such 
land ownership illustrates the reality of such an unwritten doctrine, especially with citizens so 
watchful about land obtained for government purposes (―eminent domain‖). Texas laws protecting 
landowners in cases of eminent domain, which would presumably be used by the state for new 
rail lines, were strengthened in November 2009 in response to the US Supreme Court decision in 
Kelo v. City of New London and on the heels of the Trans-Texas Corridor debacle. The voter 
referendum, overwhelmingly passing with 81% of ―yes‖ votes, prohibited ―the taking of private 
property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic development or to increase 
tax revenues‖ (Texas Secretary of State, 2009), although critics of the measure included 
prominent voices claiming the protections for landowners were still too weak. The measure also 
limited the ability of the legislature to grant eminent domain power unless approved by two-thirds 
in each house. Still, some gray area certainly exists. The same statute permitted use of eminent 
domain for ―the ownership, use, and enjoyment of the property by the State, its political 
subdivisions, the public at large, or by entities granted the power of eminent domain‖, which 
includes TxDOT, transit agencies, and municipalities. Increased mobility from construction of rail 
lines (see Chapter 6) benefits the public at large even if a private firm owns or operates the lines. 
Indeed, several instances in Thomas (2009) note or suggest that the law of eminent domain has 
―evolved from one of eminent domain being for public use to one of eminent domain being for a 
public purpose.‖ Historic deference would also suggest, based on the recent allowance for 
constructing toll roads operated by private foreign firms in Central Texas, that a comparable HSR 
project with a smaller footprint would surpass comparable judicial scrutiny. The only major 
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difference, of course, being the transportation mode. Provided the state inevitably would invoke 
eminent domain in HSR corridor development, the advantage of relatively cheap land somewhat 
limits the project construction costs compared to other populated states. According to 2008 USDA 
data, average Texas farm real estate values amounted to $1,550 per acre, lower than all states in 
the South Census Region except for Oklahoma (USDA, 2009). Compared with farm real estate 
values in other peer states pursuing rail projects, such as California ($6,100), Illinois ($4,530), 
and New York ($2,400), Texas land is quite cheap. Yet, to realize this advantage would require 
significant public support for passenger rail, particularly if built by or benefiting private interests, 
as the eminent domain limitations currently restricting new transportation corridor development 
represent initial public skepticism and wariness toward public land acquisition. This situation 
bolsters the case for using existing right-of-way and/or using marginally productive land on 
property edges alongside existing right-of-way where use of eminent domain is limited to only the 
most pressing circumstances, if for no other reason than to avoid frustrating litigation.  
TEXAS LEGISLATIVE WORK 
Despite fervent grassroots rail organizations, Texas rail needs fail to penetrate the federal 
and state legislative process, as political support is extremely limited. State Senator John Carona 
(R-Dallas) pursued rail work almost singlehandedly in the 81
st
 Texas Legislative Session. With his 
role as the chairman of the Transportation and Homeland Security Committee, his ability to push 
rail legislation was enhanced. Carona‘s authored bills encouraged high-speed rail action through 
planning, tax exemption, and redirection of fuel tax receipts and registration fees. While only a 
single bill (SB 1382, requiring TxDOT to create a statewide passenger rail system plan) was 
signed in to law, Carona displayed an unmatched commitment to Texas rail issues. Carona went 
as far as to propose specifics for a Texas high-speed rail system, including service to the state‘s 
four largest passenger airports and connectivity to the largest military institutions in the state 
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(Texas Legislature, 2008). Based on regional advocacy, his interest in a statewide rail system is 
not unfounded, but fellow legislative support is limited. The biannual legislative arrangement in 
Texas means that issues addressed in each session may change drastically from one session to 
the next as a result of shifts in political winds. In the 2009 groundswell of rail interest, his authored 
bills promoting rail planning progressed in the 81
st
 Legislature. Stark changes in political issues 
between the 81
st
 and the 82
nd
 legislative sessions and Carona‘s reassignment as the chairman of 
the Business and Commerce Committee, however, meant that both the priority and exposure of 
rail issues dropped dramatically in the legislative session. Situations like this could be addressed 
through public lobbying of state politicians on behalf of rail advocacy if a strong voice could be 
mustered accompanying internal agency recommendations. Unfortunately, as seen with the TTC 
debacle, TxDOT generally has a weak concept of public opinion on transportation needs and has, 
until recently, little experience outside of road project implementation. Project public meetings, 
envisioned by NEPA as a method for communities to address and mitigate project impacts, seem 
to summon only the most fervent supporters and opponents, and are a poor method to gauge 
overall state opinion on transportation needs, particularly untested ideas such as intercity 
passenger rail. Texas agencies, as well as state and federal policy makers from the state, would 
be smart to determine constituent support for improvements in non-roadway transportation, 
including intercity passenger rail. This information may allow rail to make a more significant 
venture into the legislative agenda beyond the support of seemingly a single politician for but a 
single legislative session.  
FINANCE AND FUNDING 
Even with greater state vision and political leadership in planning and identifying state-
wide intercity passenger rail potential, straightforward action is difficult with barriers to practical 
implementation. This leads to perhaps the largest issue of all: a funding source. All the previous 
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attempts at intercity passenger rail in Texas have taken a privately funded approach, which 
avoids some political issues. As intercity passenger rail has not seriously been tested in the 
United States (especially at high speeds), it faces some difficulty in finding investors willing to 
undergo such risk, especially with tepid state or federal government support at present. 
Furthermore, no successful intercity passenger rail system worldwide has been constructed 
without government support (Peterman et al, 2009). Even if government support for passenger 
rail did exist, capital costs are high, as pointed out in Chapter 7. 
Transportation funding in general in Texas is in flux at the state government level, 
particularly with the looming $28 billion state budget deficit for 2012-2013 closed in the 82
nd
 
Legislative Session. With state fuel excise taxes providing the dedicated funding source for 
transportation in Texas, legislators approve the budget for transportation separately from the 
larger state budget based on general revenues. The budget borrows Proposition 12 bond funds 
for transportation expenditures. Financing for these bonds is repaid primarily from the general 
fund, which faced the large deficit in the latest budget cycle (Wear, 2011). With the remaining 
bond funds to be spent, the 30-year debt service on those bonds, amounting to $600 million 
every two years, has been effectively pushed beyond the 2013 fiscal year. Illustratively, the 
expenditures on debt will exceed available cash for highway construction for the first time 
(Scharrer, 2011). This fiscal circus shows that even though current finances for TxDOT may 
balance, they are nevertheless a major burden on the overall state budget. With declining fuel 
excise tax revenues as a result of greater fuel efficiency and a reduction in VMT, the state will 
face an urgent transportation funding issue in the near future. Finances for TxDOT will continue to 
tighten, requiring the agency and political leaders to consider new ideas for revenue. Proposals 
for regions within the state to increase taxes and/or fees by local referendum (local option taxes) 
and then dedicate the receipts to transportation projects reached the governor‘s desk in the 80th 
legislative session, but met a swift veto. The state thus faces an uncertain situation for 
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transportation finances, leaving a dim short-term outlook for a relatively massive state rail project 
for Texas similar to those discussed here. 
Transportation improvements in Texas, such as those transit improvements mentioned in 
Chapter 4, appear to achieve the highest public support when local jurisdictions and/or 
municipalities secure funding. Local option taxes, mentioned in Chapter 8, have shown promise in 
Texas. Additionally, Texas enjoys creating a number of special assessment districts for a wide 
range of different purposes. Generally, within a special assessment district, residents approve a 
tax by referendum where a portion of those tax revenues provide funds for a specific purpose, 
perhaps school funding, water treatment facilities, transit services, or economic development 
(HGAC, 2011). This can be used as a tool to attract private investment for a project as well in a 
public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement. Even with emphasis in the United States squarely 
on the PPP approach, much evidence from Europe suggests that these are not without their own 
flaws when financing HSR projects, particularly when plagued with poor demand forecasts, 
unexpected project complexity, or the fundamental discord between emphasis on short-term 
profits in the private sector contrasted with long-term investment and social returns in the public 
sector (Alexandersson and Hultén, 2009). The widespread adoption of the special assessment 
district concept in Texas may provide an excellent approach to establish some public money 
marked specifically for HSR. A complex special assessment district for urban areas in the Texas 
Triangle with rail stops (not necessarily those locations through which track would pass without 
stopping) might garner political support from those urban residents who would be most likely to 
use such a rail system, who would then willingly tax themselves. Revenues could encourage 
private investment, offset maintenance costs, or cover environmental mitigation costs along the 
route. The transit agencies in the state (e.g. DART, METRO, Capital Metro, VIA Transit) have 
demonstrated relative success in generating needed funds with creation of transit districts 
operating through incremental increases in sales taxes voted in by referendum. A special 
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assessment district created similarly may generate revenue that could provide substantial 
financial incentive for private investment, which Texans may support. But, this would require 
legislative guidance through to the governor‘s desk, meaning that legislators would first have to 
understand the potential for HSR in Texas and then display willingness to support it, which, as 
noted here, is not a priority at present. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Present-day issues surrounding HSR nationwide and in Texas demonstrate the familiar 
tight intertwining of transportation and politics. The last five years have provided the most 
substantial action on rail in decades, however, with the enactment of PRIIA, the announcement of 
billions of dollars in HSR and passenger rail grants to states as a part of the 2009 economic 
stimulus act, and the subsequent rejection of funds by newly-elected governors in battleground 
states following the 2010 midterm elections. Unlike many of the more populous states in the 
nation, Texas received relatively little grant money for passenger rail improvement. Still, this 
marked the most action on passenger rail in the state since the Texas TGV project and the 
proposed Trans-Texas Corridor. Generally speaking, passenger rail remains a non-priority from a 
legislative standpoint in Texas. What little work completed in 2009 has since eroded with 
legislative committee reassignments and newly-elected representatives adjusting their political 
priorities. Additionally, the prospect of land acquisition remains a formidable hurdle for 
transportation planners to scale if HSR is to be implemented in Texas. Discussion on rail in Texas 
continues to be fueled by the many advocacy groups throughout the state. Their work, combined 
with a political champion and a comprehensive, original funding scheme, will be required for 
Texas to move forward in passenger rail planning and implementation.   
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Chapter 9: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Quality of life for Texas residents is in flux as the state‘s traditional transportation 
solutions appear to be increasingly temporary. Based on the lack of a broad and transformational 
national transportation vision following the completion of the Interstate Highways System under 
ISTEA, Texas continues to develop an automobile-centric passenger transportation system that, 
with time, may not be appropriate for its needs. The sustained growth in population and economic 
output requires a transportation system that meets the demands to travel both farther and faster. 
Perhaps unique to Texas in volume or scale, most of the transportation challenges such as 
automobile congestion, air quality non-attainment, and increasing energy use have long plagued 
other areas of the nation to some degree, yet pose growing challenges for the state to overcome. 
Given a renewed national interest in passenger rail, trains, particularly those traveling at high 
speeds, have great potential as but one tool to transition the Texas transportation system into a 
more broad system that promotes mobility and connectivity while simultaneously achieving 
measurable reductions in environmental impact, energy use, safety, and land development 
compared to the status quo. This thesis addressed the broad range of initial issues affecting the 
feasibility and ridership of potential HSR in Texas through guidance from other regions of the 
United States and consideration of the state‘s demographics and geographic layout, urban 
connectivity, track alignment issues, social and environmental benefits, and political issues. In 
addition, this thesis addressed the importance of considering different right-of-way alignments of 
proposed corridors in Texas. Texas does not lack in issues facing the potential implementation of 
HSR, but despite these, HSR displays real benefits for the state that can be maximized by 
addressing those issues. 
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TEXAS RAIL IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT 
Current American rail curiosity continues many decades of interest in passenger rail 
improvements, but little implementation. Selected regions of the country, including California, 
Florida, the Midwest, and the Northeast, pursued various forms of passenger rail for many years 
leading to the current plan iterations in those areas. Texas, conversely, for being a relatively 
populous state, has only minimally invested in passenger rail from the state perspective. As a 
result, any renewed action on passenger rail in Texas in the imminent future can rely on the prior 
missteps of other regional plans, as well as the guidance from the curtailed Texas TGV project in 
the mid-1990s. These other projects highlight, among many things, the importance of open 
communication between project entities, whether between agencies, between private consortia 
members, or integrating the private and public sector personnel. The particular personalities 
involved with a project play a major role, for better or worse, and thus point to the importance of 
incorporating individuals with keen leadership from a legislative, departmental, and private firm 
perspective. Though not a national leader from a passenger rail perspective, Texas nevertheless 
greatly benefits from actions of other regions, hopefully enabling a more efficient and focused 
approach than would otherwise occur. 
HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN A TEXAS GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT 
From a geometric and demographic standpoint, Texas fits the profile of well-patronized 
intercity passenger rail service very well. Despite the state‘s large size, the population is primarily 
focused in the eastern one-third of the state. The major urban areas in the state most likely to 
generate demand for rail service conveniently form a triangle. This triangle has two properties 
that strongly enable the popularity of future passenger rail service in the region. First, the region 
forms a prominent megaregion, the Texas Triangle, where the economies of the different urban 
areas are increasingly interwoven and co-dependent, spurring intercity transportation demand 
between those urban areas more pronounced than between urban areas without this economic 
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cohesion. Second, the primary urban areas (Dallas/Fort Worth, Houston, Austin, and San 
Antonio) all lie within a nearly ideal distance of one another for passenger rail services, based on 
experience from Europe and Asia. Trains averaging typical speeds (75-150 mph) over the 
distance between many of these cities and the smaller urban areas could be expected to easily 
capture half the air-rail mode split. The high potential for passenger rail use based on the intrinsic 
geometric layout of the major urban areas in the state cannot be understated. 
POTENTIAL HIGH-SPEED RAIL INTERMODALISM 
However, within many of the urban areas in Texas, the essential transportation 
connections most conducive to passenger rail require attention. Urban connectivity and 
intermodal travel develop concurrently, with rail station accessibility a determining factor in the 
selection of the mode. Current transit services in Texas leave much to be desired, with a low 
modal share in all Texas urban areas and limited service areas. Their use differs substantially 
from the cities connected to passenger rail in foreign countries, indicating that for passenger rail 
to succeed, some degree of urban transit improvement is probably necessary. The integration of 
air and rail transportation provides an excellent opportunity to promote intermodalism. High 
development of air travel in Texas due to hub operations at both Dallas/Fort Worth International 
and Houston Intercontinental Airports includes frequent short intra-Texas flights between cities in 
the Texas Triangle. Passenger rail operations with airport connections present a fourfold 
opportunity to improve mobility by promoting reliability and punctuality compared to personal 
automobiles, enhancing both landside and airside airport capacity, and connecting moderately-
sized cities by eliminating relatively inefficient short-haul flights. Codeshare ticketing with airlines, 
successfully demonstrated in the United States, may make airport intermodal connections with 
passenger rail more intuitive. Despite relatively poor transit connections when compared with 
other major metropolitan areas worldwide, Texas cities nevertheless demonstrate an 
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unharnessed opportunity for passenger rail to interface with a well-developed air transport 
system. 
SPATIAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The guidelines for the geometric arrangement of HSR still face much future development 
in the United States. Additionally, the spatial concerns regarding right-of-way requirements and 
zoning to encourage appropriate land use for HSR present new issues local governments must 
address because HSR itself does not necessarily encourage efficient development. As seen with 
airports, high speed modes can generate high ridership when connected to only automobiles. 
Nevertheless, a once-in-a-generation opportunity to re-define land development guidelines to 
increase sustainable transportation practices lies with HSR. This will require new capabilities for 
cities, urban areas, and even inter-urban regions to plan and zone for particular land uses, lest 
the uninhibited sprawl that defines American land development continue. For HSR to comfortably 
operate at high speeds, curve radii must be quite large – multiple miles at top speeds – which do 
not conform to existing rail lines, or other transportation infrastructure. Because of this, the 
implementation of new HSR services will require land acquisition, introducing a host of issues 
related to the use of eminent domain. Multiple public agencies in Texas may exercise the right of 
eminent domain if necessary, although the vague nature of doing so for a ―public purpose‖ 
remains to be tested in the realm of passenger rail. Only the future will determine the interaction 
between HSR and private property rights. 
EMISSIONS, ENERGY, SAFETY, AND ECONOMICS 
Society stands to gain real environmental benefits from the careful implementation of 
HSR. While many factors influence the energy efficiency of transportation modes, including the 
overall capacity, the load factor, the length of the trip, and the electricity source, at typical load 
factors, HSR outperforms air and automobiles in energy efficiency. Because transportation 
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purposes comprise about 30% of energy use in the United States, of which 96% is petroleum-
based, improvements in energy efficiency in transport mean substantial improvements in 
nationwide energy efficiency and petroleum use. Rail cannot solely create these improvements, 
but can contribute to substantial improvements in intercity travel. Limiting petroleum use will limit 
the emission of greenhouse gases and pollutants that cause respiratory harm. While trains may 
increase energy efficiency, essential reduction in fossil fuel use must occur at the electricity 
source. Currently fossil fuels provide a majority of electricity in Texas, meaning changes in the 
energy source portfolio must occur to realize significant gains in energy efficiency and fossil fuel 
use reduction along with HSR implementation. Other benefits of rail in Texas include increased 
safety, with rail improving on the safety record of the automobile, and the encouragement of land 
development that promotes positive human health. A thorough cost-benefit analysis based on the 
estimated values of these positive and negative externalities provides the basis for selecting 
transportation projects with positive returns exceeding a certain threshold. Such analysis shows 
that, in many cases, the benefits of HSR exceed the costs.  
CORRIDOR EVALUATION 
Many different HSR proposals for Texas over time demonstrate a variety of thought about 
the future of passenger rail in Texas. In order to provide guidance for the implementation of 
passenger rail, six corridors representing various approaches were analyzed using three policy 
options: using entirely new right-of-way, using existing highway right-of-way, or using existing 
tracks. Minimizing the costs of a particular corridor using an optimization procedure based on 
different estimated costs for the three policy options showed the importance of using existing rail 
lines for service. While only a simple exercise, this shows that despite being cheaper than a direct 
routing with new right-of-way, existing right-of-way along highways may not necessarily provide 
the expected cost savings compared to using existing rail lines. However, this simple analysis 
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does not consider the other side of cost-benefit analysis. Train velocity obviously affects travel 
time, and therefore ridership. If existing lines do not permit the speeds necessary to achieve 
substantial ridership, the benefits may not exceed the costs, even if the costs are low. Thus, more 
comprehensive analysis and ridership estimates based on different routing may show another 
optimal routing for a given alignment. 
POLITICAL REALITIES 
Finally, despite a great wealth of information about the factors affecting HSR potential in 
Texas, political issues play a very important and unpredictable role in transportation. Politicians 
act as critical catalysts for many transportation projects. This reflects the necessity of grassroots 
advocacy and public education so that political leadership can be made aware of the value the 
public places on a particular project. National developments and leadership for HSR have taken a 
tumultuous path in the last three years as a result of economic frustration, changes in political 
leadership, and modifications of federal priorities. This volatility reached the state level, where rail 
became a major campaign issue for some. As Texas has historically limited its planning and 
implementation of passenger rail, these events did not affect the state as drastically as others. 
This also reflected the prioritization of other political issues at the Texas state level. The 2009 
legislative session marked a high point for rail legislation in the state, led by State Sen. John 
Carona of Dallas, although the visionary yet flawed Trans-Texas Corridor of some years earlier 
also spurred some political action. Among the more important issues specific to Texas that will 
affect any HSR progress in the future are the challenging eminent domain issues related to 
transportation and the lack of a visible, visionary political champion for passenger rail in the state.  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
Development of transportation in Texas including a future with HSR will require new and 
innovative direction from many different angles. The implementation of a system such as those 
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described herein prompts many new directions that various entities in the state ought to explore. 
The critical areas for future action include arrangements for financing and alignment, as the state 
struggles with a public wary of government-financed rail and corridors that involve land 
acquisition. Recommended in Chapter 5, the use of utility corridors may provide one solution to 
locating rails in rural areas, as these corridors are already somewhat marginal in public minds 
because of the utilities that have already been implemented. The impact of rail in such corridors 
may be less than that of entirely new greenfield corridor development, and should be analyzed for 
feasibility in Texas. From a finance standpoint, the success of special assessment districts for 
various purposes in the state shows that many public improvements with a focused purpose may 
receive support from those who see potential benefits at a local level. The creation of a complex 
special assessment district that would be locally financed by those most likely to use HSR could 
provide a financial dowry that might entice private capital and/or cover environmental mitigation 
costs, operating costs, or maintenance costs. There appears to be no lack of alignment 
suggestions for the state, but an independently-authored ridership analysis for the state would 
provide some much-needed up-to-date data about the costs and benefits of a HSR system in 
Texas. However, by creating such an analysis, the state must be prepared to interface with the 
public to simultaneously educate them on the issues, communicate important facts and figures, 
and mitigate potential impacts. In the short-term, this will require the state to develop a 
comprehensive approach to use various media sources (print and electronic), undertake a 
focused campaign to align itself with local chambers of commerce, and provide state legislators 
with comprehensive information that limits the spread of politically-enhanced misinformation 
about rail. Maybe the most difficult and essential item that the state cannot control, a political 
champion for HSR in the state must emerge to promote the untapped passenger rail opportunity 
that exists. Just as Texas wants to be an economic leader, it too wants to be a transportation 
leader. Yet, it insists on using increasingly inefficient and ineffective capacity improvements to 
 176 
roadways as solutions. To continue its economic and transportation leadership, the state should 
implement the necessary foundation for passenger rail implementation that will allow it to 
capitalize on natural geometric advantages, and then proceed forward with an innovative one-
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